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forces of France and the United States, on all CHAP. X. the British dominions on the continent, and 1779. on the adjacent islands of Cape Breton and Newfoundland. This plan was matured about the time the marquis de La Fayette obtained leave to return to his own country, and was ordered to be transmitted by that nobleman to doctor Franklin, the minister of the United States at the court of Versailles, with instructions to induce, if possible, the French cabinet to accede to it. Some communications were also made, respecting this subject, to the marquis, whose influence in securing its adoption by his own government, was greatly relied on; and, in October, it was for the first time transmitted to general Washington, with a request that he would enclose it by the marquis de La Fayette with his observations on it, to doctor Franklin.

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This very extensive plan for the military operations of the ensuing campaign, prepared entirely in the cabinet, without consulting, so far as is known, a single military character, consisted of a variety of parts.

It was resolyed to march, as early as the first of June, two separate detachments, consisting, each of fifteen hundred infantry and one hundred cavalry, from Pittsburgh and Wyoming, against Detroit and Niagara. The object of these corps was to be openly avowed, and they were to destroy the towns belonging

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CHAP. X. to the hostile tribes of Indians lying in their 1779. route. The troops marching from Wyoming

against Niagara, were to be met at Anaquaqua, by a re-enforcement of fifteen hundred men to be collected at Schenectady.

A body of troops were to be stationed on the Mohawk, during the winter, for the purpose of preparing every material necessary for building vessels. They were to be re-enforced early in the spring by two thousand five hundred men, and were to take possession of Oswego; to launch the vessels constructed of the materials to be prepared during the winter; to secure the navigation of lake Ontario; and to make excursions towards Niagara, for the purpose of alarming the Indian nations, and facilitating the military operations in that quarter.

Several regiments were to be cantoned along the upper parts of Connecticut river, to be recruited during the winter, so as to form a body of five thousand regular troops. Their destination was to be kept a profound secret, and they were to penetrate into Canada by the way of the river Francis, at the mouth of which a post was to be established, and from thence their attention was to be immediately turned to the reduction of Montreal, St. Johns, and the north end of lake Champlain.

These objects being accomplished, they were to co-operate with the troops designed to

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gain the navigation of lake Ontario; but as it CHAP. X. would be necessary to be guarded against any possible attack from Quebec, they could afford but feeble aid to the operations in that quarter. It was supposed, however, that a detachment of two thousand men might be spared for this object. These, with as many Canadians as would join them, were to proceed up Cadaroqui and take a post defensible by about three hundred men, at or near the mouth of lake Ontario. They were then to unite with the troops stationed at Oswego, and leaving a garrison at that place, march to Niagara, where they were also to be joined by the detachment ordered against Detroit.

Thus far, America could proceed unaided by her ally. But, this object being accomplished, another campaign would still be necessary for the reduction of Quebec. To carry this on, the army must be wintered in Canada; and, in the mean-time, the garrison of Quebec would, in all probability, be largely re-enforced. The difficulties and dangers resulting from this circumstance wore so serious an aspect, as to render it questionable whether it would not be advisable to relinquish the enterprise on an enlarged scale, and to limit themselves to partial expeditions, unless France could be induced to take a part in it,

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CHAP. X.

1779.

The conquest of Quebec, and of Halifax, was supposed to be an object of so much importance both to France and the United States, that her aid must be solicited to effect it.

It was proposed that from four to five thousand French troops should sail from Brest in the beginning of May, under convoy of four ships of the line and four frigates. Their destination was to be avowed, but they were to be clothed as if for service in the West Indies, and thick clothes were to be sent after them in August. By the middle of August, it was supposed the conquest of Canada might be so far completed, that Halifax might be invested by the ships. A considerable body of American troops might be spared for that service; and, if Halifax should fall by the beginning, or middle of October, the army might either proceed immediately against Newfoundland, or remain in garrison until the spring, when the conquest of that place might be completed.

It had been supposed probable that the further prosecution of the war on the continent of America would be abandoned by the English; in which case, the government would have at its disposal a respectable force, the advantageous employment of which had engaged in part the attention of the commander in chief. He had contemplated an expedition against the British posts in upper Canada, as a

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measure which might be eventually eligible, CHAP. X. and which might usefully employ the arms of the United States, if their troops might safely be withdrawn from the seaboard. He had, however, considered every object of this sort as contingent, to be pursued, or abandoned according to circumstances. To be To be prepared for a state of things, should it arrive, in which offensive war might be prosecuted without risking too much, he had taken proper measures to inform himself of the state of the garrisons and fortified places in Canada, and of the advantages and disadvantages attending the different routes into that country. He had estimated the difficulties to be encountered in such an enterprise, and had found them so considerable, as to balance on the extent which might safely be given to such an expedition, admitting the United States to be evacuated by the British armies.

In this state of mind, he received the mag nificent plan already decided on by congress, which, with his comments on it, was to be delivered to a French nobleman, and also to be forwarded to the American minister at the court of Versailles. He was forcibly struck with the absolute impracticability of executing that part of it, which was to be undertaken by the United States, if the enemy should continue in their country; and with the serious mischief which would result to the common

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