Opinion. Gay, and that the Philadelphia, Wilmington & Baltimore road, finding it disabled upon their track, was guilty of no negligence in restoring it to the Southern Railway, from which it had received it, and in placing it upon the valley track of that company. It was necessary to take the lumber car to the shop where it could be overhauled, its load readjusted, and any injury which it had suffered could be ascertained and repaired. It was the business of the yard crew to remove disabled cars, and this duty involves risks which are incident to that service, and which are assumed by those who undertake to discharge them. It was necessary to remove this car, and, while the decedent may not have known of the precise danger to which he was exposed upon this particular occasion, he did know the general duties required of him, and the perils attendant upon their discharge. In N. & W. Ry. Co. v. Donnelly's Admr., 88 Va. 856, 14 S. E. 693, it is said: "It is well settled that when a servant enters upon an employment he accepts the service subject to the risks that are incident to it. An employee who contracts for the performance of hazardous duties assumes such risks as are incident to their discharge, from causes open and obvious, the dangerous character of which causes he had opportunity to ascertain. If a man chooses to accept employment, or continue in it, with a knowledge of the danger, he must abide the consequences, so far as any claim against his employer is concerned." Robinson's Admr. v. Dininny, 96 Va. 41, 30 S. E. 442; Bertha Zinc Co. v. Martin's Admr., 93 Va. 791, 22 S. E. 869. In Yeaton v. Boston & Lowell R. Corp., 135 Mass. 418, the plaintiff had some experience in railroading; knew how to "brake" and make up cars. He, with others, were in the habit of taking damaged cars and putting them upon what was known as the "Hospital Track." Whenever there had been damaged cars during his employment, his attention was called to it, generally by the yard-master, who usually told the men that the Opinion. cars had been damaged, and that he wanted them put upon such and such a track. The court says: "The plaintiff was forty-five years old, and, with his admitted experience, was thus of sufficient age and intelligence to understand the nature of the risk to which he was exposed by his employment. He knew that broken cars were to be moved and handled in the yard, and he voluntarily undertook and continued in a service which he knew included the moving and handling of them. He was aware of the danger which attends handling broken cars, and sought to guard against it by looking to see if the cars which he was to assist in moving were out of order. Notice was expected to be received in such cases, but he was also in the habit of looking out for himself. It was incident to a service of this description that broken cars might sometimes be put in the wrong place in the yard, and that sufficient notice of defects in them, and of their being put in the wrong place, might not be given. These are omissions of notice in respect to matters of detail, which cannot be given in advance, and which are not like an omission to give instructions to an inexperienced hand as to the general dangers to which his service will expose him." That case illustrates what we have already said--that it is the duty of the master to inform the employee of the nature of the risk and peril to be incurred in the course of his employment, but not as "to a special danger which springs out of a particular fact, which in its details cannot be anticipated." "There was no negligence on the part of the defendant in sending broken cars for repairs to the yard where the plaintiff was at work. This was a proper place for them. There was no negligence in omitting to give notice to the plaintiff that broken. cars were to be sent to this yard for repairs, and that his employment included the duty of handling and moving them. All this he knew already. What he did not know was that this particular car was broken, and that broken cars which were sent Opinion. for repairs might be found in that part of the yard where this car was." Yeaton v. Boston & Lowell R. Corp., supra; Watson v. Railway Company, 58 Tex. 434. We are of opinion that the judgment of the Circuit Court of Alexandria City should be affirmed. Affirmed. Statement. Wytheville. CITY OF NORFOLK V. FLYNN. June 11, 1903. Absent, Cardwell, J. 1. CITY OF NORFOLK-Police Powers-Adulterated Milk.-The police power of the State, so far as necessary to protect the health of the inhabitants of the city of Norfolk, has been delegated to that city, and the city may enact reasonable ordinances to protect its citizens from the sale of impure, adulterated, or diluted milk. 2. CITY OF NORFOLK-Milk Inspection-Ordinances-Extra-Territorial Effect-Tax on Farm Products.-The ordinance of the city of Norfolk which provides for the inspection of milk sold in the city and which requires vendors of milk in the city, whether their dairies are located inside or outside of the city, to register for that purpose, and to pay a registration fee of fifty cents per cow, to cover expenses of the inspection required by the ordinance, is not extra-territorial in its effects. It only touches those who come within the city limits to dispose of their milk. Nor do the provisions of the ordinance violate the Act of Assembly approved March 3, 1896, forbidding any city or town to impose or collect any tax, fine, or other penalty for selling farm or domestic products at other places in the city or town than the regular market houses. The charge made is in no sense a tax, fine, or penalty, but a legitimate fee designed as compensation for service rendered, and to enable the city to bear the expenses of a valid police regulation. Error to a judgment of the Circuit Court of the city of Norfolk, rendered May 12, 1902, reversing a judgment of the Police Justice of said city, imposing a fine on defendant in error for violation of the city ordinance, VOL. CI-60 Reversed. Opinion. The opinion states the case. Walter H. Taylor, for the plaintiff in error. Burroughs & Bro., for the defendant in error. KEITH, P., delivered the opinion of the court. The police justice of the city of Norfolk issued a warrant against Joseph E. Flynn for violation of an ordinance creating the office of milk inspector, defining his duties, and regulating the sale of milk in the city of Norfolk. The police justice entered a judgment against Flynn, from which an appeal was taken to the Circuit Court of the city of Norfolk, where it was reversed, and the case is now before us upon a writ of error to the judgment of that court. The ordinance in question prohibits the sale of impure, diluted, or unwholesome milk, prescribes a test of what constitutes pure milk, creates the office of milk inspector, prescribes his duties, requires him to make frequent inspection and analysis of the milk sold in the city, and directs him to report all violations of the ordinance to the Board of Health. 39 of bas By section 344, c. 43, of the Norfolk City Code, it is provided that "every person who conveys milk in carriages or otherwise for the purpose of selling the same, and those who sell or offer it for sale in a store, booth, stand or market place in the city of Norfolk, shall register annually in the books of said inspector, on the first day of May of each year, or within thirty days thereafter, and be licensed by said inspector to sell milk within the limits of the city for one year. Before said license is granted the applicant shall be required to pay fifty cents per cow, if he keeps cowse and two dollars for each stand or depot, if he has a stand or depot, for the sale of milk. The amount so collected shall be used exclusively for the purpose of paying the salary and expenses of said inspector. And who |