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of Great Britain should demonstrate a sincere CHAP. X. disposition for that purpose. The only solid 1778. proof of this disposition would be an explicit acknowledgment of the independence of these states, or the withdrawing his fleets and armies."

Some apprehensions seem to have been entertained that these propositions might make an unfavourable impression on the public mind, and increase the divisións which already existed. They were therefore attacked with much wit and asperity by individuals, who, at the same time, combatted them with great force of argument.

mr. Johnson

influential

congress.

In the packet addressed to congress were Attempt of several private letters, written by governor to bribe Johnson to particular members of that body, members of in which he blended, with the most flattering expressions of their characters, and their conduct, assurances of the honours and emoluments to which those would be entitled who should contribute to restore peace and harmony to the two countries, and to terminate the present calamitous war.*

* In addition to these letters, direct propositions, after the evacuation of Philadelphia, were made to mr. Read, a member of congress for the state of Pennsylvania, by a lady connected with the British army, who assured him, as from governor Johnson, that 10,000l. sterling, and the best office in the gift of the crown in America might be at his disposal, if he could bring about a reunion between the two countries. Mr. Read replied, that he was not worth purchasing; but such as he was, the king of Great Britain was not rich enough to do it.

CHAP. X.

July 13.

The removal from Philadelphia, followed the 1778. reception of the answer of congress to the propositions of the British commissioners, too immediately, for any further measures to be taken by them, until they had reached New York. From that city, a second letter was addressed to the president and members of congress, in which they express their regrets that, on the part of congress, any difficulties were raised which must prolong the calamities of the present war. With respect to the two alternatives stated as preliminaries necessary even to the beginning of a negotiation for peace, they declared their opinion to be, "that the independence of the people of America on Great Britain, except so far as is necessary to preserve that union of force in which the safety and advantage of both consisted, was fully acknowledged in their first letter; and that they were willing to enter into a fair discussion of all the circumstances which might be necessary to ensure, or even to enlarge that independency."

They excuse their not beginning with the other part of the alternative, the withdrawing of the fleets and armies, "on account of the precautions rendered necessary against their ancient enemies, and a regard to the safety of many, who from affection to Great Britain, have exposed themselves to suffer in this contest, and to whom Great Britain owes support at every expense of blood and treasure. This measure

however," it was intimated, "might very soon CHAP. X. follow the first advances to peace on the part of 1778. the United States, which should indicate a favourable prospect of a reconciliation with their fellow citizens of this continent, and those in Great Britain."

The most explicit assurances were added, "that no circumstances would give the commissioners more satisfaction than to find, that the extent of the future connexion between the two countries would be determined on principles of mere reason, and considerations of mutual interest, on which they were likewise willing to risk the permanence of any arrangements that might be formed."

To that part of the letter from congress which refers to treaties already subsisting, they say "that, if such treaties are to effect their are to effect their affe&i deliberations, they ought to be communicated both for their consideration, and that of the constituents of congress, who would judge whether any alliance they might have contracted, would furnish sufficient reasons for continuing this unnatural war."

Some doubt was expressed concerning the power of congress to contract foreign alliances, as the confederation was not yet in force, and the letter concluded with saying "we will not suppose that any objection can arise on your part to our communicating to the public our own proceedings; the respect which we pay to

1778,

CHAP. X. the great body of the people you are supposed to represent, shall be evidenced by us in every possible mark of consideration and regard."

It would seem that the previous conduct of congress must have satisfied the British commissioners, that all hope of restoring peace on any other terms than the complete independence of the United States, must, at least, be suspended, if not entirely abandoned. Their present endeavours therefore were most probably used, not for congress, but for the people at large. They persuaded themselves that the attachments towards Britain, and prejudices against France, which had once subsisted, could not have been entirely eradicated; and that a plain demonstration that the original ground of contest was yielded by England, would detach such numbers from the supporters of the war, as would render unavoidable an accommodation on the terms proposed. It had therefore now become a game of skill, in which the affections and passions of the people were played for, and was no longer a mere diplomatic correspondence, treating on the interests of two great nations, with the hope of accommodation between the negotiators.

The first decisive rejection of the terms held forth in the conciliatory bills, had been made at a time, when the existence of the treaties with France was neither known nor suspected. Congress had refused to listen to the propositions

of the commissioners, when no certainty existed CHAP. X.

of the commencement of war between France and England; and when, the eventual treaty of alliance not having taken effect, they were at perfect liberty to negotiate a separate peace. Intelligence was now received of the arrival of a French fleet with a minister; and the utmost confidence prevailed that a European war was inevitable. There was therefore no probability that propositions which had been rejected under circumstances much less favourable to the establishment of American independence, could be accepted when the prospects of the United States wore a brighter aspect than they had ever before assumed. The present and subsequent proceedings therefore, were designed to act on the public mind; and certainly, the moderation breathed in the letter of the 13th of July, was well calculated to rekindle any latent spark of attachment which might yet linger in the bosoms of those who had once prided themselves in the character of British subjects, and to incline to peace, on the terms offered, the great mass who were believed to have given sufficient indications of being wearied with the sufferings and calamities of war.

The letter recited above having been read, congress resolved that, as neither the independence of the United States was explicitly acknowledged, nor the fleets and armies withdrawn, no answer should be given to it.

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1778.

July 15.

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