10. When a teacher proves a contract of employment for a definite time and for a stipulated price and was prevented from fulfilling it by the act of the defendant, and that he was ready, able and willing to complete it, he is entitled prima facie, to recover the entire sum contracted to be paid, and if the defendant can mitigate the damages by showing that the plaintiff had employment or could have obtained it by reasonable diligence during the whole or any portion of the time, the burden is upon them to prove such fact. School Directors v. Crews, 23A-367.

11. Where a teacher enters into an agreement with a board of directors to teach for a certain time provided he gave satisfaction, it is held, that the special condition in the contract was intended, and had the effect, to reserve to the directors the exclusive right to determine what was required to give satisfaction and whether it was, in fact, given by the teacher, limited only by the obligation to do it in good faith and not from mere passion, prejudice or caprice. School Directors v. Ewington, 26A-379.

12. Where a teacher enters into an agreement to teach, the continuation of which is at the option of the directors, the directors, acting in good faith, may dispense with the services of such teacher, whenever they see fit to do so, and are under no legal obligation to state any cause for their action. When an employer reserves the right to terminate a contract of employment at his option, and exercise that right, he has done only what the employe expressly agreed that he might do. Olney School District v. Christy, 81A-304. 13. Where no services are performed under a contract of hiring, the true rule is that the action must be for a breach of the contract, and the measure of recovery would be the wages to be paid, less any sum actually earned, or which might have been earned by the exercise of reasonable diligence in seeking other similar employment. Brown v. Board of Education, 29Ö572.

14. The measure of recovery where the teacher has not been allowed to enter upon the performance of the contract, in a suit for a breach of the contract, is the wages agreed to be paid by the contract, and the burden, in such cases, of showing what the plaintiff did earn, or could by diligence have earned in other similar employment, is thrown upon the directors. The directors may reduce the recovery made out by the teacher's prima facie case, by proof showing what the teacher did earn, or could have earned, by the exercise of reasonable diligence in seeking other similar employment. Ibid; School Directors v. Kimmel, 31A-537; School District v. Stilley, 36A-133; School Directors v. Orr, 88A-648.

Fourth-They shall have power to assign pupils to the several schools in the district; to admit non-residents when it can be done without prejudice to the rights of resident pupils, to fix rates of tuition; collect and pay the same to the township treasurer for the use of said district.

Fifth-They may suspend or expel pupils who may be guilty of gross disobedience or misconduct, and no action shall lie against them for such expulsion or suspension.

15. The common schools are provided and maintained by taxation, their benefits are rightly to be enjoyed by all, and one who is improperly excluded sustains an injury which the law will redress. But the enjoyment of the right thus furnished by the State at public expense is necessarily conditioned upon that degree of good conduct on the part of each that is indispensable to the comfort and progress of others. Board of Education v. Helston, 32A-300. 16. As in all other forms of social life, the individual must surrender a certain measure of his natural independence and submit to be governed by those rules which have been found necessary; and very much as in the family, there is absolute necessity for strict obedience to all reasonable requirements of those who are in authority. The ordinary laws of decency and propriety in conduct and in speech cannot be disregarded, and when broken there must be prompt and effectual punishment, otherwise the great objects of the school will fail of accomplishment. Ibid.

17. Every pupil, when called upon by the superintendent or the board, should, as a matter of duty and loyalty to what is essential for the common welfare, freely state anything within his knowledge not self-criminating, that will assist in bringing the offender to justice and thereby tend to the repression of all offenses. If he refuses to do this he is guilty of disobedience, for which reasonable punishment may be inflicted. By the provisions of the school law, the board of directors may suspend or expel a pupil for misconduct, but this suspension or expulsion would not be construed to continue beyond the current school year. Ibid.

18. Boards of directors have the power of suspension or expulsion, and they may exercise that power as a means of discipline for the causes mentioned in the statute. The suspension or expulsion of a pupil from the benefits and privileges of the school for what is considered incorrigibly bad conduct, implies deliberation and decision on the part of the directors, or, as it is some times expressed, they act judicially, in a matter involving discretion in relation to the duties of their office. In such cases the law seems to be well settled, that there can be no action maintained against school officers where they act without malice. McCormick v. Burt, 95-263.

Sixth-They may provide that children under twelve (12) years of age shall not be confined in school more than four hours daily.

Seventh-They may appropriate, for the purchase of libraries and apparatus, any school funds remaining after all necessary school expenses are paid.

19. The authority given to school directors by the statute to appropriate to the purchase of libraries and apparatus any surplus funds, after all necessary school expenses are paid, would seem to be a limitation of the power to make purchases of this kind to the circumstances named, and to be an implied denial of any power to purchase generally on credit. Clark v. School Directors 78-474; Folsom v. School Directors, 91-402.

20. It is manifest from this provision, that neither is the power directly given, nor does it result by necessary implication, to directors to create a debt, chargeable upon the district, for apparatus and to issue orders on the treasurer, payable at a future day, therefor. It would be a most dangerous power to the interest of the taxpayers, and, in corrupt or incompetent hands, would be liable to great abuse, for, if the debt may be thus created, there is no limitation upon the amount, or the rate of interest it might be required to bear. The whole policy of the school law is repugnant to the existence of the power. Newell v. School Directors, 68-514.

Eighth-When any school district owns any personal property not needed for school purposes, the directors of such district may sell such property at public or private sale, as in their judgment will be for the best interests of the district, and the proceeds of such sale shall be paid over to the treasurer of such district, for the benefit of said school district.

Ninth They may grant special holidays whenever in their judgment such action is advisable: Provided, no teacher shall be required to make up the time lost by the granting of such holidays.

Tenth-They shall have the control and supervision of all school houses in their district, and may grant the temporary use of school houses when not occupied by schools, for religious meetings and Sunday schools, for evening schools and literary societies, and for such other meetings as the directors may deem proper.

21. Directors of common schools have no power to burden the people with debt, or to levy taxes, by the machinery of the law, to purchase ground and erect large and costly buildings, and then donate them to private use or gain. Sherlock v. Village of Winnetka, 68-530.

22. The clause that provides that school directors may grant the temporary use of school houses, when not occupied by schools, for religious meetings, for evening schools and literary societies, and for such other meetings as the directors may deem proper, is not repugnant to section 3, article 8 of the Constitution, that forbids any public corporation from making any grant or donation of land, money or other personal property to any church or for any sectarian purpose. Nichols v. School Directors, 93-61.

Eleventh-They shall have power to decide when the school house site, or the school buildings have become unnecessary, or unsuitable, or inconvenient for a school.

23. This clause confers a power to be exercised when changed conditions have rendered a site once chosen by the voters unsuitable or inconvenient in the opinion of the board, and the power given in such case is to take the initiative for the choice of another site by calling an election and submitting the question to the voters. A change in the center of population, or other conditions, may occur, and the language of the statute implies some such change in condition which will authorize action by the board, and not a refusal to carry out the will of the voters. Kiehna v. Mansker, 178-15; Kiehna v. Mansker, 77A-508, reversed.

24. The supervision and control of school houses is expressly vested in the directors. When one director assumes exclusive individual control of the school house of the district, and is engaged in raising it from the foundation, with the intention of removing it from its site, the restraining power of the court may be invoked by the other directors, as this is a clear interference with the right given the board of directors to its control. It is true that the trustees of schools are vested with the title, care and custody, but it is the control of the school house that is here involved, and that is vested in the directors. Ruble v. School District, 42A-483.

Twelfth-They may borrow money, and issue bonds therefor, for building school houses, purchasing sites, repairing and improving school houses, in the way and manner provided for by article 9 of

this act.

§ 28. The school directors shall draw no order or warrant payable on demand upon the township treasurer or against any fund in his hands, unless at the time of drawing such order or warrant there are sufficient funds in his hands to pay the amount of the same: Provided, this section shall not apply to orders issued to teachers for their wages.

1. An order is void unless issued when there is money in the treasury applicable to its payment. Board of Education v. Foley, 88A-470.

§ 29. Whenever there is no money in the treasury of any school district to meet and defray the ordinary and necessary expenses thereof, it shall be lawful for the board of directors to provide that orders or warrants may be drawn and issued against and in anticipation of the collection of any taxes already levied by said directors for the payment of the ordinary and necessary expenses of any such district, to the extent of 75 per centum of the total amount of said tax levy: Provided, that warrants drawn and issued under the provisions of this section shall show upon their face that they are payable solely from said taxes when collected, and not otherwise, and such warrants shall be received by any collector of taxes in payment of the taxes against which they are issued. and which taxes against which said warrants or orders are drawn shall be set apart and held for their payment.

§ 30. The school directors shall be liable as directors for the balance due teachers, and for all debts legally contracted..

§ 31, It shall not be lawful for a board of directors to purchase or locate a school house site, or to purchase, build or move a school house, or to levy a tax to extend schools beyond nine months without a vote of the people at an election called and conducted as required by section 4 of article 9 of this act. A majority of the votes cast shall be necessary to authorize the directors to act; Provided, that if no one locality shall receive a majority of all the votes cast at such election, the directors may, if in their judgment the public interest requires it, proceed to select a suitable school house site; and the site so chosen by them shall, in such case, be legal and valid, the same as if it had been determined by a majority of the votes cast; and the site so selected by either of the methods above provided shall be the school house site for such district; and said district shall have the right to take the same for the purpose of a school house site either with or without the owner's consent, by condemnation or otherwise.

1. It is not lawful for a board of directors to purchase or locate a school house site, or to purchase, build or move a school house or to levy a tax in order to extend schools beyond nine months in the year, without a vote of the people at an election called and conducted as required by law. Shires ▼. Irwin, 87A-111.201

2. This section prohibits the location of a site, without a selection being made by a majority vote at an election duly held. If, at such election, called and held for the purpose of fixing a site, no locality receives a majority of the votes cast, then, and in that event only, is a discretionary power to act granted to the board. School Directors v. Wright, 43A-270.

3. Where a majority of the legal voters, at an election held, did select a school house site, thus precluding the adoption of any other method by the directors, the money collected, and the materials bought to build a school house must be used in the construction of it upon the site legally fixed at said election, and not elsewhere. Ibid.

4. Where directors disregard the provisions of this section, and without lawful power or authority select a site, and admit they will expend the money collected, and use the materials bought, in erecting a school house on the site by said board illegally selected, an injunction may be properly granted to prevent such unlawful expenditure of public funds. Ibid.

5. Section 31, article 5 of the general school law, concerning the submission to the electors of the question of building a school house, does not require that the cost of such building be voted upon. People v. Chicago & Northwestern Railway Company, 186-139.

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6. School directors cannot annul an election changing a school site, repu diate the site chosen and call an election to vote on the question of building a new school house on the old site, discarded at a previous election, merely because the new site is some distance from a highway. Kiehna v. Mansker, 178-15; Kiehna v. Mansker, 77A-508, reversed; School Directors v. The People, 90A-670.

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7. School directors have power to lease a suitable room or rooms for establishing a school without submitting the question to the electors, and they are not discharged from their duty in that regard by a failure of proposition to build a school house, at an election held for that purpose. School Directors v. The People, 186-331.

8, The selection of a site is not invalid because the clerk of the election did not describe it by metes and bounds, but only by general reference. It is

not material to the validity of the selection that the clerk of the election should describe the place chosen with precision, in entering upon the records the fact that the voters made choice of a site. Merritt v. Ferris, 22-303.

9. Under this provision it is not within the power of the directors to contract for the building of a school house, without having received authority to do so by a vote of the people of the district as provided by law. The fact that the building may have been constructed, accepted by the directors and used for school purposes, would not legalize the act or bind the tax-payers. School Directors v. Fogleman, 76-189; Watts v. McCleave, 16A-272.

10. An order issued on account of the building of a school house, which is paid by the school treasurer out of general funds, will not support a subsequent tax levy for building purposes made to replace the amount so paid, particularly where an amount sufficient to pay the entire cost of the building has already been raised by such a tax. O'Day v. The People, 171–293.

11. Where an election is held and results in favor of building a school house, and in the location thereof, and at a subsequent election the proposition to borrow money for building purposes is defeated, this subsequent election cannot be construed to affect, change or abrogate the vote to build a school house and locate the site. The people might be willing to bear the burden of an annual tax levied for building purposes, and yet be unwilling to borrow money and issue bonds as evidence of such indebtedness. Pennington v. Coe, 57-118.

12. Directors have the right to levy a special tax for school purposes without a vote of the people, and a special tax for building purposes, with the consent of the legal voters; but they exceed their power when they attempt to appropriate the funds raised for one object for a different purpose. lbid. 13. Where the public square of a village is held in trust for the public use, it cannot be appropriated to any other use inconsistent with or destructive with the first, that the building of a school house on the public square of a village, whether such square be left open for public travel across it, or inclosed or used as a park, would be inconsistent with the original use, cannot be doubted. Davis v. Nichols, 39A-610.

14. Where it is the intention of the majority of the directors by the notice given, to submit to the voters the proposition to build a new school house as well as to change the site and borrow money, and where the returns of the election made by the directors to the school treasurer, only showed that two propositions were submitted to be voted on, and that the building of a new school house was not one of them, such omission would not invalidate the election, if it was properly held, and the questions involved were fairly submitted to the voters. Shires v. Irwin, 87A-111.

§ 32. In case the compensation to be paid for the school house site mentioned in the preceding section cannot for any reason be agreed upon or determined between the school directors and the parties interested in the land taken for such site, then it shall be the duty of the directors of such district to proceed to have such compensation determined in the manner which may be at the time provided by law for the exercise of the right of eminent domain: Provided, that no tract of land lying outside of the limits of any incorporated city or village, and lying within forty rods of the dwelling house of the owner of the land, shall be taken for a school site without the owner's consent.

1. The trustees of schools, and not the school directors, are the proper parties to petition for the condemnation of land for a school site. A condemnation judgment vesting title in the school directors upon their petition is without authority of law. Banks v. School Directors, 194-247.

2. If a man sells land for a school house site, which is wholly surrounded by his own land, the purchasers are entitled to a right-of-way over the other's ground to arrive at their own land. The way is a necessary incident to the