his future army from the fear of a calamity, CHAP. II. which he found it impossible to elude, and 1777. which had been more fatal in his camp, than January 12. the sword of the enemy. Inoculation had been very rarely practised in the western world, and the small-pox had been ever dreaded as a scourge the most tremendous with which the human race could be afflicted. Notwithstanding the efforts incessantly used to guard against this disease, which, taken in the natural way, is so destructive to our species; it had found its way both into the northern and middle army; and had, to a very alarming degree, impaired the force of both. In the northern army especially, its havoc had been so extensive that, according to every probability, only the delay requisite to obtain the superiority on lake Champlain, a measure believed to be of absolute necessity, prevented the British army in 1776, from penetrating to the Hudson. army As the only effectual mode of avoiding a American return of the same evils the ensuing campaign, inoculated. the general determined to inoculate all the soldiers in the American service. With as much secrecy as could be observed, preparations were made to give the infection in camp, and the hospital physicians at Philadelphia were ordered to carry all the southern troops, who were for that purpose stopped in that place and its neighbourhood, as expeditiously as 1777. CHAP. II. possible, through the disease. Similar orders were also given to the physicians at other places; and thus was prepared, for the ensuing campaign, an army exempt from the fear of a calamity which had at all times endangered the most important operations. The process in camp was so conducted that no advantage of it was taken by the enemy, and the example given in the army was fortunately followed very generally through the country; so that * this alarming disease, in a great degree, ceased to be the terror of America. While Philadelphia was supposed to be in hazard, the militia of New England had been called for, and had been ordered in considerable numbers to the Delaware. Six thousand men under general Lincoln marched from Massachussetts, and a force in proportion to its population, was raised in Connecticut. Of these the greater number were detained by the invasion of Rhode island; but a few regiments marched as far as the North river, to the camp of general Heath, who had been left to guard the highlands of New York. Here they were stopped by order of the commander in chief, for the purpose of making a diversion on the side of New York, from which hopes of considerable advantage were entertained. As the enemy was in great force in Jersey, and had detached a strong corps to Rhode Island, New York must necessarily be weak. About two thousand men were understood to CHAP. II. be in the neighbourhood of King's bridge, and 1777. the whole force on the island was not calculated at a much more considerable number. On Long island, it was said there was only Delancy's brigade of American loyalists, amounting to but little more than one thousand men. It was supposed that the militia of New England and New York would form a respectable army, with which general Heath might alarm, and perhaps more than alarm, that important post. He was directed to march down to the neighbourhood of King's bridge, to carry off the forage and fresh provisions with which the enemy might be supplied, and, if the prospect of succeeding appeared probable, to attack the forts which guarded the entrance into the island. It was expected that fears for New York might induce the enemy, either to evacuate the Jerseys entirely, in which event they must suffer extremely through the winter for fuel, forage, and provisions; or so to weaken their posts at Brunswick and Amboy, as to give general Washington an opportunity of attacking them with some advantage. If he should be disappointed in this expectation, and the enemy in the Jerseys should remain undiminished, he thought it not improbable that some important advantages might be gained on York, or Long islands. CHAP. II. General Heath moves down to Kingsbridge, but returns to without effecting any thing. In pursuance of this plan, general Heath 1777. marched down towards West Chester, and summoned fort Independence to surrender : but the garrison determining to hold the place, Peck's-Kill it was thought by a council of war unadvisable to risk an assault with only militia; and, some intelligence having been received that the army from Rhode Island had embarked, and would probably land in their rear, they retreated to the Highlands without effecting any thing. A corps of Connecticut militia under general Wooster, and some New York militia under colonel Rensalear, were left to collect and bring away the forage and horned cattle, which were in considerable quantities, and would furnish the enemy with supplies they greatly wanted. About the same time, an expedition which had been planned by general Spencer against Rhode Island, where the enemy were between three and four thousand strong, was also abandoned. He had proposed landing near Howland's ferry, on a point of land which projects from the island, and is commanded by high grounds on the opposite shore, where the Americans had erected a battery: but general Washington directed that the attempt should not be made without the strongest probability of success; and as the eastern continental troops were ordered to Ticonderoga, it was thought unsafe to make so hazardous an attempt with only militia. "It is right," said general Washington on this occasion, "not to risk a miscarriage. Until we get our new army properly established, it is our business to play a certain game, and not depend upon militia for any thing capital." CHAP. IL 1777. In the mean time, every day almost produced skirmishes. some skirmish, which increased the distress of the enemy, and the confidence of the Americans in themselves. The British found it totally unsafe to forage but with large covering parties, which were often attacked with advantage, and their horses frequently taken. The miserable appearance they made, evidenced the scarcity which prevailed in camp. In these skirmishes, prisoners were often made, and repeated small successes, the details of which filled the papers throughout America, served very much to animate the people at large, who even supposed that, so soon as the season would permit the armies to take the field, the British would be driven to their ships for protection. Yet the real situation of general Washington, which was happily concealed in a great degree both from the enemy, and from his own countrymen, was extremely cri- State of the tical. He was often abandoned by bodies of the militia, before their places were filled by others, and thus left in a state of dangerous weakness, exposed to have his positions forced by the enemy. This was not the only inconvenience resulting from this fluctuating army. VOL. III. L * army. |