strength of the argument is marshalled by Mede in the four following reasons, which the reader, from the great celebrity of that writer, will naturally be desirous to see.

"First, Every sacrifice, saith our Saviour, Mark ix. 49. is salted with salt. This salt is called, Levit. ii. 13, the salt of the covenant of God; that is, a symbol of the perpetuity thereof. Now, if the salt, which seasoned the sacrifice, were sal fœderis Dei, the salt of the covenant of God, what was the sacrament itself but epulum fœderis, the feast of the Covenant? -Secondly, Moses calls the blood of the burnt offerings and peace offerings, wherewith he sprinkled the children of Israel when they received the Law, The blood of the covenant which the Lord had made with them: This is, saith he, the blood of the covenant which the Lord hath made with you, Exod. xxiv. 8.-Thirdly, But above all, this may most evidently be evinced out of the 50th psalm, the whole argument whereof is concerning sacrifices: there God saith, verse 5. Gather my saints together unto me, which make covenant with me by sacrifice: and verse 16, of the sacrifices of the wicked, Unto the wicked God saith, what hast thou to do to declare my statutes, and take my covenant in thy mouth, seeing thou hatest instruction, &c. -Fourthly, I add in this last place, for a further confirmation, that when God was to make a covenant with Abram, Gen. xv. he commanded him to offer a sacrifice, verse 9, Offer unto me (so it should be turned) a heifer, a she goat, and a ram, each of three years old, a turtle dove, and a young pigeon. All which he offered accordingly, and divided them in the midst, laying each peace or moiety one against the other; and when the sun went down, God, in the likeness of a smoking furnace and burning lamp, passed between the pieces, and so (as the text says)

made a covenant with Abram, saying, Unto thy seed will I give this land, &c. By which rite of passing between the parts, God condescended to the manner of men." The author then proceeds to shew, that this custom of dividing the sacrifice and passing between the parts was usual with the Gentiles, and not unknown among the Jews: and upon the whole concludes, as a matter decisively established, that sacrifices were in their nature and essence "federal feasts, wherein God deigneth to entertain man to eat and drink with or before him, in token of favour and reconcilement." (Works of Joseph Mede, p. 170-172.)

The opinions and arguments of a divine so learned, and a reasoner so profound, as Joseph Mede, should not be approached but with reverence: yet upon close examination it must be evident that this great man has here arrived at a conclusion not warranted by his premises. For, as to his first argument, it manifestly proves no more than this, that the Jewish sacrifices, which were all offered under and in reference to the covenant which God had originally made with the Jews, (Lev. ii. 13. and Ex. xxiv.) were always accompanied with that which was considered to be a symbol of the perpetuity of that covenant. In this there was evidently nothing federal, nothing which marked the entering into a present covenant, or even the renewing of an old one, but simply a significant and forcible assurance of the faithfulness of that great Being with whom the national covenant of the Jews had been originally entered into.

If this reasoning be just, and I apprehend it cannot be controverted, the whole strength of the cause is gone for the remaining arguments, although they undoubtedly establish this, that some sacrifices were of the nature of federal rites, yet they establish no

more: so that the general nature of sacrifice remains altogether unaffected. In those cases also, where the sacrifice appears to have had a federal aspect, the true state of the matter is probably this, that where there was a covenant there was a sacrifice also to give solemnity and obligation to the covenant, sacrifice being the most solemn act of devotion, and therefore naturally to be called in for the enforcement of the religious observance of any compact engaged in. Thus, the sacrifice being but the accompaniment of the covenant, does not necessarily partake of its nature. In other words, although it be admitted, that where there was a covenant there was also a sacrifice; it by no means follows, that wherever there was a sacrifice there was also a covenant. That some sacrifices therefore had a federal relation, proves nothing as to the nature of sacrifice in general: and the conclusion, which we had before arrived at, remains, consequently, unshaken by the reasons which have been adduced by Mede.-Bishop Pearce's Two Letters to Dr. Waterland may be read with advantage upon this subject, although they contain many particulars in which the reflecting reader will probably not concur.

NO. L.-BISHOP WARBURTON'S THEORY OF THE ORIGIN OF

SACRIFICE.

PAGE 35. (c)-Bishop Warburton (Div. Leg. B. ix. ch. 2.) represents the whole of sacrifice as symbolical. The offerings of first fruits he holds to be an action expressive of gratitude and homage: and in this way he accounts for the origin of such sacrifices as were eucharistic. But, aware of the insufficiency of the theory, which places the entire system of sacrifice on the ground of gifts, he proceeds to explain the nature of expiatory sacrifice

in the manner described in the page to which this Number refers.

It is to be lamented, that an ingenious writer, of whom I have had occasion in another place to speak in terms of commendation, should, in his view of the Bishop's opinions upon this subject, have permitted himself to give support to that, which is certainly not among the most tenable of his Lordship's notions; namely, the idea of the human origin of sacrifice. This too (though probably not so intended by the author,) has been done in a way which has a powerful tendency to mislead the unwary reader: the professed object being to exhibit an impartial enumeration of the arguments on both sides of the question, whilst in truth a preponderating weight has been studiously east in favour of one. I allude to Mr. Pearson's critical essay; in the IVth section of which, the reasonings of Spencer and Warburton in defence of the heathenish origin and subsequent divine adoption of the rite of sacrifice, are treated with a complacency, which they but ill deserve. The reasonings themselves, as they are elsewhere in this work largely considered, I shall not here stop to consider.

NO. LI.-THE SUPPOSITION THAT SACRIFICES ORIGINATED IN THE IDEA OF GIFTS, ERRONEOUS.

PAGE 35. (4) Dr. Rutherforth, in a communication to Dr. Kennicot, collects from Gen. iv. 20. that the introduction, of property, or exclusive right, amongst mankind, is not to be fixed higher than the time of Jabal, the eighth from Adam. He is there said to have been the father, or first inventor, of : that is, says Rutherforth, not, as we translate it, the father of such as have cattle, (for he was clearly not the first of such, Abel having been a keeper VOL. I.

: מקנה

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394

GIFTS NOT THE ORIGIN OF SACRIFICE.

of sheep long before,) but of private property; the word signifying strictly possession of any sort, and being so rendered in the Syriac version. (Kennic. Two Dissert. App. p. 252-254.) In addition to this it may be remarked, that the word

seems to have been applied to cattle, merely because cattle were, in the earliest ages, the only kind of possession; and that when there is nothing in the context to determine the word to that application, it can be considered only in its original and proper sense, namely possession.

But whether this idea be right or not, it is obvious, that a community of goods must have for some time prevailed in the world; and that consequently the very notion of a gift, and all experience of its effect upon men, must have been for a length of time unknown. And if the opinion be right, that sacrifice existed before Abel, and was coeval with the fall; it becomes yet more manifest, that observation of the efficacy of gifts could not have given birth to the practice, there being no subjects in the world upon which Adam could make such observation. Besides, as Kennicot remarks, (Two Diss. p. 207.) "no being has a right to the lives of other beings, but the Creator, or those on whom he confers that right;" if then God had not given Abel such a right, (and that he did not confer it even for the purposes of necessary food, will appear from the succeeding Number,) even the existence of the notion of property, and the familiar use and experience of gifts, could not have led him to take away the life of the animal as a gift to the Almighty; nor, if they could have done so, can we conceive, that such an offering would have been graciously accepted.