of Wales had been carefully 77 furnished 78 with everything that an infant could require. One of the attendants 79 presented 80 to the queen the key of a superb 81 casket 82 which stood in her apartment.83 She opened the casket, and found in it six thousand pistoles. On the following day James arrived at St. Germains. Louis was already there to welcome 84 him. The unfortunate exile 85 bowed 86 so low 87 that it seemed as if he was about to embrace the knees of his protector. Louis raised 88 him, and embraced him with brotherly tenderness. The two kings then entered the queen's room. Here is a gentleman," said Louis to Mary, whom you will be glad 9 to see." Then, after entreating 90 his guests to visit him next day at Versailles, and to let him have the pleasure of showing them his buildings, pictures, and plantations 91, took the unceremonious 92 leave of an old friend. 89 In a few hours the royal pair were informed 93, that as long as they would do 94 the king the favour to accept of95 his hospitality 96, forty-five thousand pounds sterling a-year would be paid them from 97 his treasury. 98 Ten thousand pounds sterling were sent for outfit.99 The liberality 100 of Louis, however, was much less rare and admirable than the exquisite 101 delicacy 102 with which he laboured 103 to soothe 104 the feelings of his guests, and to lighten the almost intolerable 105 weight of the obligations 106 which he laid upon 107 them. He who had hitherto 108, on 109 all questions of 110 precedence111, been sensitive 112, litigious 113, sorgfältig. 78 verzieren. 82 Kästchen. 77 79 89 80 86 fich) 90 ersuchen. Hofdiener. 'einhändigen. 81 prächtig. 83 Gemach, n. 84 bewillkommen. 85 Verbannt. 88 aufheben. express by gern. Pflanzung. say, without ceremony-leave, ohne Umstånde, Ab= benachrichtigen. erzeigen. 95 annehmen. 93 92 verneigen. 87 tief. 91 schied. schaft. Possessive. bemühen. 107 97 aus. 94 101 98 Schatkammer, f. Einrichtung, with the Pron. ausnehmend. Zartheit. sich 105 unerträglich. 100 Freigebigkeit. auflegen, with Dat. 108 bisher. 111 Vortritt, with Def. Article. 106 Verpflichtung. 110 in Rücksicht auf. 109 bei. insolent 114, who had been more than once ready 115 to plunge Europe into war rather than concede 116 the most frivolous 117 point of etiquette 118, was now punctilious 119, indeed 120, but punctilious for 121 his unfortunate friends against himself. He gave orders that Mary should receive all the marks 122 of respect that had ever been paid 123 to his own deceased 124 wife. 125 A question was raised, whether the princes of126 the house of Bourbon were entitled 127 to be indulged with 128 chairs in the presence of the queen. Such trifles 129 were There serious matters 130 at131 the old court of France. were 132 precedents 133 on 134 both sides; but Louis decided the point against his own blood. Some ladies of illustrious 135 rank omitted the ceremony 136 of kissing the hem137 of Mary's robe.138 Louis remarked the omission, and noticed it in 139 such a voice and with such a look that the whole peerage 140 was ever after ready to kiss her shoe.141 When Esther, just written by Racine, was acted 142 at Saint Cyr, Mary had the seat of honour.143 James was at her right hand. Louis modestly placed himself on her left. Nay, he was well pleased 144, that, in his own palace, an outcast 145 living on 146 his bounty 147 should assume 148 the title of149 king of France, quarter 150 the lilies 151 with the English lions, and should, as king of France, dress 152 in violet 153 on days of court mourning,154 History of England. Macaulay's 127 ein Recht haben, and use Subj. 130 136 131 117 unbedeutend. 121 zum Vortheil. 125 Gattin. 126 6 aus. 128 say, to receive. 129 Kleinigkeit. 134 für. 139 mit. Sache, f. an. 132 es findet sich. 133 früheres Beispiel. Förmlichkeit. 137 Saum, m. 138 Gewand, n. 141 Schuh, m. 142 aufführen. 143 Ehrenfig. 144 es wohl 135 höchst. 140 Adel, m. zufrieden sein. thätigkeit. 151 Lilie, f. 145 15 Verwiesen, treated as Sub. 148 sich anmaßen. 154 146 Don. 147 Mild 150 im Wappen führen. Hoftrauer, f. XXXV. SIR ROBERT WALPOLE'S REPLY TO SIR JOHN ST. AUBIN'S SPEECH FOR REPEALING THE SEPTENNIAL Аст. MR. Chancellor of the Exchequer,-Though the question has been already so fully opposed, that there is no great occasion to say anything farther against it, yet I hope the house will indulge me in the liberty of giving some of those reasons which induce me to be against the motion. In general I must take notice, that the nature of our constitution seems to be very much mistaken by the gentlemen who have spoken in favour of this motion. It is certain that ours is a mixed government, and the perfection of our constitution consists in this, that the monarchical, aristocratical, and democratical forms of government are mixed and interwoven in ours, so as to give us all the advantages of each, without subjecting us to the dangers and inconveniences of either. The democratical form of government, which is the only one I have now occasion to take notice of, is liable to these inconveniences: that they are generally too tedious in their coming to any resolution, and seldom brisk and expeditious enough in carrying their resolutions into execution: that they are always wavering in their resolutions, and never steady in any of the measures they resolve to pursue; and that they are often involved in factions, seditions, and insurrections, which expose them to be made the tools, if not the prey, of their neighbours; therefore, in all the regulations we make, with respect to our constitution, we are to guard against running too much into that form of government which is properly called democratical; this was, in my opinion, the effect of the triennial law, and will again be the effect if ever it should be restored. That triennial elections would make our government too tedious in their resolves, is evident; because, in such case, T no prudent administration would ever resolve upon any measure of consequence, till they had felt not only the pulse of the Parliament, but the pulse of the people; and the ministers of state would always labour under this disadvantage, that as secrets of state must not be immediately divulged, their enemies (and enemies they will always have) would have a handle for exposing their measures, and rendering them disagreeable to the people, and thereby carrying perhaps a new election against them, before they could have an opportunity of justifying their measures, by divulging those facts and circumstances, from whence the justice and wisdom of their measures would clearly appear. Then, Sir, it is by experience well known, that what is called the populace of the country, are apt to be too much elated with success, and too much dejected with every misfortune; this makes them wavering in their opinions about affairs of state, and never long of the same mind: and as this house is chosen by the free and unbiassed voice of the public in general, if this choice were so often renewed, we might expect, that this house would be as wavering and as unsteady as the people usually are: and it being impossible to carry on the public affairs of the nation, without the concurrence of this house, the ministers would always be obliged to comply, and consequently would be obliged to change their measures as often as the people changed their minds. With septennial Parliaments, Sir, we are not exposed to either of these misfortunes, because, if the ministers, after having felt the pulse of the Parliament, which they can' always soon do, resolve upon any measures, they have generally time enough, before the new election comes on, to give the people proper information, in order to show them the justice and the wisdom of the measures they have pursued; and if the people should at any time be too much elated, or too much dejected, or should without a cause change their minds, those at the helm of affairs have time to set them right before a new election comes on. As to faction and sedition, Sir, I will grant, that in monarchical and aristocratical governments it generally arises from violence and oppression; but in democratical governments it always arises from the people having too great a share in the government; for in all countries, and in all governments, there always will be many factious and unquiet spirits, who can never be at rest either in power or out of power; when in power, they are never easy, unless every man submits entirely to their direction; and when out of power, they are always working and intriguing against those that are in, without any regard to justice or to the interest of their country: in popular governments such men have too much game, they have too many opportunities for working upon and corrupting the minds. of the people, in order to give them a bad impression of, and to raise discontents against those that have the management of the public affairs for the time; and these discontents often break out into seditions and insurrections. This, Sir, would, in my opinion, be our misfortune, if our Parliaments were either annual or triennial: by such frequent elections, there would be so much power thrown into the hands of the people, as would destroy that equal mixture, which is the beauty of our constitution: in short, our government would really become a democratical government, and might from thence very probably diverge into a tyrannical, Therefore, in order to preserve our constitution, in order to prevent our falling under tyranny and arbitrary power, we ought to preserve that law, which I really think has brought our constitution to a more equal mixture, and consequently to greater perfection than it was ever in before that law took place. |