statement made by a member of the city council, during a session thereof, in reference to the official conduct of the superintendent of streets, that he is a "downright thief," is not privileged, if at the time there was no proceeding before the council as to the latter's official conduct.315 So, while communication to a governor concerning proper legislation, to influence his action, is prima facie privileged, it is not in fact privileged if it contains defamatory matter which is necessarily published to others, 316-as where a pamphlet is generally circulated.317 Again, "for the sake of public justice, charges and communications which would otherwise be slanderous are protected if made bona fide in the prosecution of an inquiry into a suspected crime." 318

Same-Religious and Fraternal Organizations.

The law encourages the various members of a religious organization, who are unable to dwell together in unity, peace, and concord, to try to settle their differences without public scandal. Hence communications in trials before church tribunals are privileged. Therefore, the congregation may prefer charges against the clergyman in accordance with the usage and discipline of the church, without civil responsibility.319 And one church member may, before such tribunal, publicly charge that another had committed adultery with the plaintiff, who did not belong to that church.320 The same privilege is extended to secret societies.321 A vicar's counsel with his curate is privileged.322 But a clergyman has no peculiar privi

Flood, 160 Mass. 509, 36 N. E. 482, distinguishing, inter alia, Spill v. Maule, L. R. 4 Exch. 232-237; Chatfield v. Connerford, 4 Fost. & F. 1008.

315 Callaham v. Ingram, 122 Mo. 355, 26 S. W. 1020.

316 Coffin v. Coffin, 4 Mass. 1; Rex v. Creevey, 1 Maule & S. 273. 317 Woods v. Wiman, 122 N. Y. 445, 25 N. E. 919.

And see Jones v.

318 Coleridge, J., in Padmore v. Lawrence, 11 Adol. & E. 380. Johnson v. Evans, 3 Esp. 32; Fowler v. Homer, 3 Camp. 294; Thomas, 34 Wkly. Rep. 104; Dale v. Harris, 109 Mass. 193. Cf. Eames v. Whittaker, 123 Mass. 342; Cristman v. Cristman, 36 Ill. App. 567; Harper v. Harper, 10 Bush, 447.

319 Piper v. Woolman, 43 Neb. 280, 61 N. W. 5S8. 820 Etchison v. Pergerson, 88 Ga. 620, 15 S. E. 680.

321 Shurtleff v. Stevens, 51 Vt. 501; Kirkpatrick v. Eagle Lodge, 26 Kan. 384.

322 Clark v. Molyneux, 3 Q. B. Div. 237; James v. Boston, 2 Car. & K. 4–8. And see Joannes v. Bennett, 5 Allen, 169; Kerbs v. Oliver, 12 Gray, 239.

lege for publishing a slander in a pastoral letter, however grave his sense of duty, or sincere his desire to improve the morals of the community.323 In an action for slander in imputing unchastity to a woman, the fact that the slander was spoken to one who had formerly been pastor of a church to which both plaintiff and defendant belonged, and in response to inquiries by such former pastor, did not make the speaking a privileged communication.824

Same-Commercial Communications.

Fair reports of business standing, made up on special request,325 even if a copy of a libelous article be sent, are not actionable.32 But if defamatory matter be inserted in the reports of a commercial agency, not in good faith, nor with the honest purpose of truly informing the agency of the person's financial standing, but maliciously and to subserve the defendant's own private purposes, then the com

323 Gilpin v. Fowler, 9 Exch. 615. But see Laughton v. Bishop, L. R. 4 P. C. 495, holding that a bishop's charge, containing strictures on the conduct of a layman who had attacked his character, was privileged.

324 Carpenter v. Willey, 65 Vt. 168, 26 Atl. 488.

325 King v. Patterson (1887) 49 N. J. Law, 417, 9 Atl. 705 (see dissenting opinions); Locke v. Bradstreet Co., 22 Fed. 771; Pollasky v. Minchener, 81 Mich. 280, 46 N. W. 5; Trussell v. Scarlett, 18 Fed. 214. A creditor may lawfully inquire into the circumstances of his debtor, and the person inquired of may answer freely; and, if his communication be for the honest purpose of giving the desired information, no action will lie. Van Horn v. Van Horn, 56 N. J. Law, 318, 28 Atl. 669. And, generally, see Lowry v. Vedder, 40 Minn. 475, 42 N. W. 542; Montgomery v. Knox, 23 Fla. 595, 3 South. 211; Lynch v. Febiger, 39 La. Ann. 336, 1 South. 690. Lemay v. Chamberlain, 10 Ont. 638; Todd v. Dun, 12 Ont. 791; King v. Patterson, 49 N. J. Law, 417, 9 Atl. 705. As to answer to inquiries, see Story v. Challard, 8 Car. & P. 234; Kine v. Sewell, 3 Mees. & W. 297; Rude v. Nass, 79 Wis. 321, 48 N. W. 555; Posnett v. Marble, 62 Vt. 481, 20 Atl. 813; Howland v. George F. Blake Manuf'g Co., 156 Mass. 543, 31 N. E. 656; Zuckerman v. Sonnenschein, 62 Ill. 115; Van Horn v. Van Horn, 56 N. J. Law, 318, 28 Atl. 669; Brown v. Vannaman, 85 Wis. 451, 55 N. W. 183.

326 Howland v. George F. Blake Manuf'g Co., 156 Mass. 543, 31 N. E. 656. And see cases collected in 30 Cent. Law J., at pages 13 and 14. Taylor v. Hawkins, 16 Q. B. 308; Amann v. Damm, 8 C. B. (N. S.) 597; Force v. Warren, 15 C. B. (N. S.) 806; Missouri Ry. Co. v. Behee, 2 Tex. Civ. App. 107, 21 S. W. 384; John W. Lovell Co. v. Houghton, 116 N. Y. 520, 22 N. E. 1066; Bacon v. Michigan Cent. R. Co., 66 Mich. 166, 33 N. W. 181; Beeler v. Jackson, 64 Md. 589, 2 Atl. 916.

330

munication is not privileged.327 Indeed, if the report be false and injurious, it is not privileged even if the sheet be sent to subscribers in a cipher, and understood by them only,328 but without reference to such special interest as the plaintiff as a creditor would have.32 The privilege of business communications is, however, broader than as to mere commercial reports. It extends to cases where there is a personal interest in the subject-matter to which the communication relates. It applies where there is imminent danger to the subject-matter to which it relates, for example, to a ship, its cargo, or company.331 And, generally, business communications between strangers, although volunteered, are privileged if made in performance of a "duty which may be supposed to exist to give advice faithfully to those who are in want of it, for the sake of the general convenience of business, though with some disregard of the equally important rule of morality that a man should not speak ill, falsely, of his neighbor." 332

Same-Privilege of Advertisers.

So, with a defamatory advertisement, inserted in a newspaper, if necessary to protect the advertiser's interest, or if advertising was the only way to accomplish his lawful object, the circumstances ex

827 Lowry v. Vedder, 40 Minn. 475, 42 N. W. 542; Marks v. Baker, 28 Minn. 162-165, 9 N. W. 678; Zier v. Hofflin, 33 Minn. 66, 21 N. W. 862.

328 Sunderlin v. Bradstreet, 46 N. Y. 188.

329 Mitchell v. Bradstreet Co., 116 Mo. 226, 22 S. W. 358; Goldstein v. Foss, 2 Car. & P. 252; Com. v. Stacey, 1 Leg. Gaz. Rep. (Pa.) 114; Pollasky v. Michener, 81 Mich. 280, 46 N. W. 5; Taylor v. Church, 8 N. Y. 452; Ormsby v. Douglass. 37 N. Y. 477; Sunderlin v. Bradstreet, 46 N. Y. 188; King v. Patterson, 49 N. J. Law, 417, 9 Atl. 705; Bradstreet v. Gill, 72 Tex. 115, 9 S. W. 753; Johnson v. Bradstreet, 77 Ga. 172; Erber v. Dun, 12 Fed. 526; Trussell v. Scarlett, 18 Fed. 214; Locke v. Bradstreet Co., 22 Fed. 771; Kingsbury v. Bradstreet Co., 116 N. Y. 217, 22 N. E. 365; State v. Lonsdale, 48 Wis. 348, 4 N. W. 390. But such an agency may publish, generally, the entry of a judgment against defendant without liability, unless it be a false statement and special damage result. Woodruff v. Bradstreet Co., 116 N. Y. 217, 22 N. E. 365.

330 Blackham v. Pugh, 2 C. B. 611 (auction; charge of bankruptcy); Pig. Torts, 323.

831 Pig. Torts, 324.

832 Coltman, J., in Coxhead v. Richards, 2 C. B. 569-601; Beatson v. Skene, 5 Hurl. & N. 838; Bigelow, Lead. Cas. 174. A letter, written by one of two rival milk sellers, advising a shipper to sell no more milk to the other

cuse the extensive publication. But, if it was not necessary to advertise at all, or if the advertiser's object could have been accomplished equally well by an advertisement which did not contain the defamatory words, then the extent given to the announcement is evidence of malice, to go to the jury.333 Therefore, in an advertisement notifying the public not to harbor or trust the advertiser's wife on his account, defamatory words in regard to the wife are not privileged. 334

Same-Communications in Confidential Relations.

335

A qualified privilege is recognized where the relation between two persons is intimate, socially or professionally, or arises from family connections. Thus, a letter from a son-in-law to his mother-in-law, volunteering advice respecting her proposed mar riage, and containing imputations on her future husband, is privileged.336 Such communications are "fairly warranted by any reasonable occasion or exigency, and when honestly made they are protected for the common convenience and welfare of society, and the law has not restricted the right to make them within any narrow compass." Thus, a surety may speak unreservedly of

"337

unless he had surety for his goods, was not a privileged communication. Brown v. Vannaman, 85 Wis. 451, 55 N. W. 183. And see Lawless v. AngloEgyptian Cotton Co., L. R. 4 Q. B. 262; Shurtleff v. Stevens, 51 Vt. 501; Tillinghast v. McLeod, 17 R. I. 208, 21 Atl. 345; Klinck v. Colby, 46 N. Y. 427; Shurtleff v. Parker, 130 Mass. 293. Cf. Cook v. Wildes, 5 El. & Bl. 328, 24 Law J. Q. B. 367.

333 Odgers, Sland. & L. §§ 225, 226.

334 Champlin, J., in Smith v. Smith, 73 Mich. 445, 41 N. W. 499, 500.

335 As between attorney and client, see Wright v. Woodgate, 2 Cromp., M. & R. 573; Davis v. Reeves, 5 Ir. C. L. 79.

336 Todd v. Hawkins, 8 Car. & P. S8, 2 Man. & R. 20. So, between brother and sister, Anon., cited in 2 J. P. Smith (Eng.) 4, and Adams v. Coleridge, 1 Times Law R. 84; charge by mother against son, Cristman v. Cristman, 36 Ill. App. 567; by one friend to another, as a doctor, Dixon v. Smith, 29 Law J. Exch. 125; or tradesman, Storey v. Challands, 8 Car. & P. 234.

337 Cockayne v. Hodgkisson, 5 Car. & P. 543, 545, (gamekeeper selling game), by Parke, J. And see M'Dougall v. Claridge, 1 Camp. 266 (concerning solicitor's personal character). Statements made before a meeting of stockholders of a railroad company by a member, attributing drunkenness and incapacity to one of the officials, are privileged if made in good faith; and the fact that attorneys of the company, not stockholders, were present at

the man for whom he is responsible.338

And, generally, communications in course of business between employer and employé are privileged.339 However, defamatory words are not privileged because uttered in strictest confidence by one friend to another, nor because they are uttered after the most urgent solicitation, nor because the interview in which they are uttered is obtained at the instance of the person slandered. Therefore, a libelous letter to an unmarried woman concerning her suitor, written by mutual friends to prevent the marriage, is not privileged by previous friendship, nor by a general request made years before.340

Same-Master as to Servant.

The right of the master with reference to a servant who has been in his employ is generally recognized as privileged.341 He may refuse to give a letter of recommendation to his servant when the latter leaves without committing slander,342 and may give his servant a character to his neighbor, who afterwards employed him, which would be otherwise actionable.34 343 He may warn other

the meeting, at the request of the president and some of the stockholders, does not take away the privilege. Broughton v. McGrew, 39 Fed. 672. And see Rude v. Nass, 79 Wis. 321, 48 N. W. 555.

338 Dunman v. Bigg, 1 Camp. 269, note. So, to father of person alleged to have been slandered. Hix v. State (Tex. Cr. App.) 20 S. W. 550; Davis v. State (Tex. Cr. App.) 22 S. W. 979. To father of child, by Earle, C. J., in Whiteley v. Adams, 33 Law J. C. P. 89-95. Cf. Masters v. Burgess, 3 Times Law R. 96; Fowler v. Homer, 3 Camp. 294.

339 Hill v. Durham House Drainage Co. (Sup.) 29 N. Y. Supp. 427. A circular letter, sent out by a firm, stating that a certain person is no longer in their employ, and advising their "friends and customers" to give him no recognition on their account, is not a privileged communication. Warner v. Clark, 45 La. Ann. 833, 13 South. 203; Daniel v. New York News Pub. Co., 67 Hun, 649, 21 N. Y. Supp. 862; Wright v. Woodgate, 2 Cromp., M. & R. 573; Scarll v. Dixon, 4 Fost. & F. 250; Stace v. Griffith, L. R. 2 P. C. 420; Hume v. Marshall, 42 J. P. 136; Washburn v. Cooke, 3 Denio, 110; Lewis v. Chapman, 16 N. Y. 369.

340 Byam v. Collins, 111 N. Y. 143, 19 N. E. 75; Coles v. Thompson (Tex. Civ. App.) 27 S. W. 46. Cf. Whiteley v. Adams, 15 C. B. (N. S.) 310, 311, 392. 341 White V. Nicholls, 3 How. 266; Pattison v. Jones, 8 Barn. & C. 578; Child v. Affleck, 9 Barn. & C. 403.

342 Carroll v. Bird, 3 Esp. 201.

343 Fresh v. Cutter, 73 Md. 87, 20 Atl. 774. Cf. Over v. Schiffling, 102 Ind. 191, 26 N. E. 91.