in its result, to the completion of the regular CHAP. II. regiments.

The recruiting service progressed slowly, and, instead of being able to execute the great designs he had meditated, the general entertained the most serious fears that the enemy would take the field during the winter, force his positions, and crossing the Delaware upon the ice, proceed to Philadelphia.

The frequent demands made on the militia, in consequence of this weakness of the regular army, were extremely harassing and distressing to the great body of the people. While but little real efficient force was acquired, great additional expense was incurred; and in those states most exposed to these calls, serious apprehensions were entertained for the agriculture of the country.

1777.

The real condition of the army during the winter, is exhibited in a letter from the commander in chief to congress, in answer to that which enclosed the resolutions which have been mentioned, and which expressed the brilliant schemes of victory in which the government at that time indulged itself. "Could I," said March 4. the general," accomplish the important objects so eagerly wished by congress; confining the enemy within their present quarters, preventing their getting supplies from the country, and totally subduing them, before they are re-enforced; I should be happy indeed. But what

CHAP. II. prospect, or hope, can there be, of my effect. 1777. ing so desirable a work at this time? the enclosed return, to which I solicit the most serious attention of congress, comprehends the whole force I have in Jersey. It is but a handful, and bears no proportion, on the scale of numbers, to that of the enemy. Added to this, the major part is made up of militia. The most sanguine in speculation, cannot deem it more than adequate to the least valuable purposes of war."

In pursuance of those cautionary measures, which were suggested by the mortifying weakness of his army, the boats on the Delaware were once more secured, and the public stores deposited in places supposed to be least exposed to the enemy.

The hope that, by a great exertion of heroic patriotism, a sufficient force might be collected, during the winter, to destroy the Biitish army, and thereby at once terminate the war, being entirely disappointed; the views of the general were almost exclusively directed to the next campaign.

As the troops to constitute the new army were to be raised principally, through the agency, and by the authority, of the state governments; and congress could take no measures to fill the regiments, other than such as were merely

* See Note, No. II. at the end of the volume.

up

recommendatory: in addition to the bounty CHAP. II. offered to those who would voluntarily inlist, 1777. the state authorities were resorted to, and different expedients were devised by them, to substitute other motives for that zeal for independence which had at first been relied on; but which, it was now feared, would not operate with sufficient force to bring the requisite numbers into the field.

In the New England states, where in consequence of the influx of money, produced, among other causes, by the sales of prizes, the depreciation of the continental currency began to be most sensibly perceived, the system formerly adopted, of giving increased pay to their troops, was resumed. But the strong remonstrances urged by general Washington against this measure, induced those states once more to abandon it; but they persisted in their resolution to encourage the recruiting service by an additional bounty. This, though indeed less pernicious than a partial augmentation of pay, was at first opposed as being calculated to effect in a degree, the same mischief. Finding however that the bounty offered by congress was no sufficient inducement to inlist, this voluntary aid of the northern states was assented to; and it would have been, perhaps, a favourable circumstance, had the example been imme. diately followed throughout the continent.

VOL. III.

M

*

CHAP. II. Even this measure did not produce the effects 1777. expected from it. The regiments continued to fill slowly, and it became every day more apparent, that the American army must still be inferior in number to the enemy, unless more energetic measures could be adopted. The critical situation of their affairs, and the necessity of bringing a respectable force into the field, were urged on the different states by general Washington, with all the earnestness to be expected from his situation, and zeal for the service. In Connecticut and Massachussetts, the country was laid off into districts, each of which was called on for its man, and, in default of producing, by a given day, a soldier inlisted for three years, or for the war, it was directed that one person, from those capable of bearing arms, should be drafted to serve until the first of the next ensuing January. This measure received the approbation of the commander in chief, who, though he deprecated any reliance on men whose terms of service were to be of less duration than that for which the whole army was to be raised; yet submitted to this, as perhaps the most eligible expedient of which the existing state of things would permit the adoption.

In Virginia, where the same difficulty attended inlistments, it was proposed by the executive to fill the regiments with volunteers, who should engage to serve for six months.

1777.

This plan was submitted to general Washington CHAP. II. by governor Henry, and his opinion asked concerning its adoption. "I am under the necessity of observing" said the general in reply, "that the volunteer plan which you mention will never answer any valuable purpose, and that I cannot but disapprove the measure. To the short engagements of our troops may be fairly and justly ascribed almost every misfortune that we have experienced."

In a subsequent letter to the same gentleman, the necessity of bringing a sufficient army into the field, should even coercive measures be resorted to, was very strongly enforced. At the same time, some alternatives were suggested, which, in a later period of the war, constituted the basis of various experiments to furnish the quota of troops required from that

state.

As the usual season for active operations approached, and the solicitude of the commander in chief to assemble his army increased; fresh difficulties, growing necessarily out of the organization of the American system, unfolded themselves. As every state was exposed to hostile invasion, and the enemy, in perfect possession of the ocean, could transfer the war at pleasure to any part of the union, the attention of the states was principally directed each to its particular situation. Each state in the neighbourhood of the great theatre of action