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CHAP. I. tained assurances, that the laws which had been 1776. complained of, and which had occasioned the war, would be revised.

The spirit of resistance in Jersey appeared to have nearly spent itself. The American cause was thought desperate. No manly effort was made in defence of their country, and a general disposition seemed to prevail among the people, to save themselves by submission. A few militia were in arms under general Williamson, whose indisposition compelled him to leave the service, after which they were commanded by general Dickenson; but the great body of the country was either with the enemy, or felt too little ardour for the common cause to hazard their lives and fortunes in its support. When urged to take up arms, they answered, "that general Howe promised them peace, liberty, and safety, and they could require nothing further."

In Pennsylvania too, a great abatement of zeal was manifested, and though a great part of the city of Philadelphia remained firm, many other parts of the state seemed unwilling to engage themselves deeper in a controversy, concerning the issue of which, there was so much reason to doubt.

The condition of the American army, and the defects of its interior organization, have been occasionally noticed in relating the events of the war. A minute detail of all the errors

on militia

defects in the structure of the American

in the military system of the United States CHAP. I. would indeed display, but without affording 1776. instruction or amusement, the immense diffculties surmounted by the superior officers generally, and especially by the commander Observations in chief. A nation totally unskilled in the and other science of war, if even divested of prejudices which experience only can remove, would certainly, in creating an army, omit many essential parts, the indispensable necessity of which, time would show. In no instance can this proposition ever be more completely verified, than it was during the war which terminated in the independence of the United States.

But there were certain cardinal errors which may be repeated, when the dangers they produced, and by which they were connected, shall be forgotten. Of these the most material and that which has been unavoidably most noticed, because it forms a most essential part of American history, was the too great reliance on militia, and the consequent short inlistments of the regular troops. Militia were not merely depended on as auxiliaries, and as covering the country from the sudden irruptions of small parties, for which purposes they ought certainly to be competent, and with a view to which they will ever be important, but they were also relied on as constituting the main body and strength of the army. Their absolute incapacity to maintain this station in the military

arniy.

CHAP. I. arrangements of any country, engaged in war 1776. with an enemy of nearly equal strength; em

ploying a permanent force, at all times capable of being used to its utmost extent, was demonstrated to the conviction of scepticism itself; and under the weight of this conviction, every effort was made by congress, though almost too late, to remedy the very extensive mischief which this fatal error had already produced. Not the least of these was the difficulty attending all attempts to cure it.

Men unaccustomed to submit their actions to the control of others, bear impatiently that degree of authority, and submit reluctantly to that subordination so indispensably necessary to their own safety, and without which an army, to use the expression of general Washington, when struggling to reform abuses of the most dangerous nature, "is an armed mob" incapable of being applied to the purposes of its creation.

Raw soldiers too can seldom be induced to pay that attention to cleanliness, to their persons, their lodging, their food, and to many other minute circumstances, on which the health of a large body of men, collected together, essentially depends. They are therefore found to be infinitely more exposed to disease, and to be swept off by sickness in much greater numbers, than those who have been taught by experience the value of attending to those cir

cumstances which the young recruit never suf- CHAP. I. ficiently appreciates. Of this, the unexampled 1776. mortality, of both the northern and middle armies, furnished evidence as conclusive, as it was melancholy.

The total change experienced too in their situation, their duties, and mode of living, contributes, not a little, to render the military life, in the first instance, unpleasant to those who engage in it.

Habit conquers these impressions, and removes many of the causes which produced them. We, therefore, often see the veteran attached to the camp. But regulars engaged only for a short time, and militia engaged for a still shorter time, receive all these unfavourable impressions, without remaining long enough for them to wear off. They conse quently acquire a distaste for the service, and on their return home, not unfrequently, spread among their friends and neighbours, the prejudices imbibed by themselves.

These impediments to recruiting an army, would probably after the war had progressed for some time, occur in any state of things where the facts producing them existed; but in America, other adventitious circumstances added greatly to their influence.

Two winter campaigns had been made, in the course of the last of which, the soldiers, exposed half naked to a climate of extreme

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1776.

CHAP. I. rigour, suffered excessive hardships, to which were attributed the diseases under which a large portion of them perished. Old clothes had been collected for them in Philadelphia; but these supplies were late, and inadequate to their wants.

These causes, checking the ardour at first felt by the youth of America for the service of their country, produced another effect, which, . in its turn, operated as a powerful cause to prevent inlistments to serve during the war. When, from a defect of regulars, repeated calls were made on the militia, it was soon perceived that many of those whose tour of duty was to be performed, either from the interruption which a short absence would give to their domestic affairs, or from some other cause, were extremely unwilling to take the field; and chose rather to give a small sum of money to a substitute. In a short time, more money was given for a month's service in the militia, than was offered to a soldier to engage in the regular service. This practice soon taught those who would otherwise have inlisted, the superior value of their services, when they retained the disposition of themselves; and disinclined them to engage permanently in the army. The longer the war continued, the higher was the price of a substitute, and of consequence an increased bounty became necessary to induce a man to inlist. Such was the effect of these and other causes, that by the time

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