congress became convinced of the error which had been committed, the ability to correct it, if not entirely passed away, was certainly very much diminished.

The immense loss of arms, resulting inevitably from their being placed in the hands of troops who were soon to return home, and who could not be subjected to discipline while in camp, was also a very serious mischief.

Connected with short inlistments, and with the organization of civil governments in America, were other defects in the structure of the army, which produced no inconsiderable degree of embarrassment. It has been seen that in the commencement of the war, the troops were raised entirely by the local authorities, who, without consent, established military systems of their own, and appointed officers whose relative rank, and right of promotion, it was not very easy to adjust. The officers, like the men', were engaged only for one year, and, at the expiration of that time, were to be re-commissioned. Congress appointed the general officers, and took the armies raised by the respective colonies into continental pay. With considerable difficulty, a new army was formed out of these materials, in the face of the enemy, during the blockade of Boston. This work was to be repeated, with infinitely more difficulty, during the active operations of the campaign of 1776. The attention of congress

CHAP. I.

1776.

CHAP. I. was very early called to this interesting subject 1776. by general Washington; but that body performed its most important duties through the agency of sovereign states. Those states were

to nominate the officers, and were requested to send commissioners to camp to attend to this object. So many delays were experienced, that the dissolution of the army approached, before officers were appointed to recruit that which was to take its place. At length, congress resolved, that general Washington should himself be empowered to appoint the officers for those states which had failed to depute commissioners for that purpose. The manner in which appointments were made, unfortunately brought into the service, as officers, men without capacity or sufficient weight of character to preserve the respect of the soldiers, and that discipline, which is essential to an army; and the repeated re-organization of the troops gave continual discontent.

The various independent authorities employed in raising the army, gave occasion to other very embarrassing circumstances. In order to complete their quotas, some of the states engaged to those who would inlist in their service additional pay to that promised by congress. The discontents excited by a disparity of pay among soldiers in the same army, will readily be conceived. The interference of the general with the state governments, to produce a depar

ture from this pernicious plan, became abso- CHAP. I. lutely necessary.

From the same motives, some of the states gave large additional bounties. This, it was supposed by congress, would effectually destroy the recruiting business in other states where the same liberality was not used, and therefore, a resolution was passed, recommending, and insisting on a strict adherence to the precise system which had been proposed by the continental government.

A defect in the structure of the army, which was very seriously felt, was the want of engineers, artillery, and cavalry. During the campaign of 1775 and 1776, there existed but one regiment of artillery, no corps of engineers, and not a single troop of horse. General Lee, who commanded in the southern department, and whose experience of the utility of horse was not now to be acquired, very early pressed the necessity of employing troops of that description, and at his suggestion, a regiment was raised in Virginia to be commanded by colonel Bland. The active and extensive operations of 1776, disclosed fully to the commander in chief, the disadvantages to be combated by an army composed almost entirely of infantry. Among the militia of Connecticut were indeed a few cavalry; but the expense attending the maintenance of their horses prevented their being employed in the first instance, and when

1776.

1

CHAP. I. they were taken into service, it was soon per1776. ceived that better horses, than could be furnished by militia men, were indispensable to the duties required from them. Towards the close of that campaign, therefore, he urged on congress the importance to the service of making these improvements in the organization of the army; and his representations had the influence they merited.

It was determined to increase the corps of artillery to three regiments, the command of which was given to colonel Knox, now promoted to the rank of a brigadier general; to take Bland's regiment into continental pay; to raise a body of three thousand cavalry; and to enable general Washington to create a corps of engineers. In this important branch of the military art, the Americans were peculiarly defective. No state of things had heretofore existed which held forth inducements to study this essential part of the science of war. acquire even a moderate proficiency in it, requires time, application, and experience. The foundation, therefore, of an able corps of engineers, must be laid long before the advantages expected from them can be realized. Of consequence, the attention of congress could not have been directed too soon to this object.

To

The want of skill and experience in this important department, could not fail to be dis

1776.

played in the defensive works constructed in CHAP. I. the first instance by the Americans. Another mischief resulting from the same cause, was a disposition to place too much confidence in their fortifications, and to believe them stronger than they were in reality.

The defect of engineers among the native Americans, rendered the employment of foreigners, in that important branch of service, indispensably necessary; and when the corps authorized by congress was formed, it was composed of French and Germans. General De Portaile, an officer of great reputed talents, was placed at its head.

* In the early part of the war, colonel Putnam, a very valuable officer from New England, appears to have been frequently employed in the capacity of an engineer. It cannot derogate from his merit to say, that it was impossible he could possess the professional skill which that department required.