it was made the duty of clerks of courts to cause to be printed and forwarded to the Attorney-General copies of all bills of exceptions and reports of cases in which the Commonwealth was a party or interested.

Under the authority of chapter 345 of the Acts of 1893, the district attorneys within their respective districts now appear for the Commonwealth in the supreme judicial court in the hearing of all questions of law arising in the cases of which they respectively have charge in the superior court. The passage of this act entirely removed, in all cases where it was the duty of the district attorney to appear, the necessity of having the clerks of courts forward to the Attorney-General copies of bills of exceptions, etc., as ordered by chapter 374 of the Acts of 1890.

This act, however, has neither been amended nor repealed, and it still remains the duty of the clerks of courts to send such copies to this department. The mode of procedure, therefore, in cases managed by the district attorneys in both the superior and the supreme judicial courts, is, upon exceptions being taken or a report made, for the clerk of the superior court to forward copies of such exceptions or report to the Attorney-General; the case is entered upon the latter's docket, and, with the copies, is immediately referred back to the district attorney.

I recommend, therefore, that such legislation be adopted, amending chapter 374 of the Acts of 1890, as will enable the clerks of courts to deliver to the district attorneys, without the medium of the Attorney-General, all bills of exceptions and reports of cases where the district attorneys are authorized to represent the Commonwealth in the supreme judicial court.

In compiling my report for the present year, I have omitted to report the cases of this nature now encumbering the docket of this department, for the reason that such a list, if reported, would be incomplete and misleading, and would therefore furnish no information of any value.

CONDUCT OF CAPITAL CASES.

The act transferring the trial of capital cases to the superior court contained a provision that the Attorney-General should appear in the trial of all such indictments. Subsequently, however, by Statutes 1893, chapter 324, the law was amended so

as to require the Attorney-General to appear in capital cases "when the public interest requires." Experience has convinced me that this amendment is not a wise one. It devolves upon the Attorney-General the difficult and sometimes embarrassing duty of determining when the public interest requires him to appear in capital cases, and divides the responsibility of their conduct and disposition. I have no hesitation in saying that these cases should either be wholly entrusted to the district attorneys, or that the Attorney-General should again have the entire charge of them.

There is no sufficient reason why district attorneys may not properly be entrusted with the responsibility of capital cases. I recommend that the law be so amended.

DELAYS IN CRIMINAL CASES.

The declaration of rights asserts that every subject ought to obtain justice" promptly and without delay." As a suitor in its own courts, the Commonwealth should have, at least the same rights that belong to its subjects. Yet, as the law now stands, the moral effect of criminal prosecutions, not only upon the community but upon the criminal as well, is very much impaired by the delays which too often intervene between the crime and its punishment.

The trial of criminal prosecutions by the jury is usually had with reasonable despatch. The delays that are harmful occur after the verdict. If an appeal is taken to the law term of the supreme judicial court, all proceedings in the superior court are suspended until the determination of the question raised by the appeal. The law term, in most of the counties, is held but once a year; and it therefore happens that the imposition of sentence is delayed for many months after the verdict. By that time the circumstances of the crime have so far passed out of the public mind that what should be the salutary effect of the sentence is greatly weakened, if not destroyed. Indeed, in misdemeanors, and especially in liquor cases, a sentence of imprisonment, which, following promptly after the verdict, would have seemed adequate and proper, if imposed after a delay of a year or more often has the appearance of persecution rather than punishment.

The extent of the delays which may occur in criminal cases, and the demoralizing effect of them, may not be fully understood even by those engaged in the practice of law, unless their attention has been especially directed to the matter. They can perhaps be better appreciated by reference to an actual case. A man received a license to sell intoxicating liquors on the first day of May, 1891. In June of the same year he was complained of for violating his license by selling to minors, the penalty for which is imprisonment and forfeiture of his license. He was tried in the police court; and, upon his appeal, the case went to the next term of the superior court, held in November, when he was found guilty by the jury. He took an appeal upon questions of law to the supreme judicial court. His appeal was heard at the annual law term of that court, held in October, 1892; and a rescript was sent down in November of the same year. He was sentenced at the next term of the superior court, held in February, 1893, fifteen months after the jury had found him guilty, and twenty months after the commission of the offence. Meanwhile his license, which he should have forfeited, remained in force until its expiration in May, 1892. The municipal administration which caused his prosecution had come to an end, and even its successor had also gone out of office; so that no one in authority knew anything of the circumstances of his case at the time of sentence. The defendant, at the expiration of his license, had gone into other business, in which he had been engaged for nearly a year when summoned to receive his sentence of imprisonment. It is scarcely necessary to say that the imposition of sentence at a time so remote from the offence was, to say the least, of very doubtful utility to the defendant, or as an example to others. Such a case, though perhaps extreme, is by no means uncommon. It illustrates how the purpose of the administration of criminal law, which is to secure prompt punishment of offences, to the end that the community be encouraged in good works and the commission of crime be deterred, is too often nullified and destroyed by unseemly delays.

The obvious remedy for these evils is to provide that exceptions and appeals shall be promptly heard. This cannot be done under the present arrangements of the law terms of the

supreme judicial court. For ten counties law terms are held but

In addition to the foregoing, a "law term of the court for the Commonwealth" is held at Boston on the first Wednesday of January, at which are heard cases arising in the counties of Suffolk, Middlesex, Norfolk and Barnstable, and also such as may be transferred from other counties. Sessions of this term are held in January, by adjournment in March and November, and occasionally at other times. In the last-named counties, therefore, the hearing of criminal appeals may be delayed from April to November; and in other counties for eleven months.

It is the view, I think, of those of the profession whose opinions are not influenced by local considerations, that the system of holding law terms in so many places throughout the State a system which necessarily delays the administration of justice in civil as well as in criminal cases - should not be perpetuated. It may have been useful at the time of its establishment, when the full bench consisted of but three judges, and when the methods of travel were slow and primitive; but in these days, when it takes less time and costs no more to traverse the State than it once did to go from Worcester to Boston, it is unnecessary. In most of the other States such a system of county terms is no longer in force. No other New England State sends its appellate court travelling over the State from county to county. In New York all law cases are heard at Albany, or in the summer at Saratoga. The supreme court of the United States sits only in Washington.

Indeed, the States where the full bench holds county sessions are rare exceptions to what may be stated as the general rule, not only in this country but elsewhere; to wit, that the court of last resort sits only at the capital, or at the principal centres of population.

It will be asserted, however, that it is for the convenience of defendants and their attorneys that the law terms should be held in the counties where the cases arise. An analysis of the work of the court, however, shows how little real foundation exists for this position, at least so far as the criminal sessions are concerned. I append a statement, kindly furnished me by the chief justice, of the criminal appeals during the last three years, arising in the various counties of the Commonwealth. The statement may not be entirely, though it is substantially,

correct:

Criminal Appeals in Supreme Judicial Court from January 1, 1892, to January 1, 1895.

From this table it appears that in twenty-one law terms of the supreme judicial court held outside of Boston, covering a period of three years, there have been but twenty criminal cases in which parties appeared and were heard, or less than one for each term. It can scarcely be claimed that serious hardship would result from transferring these cases to the term