board aforesaid, or those of them voting for such requisition or order aforesaid, and not the said township treasurer, shall be liable, jointly and severally, to the the inhabitants of the township for all such damages to be recovered by an action of assumpsit in a suit brought in the official name of the county superintendent of schools for the use of the proper township: Provided, said treasurer shall be liable for any loss not collected by reason of the insolvency of said trustees.

§ 5. When a township treasurer shall resign or be removed, and at the expiration of his term of office, he shall pay over to his successor in office, when appointed, all money on hand, and deliver over all books, notes, bonds, mortgages and all other securities for money and all papers and documents of every description in which the corporation has any interest whatever; and in case of the death of the township treasurer, his securities and legal representatives shall be bound to comply with the requisitions of this section so far as the said securities and legal representatives may have the power so to do. And for any failure to comply with the requisitions of this section, the person neglecting or refusing shall be liable to a penalty of not less than ten nor more than one hundred dollars, at the discretion of the court before which judgment may be obtained, to be recovered in an action of debt before any justice of the peace, for the benefit of the school fund of such township: Provided, that the obtaining or payment of such judgment shall in no wise discharge or diminish the obligations of the persons signing the official bond of such township treasurer.

§ 6. If any county superintendent, trustee of school, township treasurer, director or any other person entrusted with the care, control, management or disposition of any school, college, seminary or township fund for the use of any county, township, district or school, shall convert such funds, or any part thereof, to his own use, he shall be liable to indictment; and upon conviction thereof, shall be fined in any sum not less than double the amount of money converted to his own use, and imprisoned in the county jail not less than one nor more than twelve months, at the discretion of the court.

§ 7. Trustees of schools shall be liable, jointly and severally, for the sufficiency of securities taken from township treasurers; and in case of judgment against any treasurer and his securities for or on account of any default of such treasurer on which the money shall not be made for want of sufficient property whereon to levy execution, action on the case may be maintained against said trustees, jointly and severally, and the amount not collected on said judgment shall be recovered with costs of suit from such trustees: Provided, that if said trustees can show, satisfactorily, that the security taken from the treasurer, as aforesaid was, at the time of said taking, good and sufficient, they shall not be liable as aforesaid.

§ 8. The real estate of county superintendents, of township treasurers, and all other school officers, and of the securities of each of them, shall be bound for the satisfaction and payment of all claims and demands against said superintendents and treasurers, and other school officers as such from the date of issuing process against them,

in actions or suits brought to recover such claims or demands until satisfaction thereof be obtained; and no sale or alienation of real estate, by any superintendent, treasurer or other officer or security aforesaid, shall defeat the lien created by this section, but all and singular such real estate held, owned or claimed, as aforesaid, shall be liable to be sold in satisfaction of any judgment which may be obtained in such actions or suits.

1. This section provides that the real estate of the securities of school officers, in case of default, shall be bound from the date of the issuing of the process, and that no alienation of the estate after process issued shall operate to defeat the lien created thereby. There is no provision that it shall require the service of the process or the rendition of a judgment to create the lien. The lien, therefore, attaches, if judgment shall thereafter be rendered, from the date of the issuing of the process, without reference to the time when it was served. Snyder v. Spaulding, 57-480.

§ 9. Trustees of schools, or either of them, failing or refusing to make returns of children in their township according to the provisions of this act, or if either of them shall knowingly make a false return, the party so offending shall be liable to a penalty of not less than ten (10) dollars nor more than one hundred (100) dollars, to be recovered by an action of assumpsit before any justice of the peace of the county; which penalty, when collected, shall be added to the township school fund of the township in which said trustees reside. 1. The word information means complaint in the connection that it is used in such actions. The context shows that other penalties, imposed by the same section, may be collected in an action of assumpsit before a justice of the peace. Whether the action is debt or assumpsit is immaterial. It is sufficient that it is in the name of the People, on the information or complaint of any citizen aggrieved. Newton v. The People, 72–507.

10. If any county superintendent, director, or trustee, or either of them, or other officer whose duty it is, shall negligently or wilfully fail or refuse to make, furnish or communicate the statistics and information, or shall fail to discharge the duties enjoined upon them, or either of them, at the time and in the manner required by the provisions of this act, such delinquent or party offending shall be liable to a fine of not less than twenty-five (25) dollars, to be recovered before any justice of the peace at the suit of any person, or information in the name of the People of the State of Illinois, and when collected, the said fine shall be paid to the county superintendent of the proper county for the use of the school fund.

§ 11. County superintendents, trustees of schools, directors and township treasurers, or either of them, or any other officer having charge of school funds or property, shall be pecuniarily responsible for all losses sustained by any county, township or school fund, by reason of any failure on his or their part to perform the duties required of him or them by the provisions of this act: or by any rule or regulation authorized to be made by the provisions of this act; and each and every one of the officers aforesaid shall be liable for any such loss sustained as aforesaid, and the amount of such loss may be recovered in a civil action brought in any court having jurisdiction thereof, at the suit of the State of Illinois, for the use of the county,

township or fund injured; the amount of the judgment obtained in such suit shall, when collected, be paid to the proper officer for the benefit of the said county, township or fund injured.

1. If school officers have squandered school funds, or appropriated the same to a purpose not authorized by law, in consequence of which a loss has occurred, proper relief may be had under this section of the statute. A court of equity has no jurisdiction. Moore v. Fessenbeck, 88-422.

2. If school directors appropriate school funds under their control to a purpose not authorized by law, in consequence of which a loss occurs to the district, adequate relief may be had under this section of the statute. If the directors have squandered the funds of the district, or appropriated them to purposes not authorized by law, and in consequence thereof the taxpayers have been injured, they have a remedy at law, Wahl v. School Directors, 78A-403.

3. Where two directors, without notifying the other director, cause a well to be dug and walled on the school house lot of the district, where the well is a necessity, although the record of the proceedings of the board of directors shows that the well was not ordered and paid for out of the funds of the district, at any regular or special meeting held by the directors or any two of them, it is held, that such proceedings do not cause the funds of the district to sustain such loss as would render the directors liable under this section. Rea v. The People, 84A-504.

4. It is true that the business of the school districts in this State should be transacted by its board of directors in the manner pointed out by the statute, and that the directors in this case ought to have contracted and paid for the well in question at some regular or special meeting, and caused a record to be made of their actions, and that the third director should have been notified of the proposed action of the other two so that he could have had an opportunity to participate therein, yet the court cannot say that the directors, by having the well dug and paying for the same in the manner shown, have occasioned such a loss to the funds of the district as is intended to be provided against by this section. lbid.

5. The court does not decide however, that school directors in this State and other officers named in the statute, are justified in expending the school funds in their charge in any other manner than that prescribed by the statute, but as deciding only that the pecuniary liabilities of directors and the other officers named in this section is limited by the terms thereof, to losses sustained by such fund, by reason of the failure of directors and other officers named, to perform the duties required of them by the provisions of the act of which it is a part. Ibid.

6. In order that school officers shall be pecuniarily responsible, under section 11, article 15 of the general school law, for failure to perform duties required by the statute, there must be a loss by the school fund, resulting from such omission of duty. People v. Rea, 185-633; Rea v. The People, 84A-504, affirmed.

7. School directors are not personally liable for a reasonable sum of money expended by them for necessary water supply for the school, even though they have proceeded illegally in acting without an order of the board of directors adopted at any meeting, since the school fund has in that case sustained no loss within the meaning of the statute, the transaction being one which might have been originally authorized or subsequently ratified at a board meeting. lbid.

§ 12. No county, city, town, township, school district or other public corporation shall ever make any appropriation, or pay from any school fund whatever, anything in aid of any church or sectarian purpose, or to help support or sustain and school, academy, seminary, college, university or other literary or scientific institution controlled by any church or sectarian denomination whatever; nor shall any grant or donation of money, or other personal property, ever be made

by any such corporation to any church or for any sectarian purpose; and any officer or other person having under his charge or direction school funds or property, who shall pervert the same in the manner forbidden in this section, shall be liable to indictment, and upon conviction thereof, shall be fined in a sum not less than double the value of the property so perverted, and imprisoned in the county jail not less than one (1) nor more than twelve (12) months at the discretion of the court.

1. The paying of rent to a church organization for the use of a room for school purposes is not such an appropriation, or aid to the church, as comes within the prohibition of our Constitution. Religious organizations are not under such legal bans that they may not deal at arm's length with the public in selling or leasing their property, when required for public use, in good faith, receiving therefor but a fair and reasonable compensation. The public in such case receives the full benefit of its contract, and the funds paid are not a gift, appropriation or aid to the church, nor paid for any sectarian purpose. Millard v. Board of Education, 19A-48; Millard v. Board of

Education, 121-297.

2. The free schools are institutions provided where all children of the State may receive a good common school education. The schools have not been established to aid any sectarian denomination, or assist in disseminating any sectarian doctrine and no board of education or school directors have any authority to use the public funds for such a purpose. Millard v. Board of Education, 121-297.

3. If the district where a school has been maintained has no school house, and it becomes necessary for the board of education to procure a building to be used for school purposes, they have the right to rent of any person who has property suitable for school purposes. The owner of the property may be some religious denomination. It is not material that the building has been used as a church. Ibid.

§13. No teacher, State, county, township or district school officer shall be interested in the sale, proceeds or profits of any book, apparatus or furniture used, or to be used in any school in this State with which such officer or teacher may be connected; and for offending against the provisions of this section such teacher, State, county, township or district school officer shall be liable to indictment, and upon conviction shall be fined in the sum not less than twenty-five (25) dollars nor more than five hundred (500) dollars, and may be imprisoned in the county jail not less than one (1) month nor more than twelve (12) months, at the discretion of the court.

§ 14. Any school officer or officers, or any other person, who shall exclude or aid in the exclusion from the public schools, of any child who is entitled to the benefits of such school, on account of such child's color, shall be fined, upon conviction, in any sum not less than five (5) dollars nor more than one hundred (100) dollars each, for every such offense.

ARTICLE XVI.

MISCELLANEOUS.

SECTION 1. No justice of the peace, constable, clerk of any court, sheriff or coroner shall charge any costs in any suit where any school officer, school corporation or any agent of any school fund, suing for

the recovery of the same, or any interest due thereon, is plaintiff and shall be unsuccessful in such suit; nor where the costs can not be recovered from the defendant by reason of the insolvency of such defendant.

1. Where an action of debt is instituted in the circuit court by the trustees of schools on the official bond of a township treasurer, and where the issues are found for the defendant, no judgment for costs should be entered against the trustees of schools. Under the statute there can be no costs adjudged against the trustees of schools where they prosecute in their official capacity. Cassady v. Trustees of Schools, 94-589.

2. These provisions embrace every case in which action can be brought on official bonds, for matters affecting the interests of the public, and they expressly exempt the plaintiffs in such actions from the payment of costs, in the event they are unsuccessful. If they are not compelled to pay costs, the legislature certainly never intended them to give security for their payment. Trustees of Schools v. Walters, 12-154; Trustees of Schools v. Stokes, 3A-267; Board of Education ▼. Helston, 32A-300; Board of Education v. Trustees of Schools, 74A-401; Trustees of Schools v. Hihler, 85-409; People v. Wiltshire, 92-260; Board of Education v. Trustees of Schools, 174-510.

§ 2. Any woman, married or single, of the age of twenty-one years and upwards, and possessing the qualifications prescribed for the office, shall be elegible to any office under the general or special school laws of this State.

§3. Any women elected or appointed to any office under the provisions of this act, before she enters upon the discharge of the duties of the office, shall qualify and give the bond required by law (if bond is required), and such bond shall be binding upon her and her securities.

§ 4. All boards of school directors, boards of education or school officers, whose duty it now is, or may be hereafter to provide, in their respective jurisdictions, schools for the education of all children between the ages of six and twenty-one years, are prohibited from the excluding, directly or indirectly, any such child from such school on account of the color of such child.

1. No child entitled to attend a certain public school can be excluded therefrom, directly or indirectly, by school officers, on account of its being colored. People v. Board of Education, 101-308; People v. Board of Education, 127-613.

2. No child otherwise entitled to attend a certain public school can be excluded therefrom, directly or indirectly, by school officers or public authorities on account of his being colored. People v. Mayor of Alton, 179-615.

3. Where a board of education, created by a municipal corporation, unlawfully excludes colored children from a public school, with the consent and approval of the city authorities and under a well understood plan to separate white and colored children in the public schools, mandamus will lie against the city authorities to compel the admission of such children. Ibid.

4. Under the law no school district has the right to establish different schools for white children and colored children of said district, and to exclude the colored children from the schools established for white children, even though the schools established for colored children furnish educational facilities equal or superior to those of the schools established for white childPeople v. Mayor of Alton, 193-309; People v. McFall, 26A-319.

ren.

5. Exclusion, without reason, of colored children from the schools to which their standing and residence would entitle them to admission if they were white children, amounts, in law, to discrimination against them on account of color.

Ibid.