of the first movement of the enemy. Corres- CHAP. VIII. ponding orders were also given to the rear divi- 1778. sion of the army.

About five in the morning, intelligence was received from general Dickenson, that the front of the enemy was in motion. The troops were immediately put under arms, and orders were dispatched by an aid-du-camp to general Lee, directing him to move on and attack the rear, "unless there should be powerful reasons to the contrary." He was at the same time informed, that the main army would be on its march to support him.

Sir Henry Clinton had perceived from the appearances on his flanks and rear on the 27th, that the American army was in his neighbourhood, and had therefore changed the order of his march. The whole baggage was placed under the care of general Knyphausen, while the strength and flower of his army, entirely unincumbered, formed the rear division, which was placed under the particular command of lord Cornwallis, and was accompanied by sir Henry in person.

To avoid pressing on general Knyphausen, Cornwallis remained on his ground until about eight o'clock, and then descending from the heights of Freehold, into a plain of about three miles in extent, took up his line of march in rear of the front division.c

Letter of sir Henry Clinton.

June 28.

CHAP. VIII.

On receiving the orders which had been 1778. given in the preceding evening, and repeated in the morning, general Lee had made the dispositions necessary for their execution; and, soon after the rear of the enemy was in motion, he prepared to attack it. General Dickenson had been directed to detach some of his best troops, to take such a position as to co-operate with him; and Morgan also was ordered to act on their right flank, but with so much caution, as to be able readily to extricate himself, and form a junction with Lee, should it be neces

sary.

He appeared on the heights of Freehold soon after the enemy had left them, and following the British into the plain, gave directions to general Wayne to attack their covering party in the rear so as to halt them, but not to press them sufficiently either to force them up to the main body, or to draw re-enforcements from thence to their aid. In the mean-time, he proposed to gain their front by a shorter road on their left, and entirely intercepting their communication with the line, to bear them off before they could be assisted.

While in the execution of this design, a gentleman of general, Washington's suite came up to gain intelligence, and to him, Lee communicated his present object.

Before he reached the point of destination, there was reason to believe that the enemy were in much greater force than had been expected.

The intelligence on this subject was very con- CHAP. VIIL tradictory, and the face of the country, which was a good deal covered with woods, was well calculated to conceal the truth. He therefore deemed it advisable to reconnoitre them in person, and to satisfy himself, from his own view, of their numbers.

Be

Sir Henry Clinton, soon after the rear division was in full march, had received intelligence that a column of the Americans was on his left flank. This being a corps of militia, was soon dispersed, and the march continued. When his rear guard had descended from the hills, he saw it followed by a strong corps, soon after which, a cannonade upon it was commenced from some pieces of artillery commanded by colonel Oswald, and at the same time, he received intelligence that a respectable force had shown itself on both his flanks. lieving a design to have been formed on his baggage, which in the defiles through which it was to pass, would be considerably exposed, he determined, in order to secure it from the danger with which it was threatened, to attack the troops in his rear with all his force, so vigorously, as to compel them to call off those on his flanks. This induced him to march back his whole rear division, which movement was making, as Lee advanced for the purpose of reconnoitring to the front of the wood which adjoined the plain that has been mentioned.

CHAP. VII. He soon perceived himself to have been mis1778. taken in the force which formed the rear of the British; but he yet proposed to engage on that ground, although his judgment, as was afterwards stated by himself on an inquiry into his conduct, disapproved of it; there being a morass immediately in his rear, which could not be passed without difficulty, and which would necessarily impede the arrival of re-enforcements to his aid, and embarass his retreat should he be finally overpowered.

This was about 10 o'clock. While both armies were preparing for action, and performing those previous manœuvres which each deemed necessary, general Scott (as stated by general Lee) mistook an oblique march of an American column for a retreat; and, in the apprehension of being abandoned, left his position, and repassed the ravine in his rear.

Being himself of opinion, that the ground on which the army was drawn up was by no means. favourable to them, Lee did not correct the error Scott had committed, but directed the whole detachment to regain the heights they had passed.

He was pressed by the enemy, and some slight skirmishing ensued during this retrogade movement, in which very little damage was done on either side.

When the first firing announced the commencement of the action, the rear of the army

threw off their packs, and advanced rapidly to CHAP. VIII. the support of the front. As they approached 1778. the scene of action, general Washington, who had received no intelligence from Lee notifying his retreat, rode forward; and about noon, after the army had marched about five miles, to his utter astonishment and mortification, met the advanced corps retiring before the enemy, without having made a single effort to maintain their ground. Those whom he first fell in with, neither understood the motives which had governed general Lee, nor his present design; and could give no other information than that, by his orders, they had fled without fighting.

General Washington rode to the rear of the division, which he found closely pressed. There he met Lee, to whom he spoke in terms of some warmth, implying disapprobation of his conduct. He also gave immediate orders to the regiments commanded by colonel Stewart, and lieutenant colonel Ramsay, to form on a piece of ground which he deemed proper for the purpose of checking the enemy, who were advancing rapidly on them. General Lee was then ordered to take proper measures with the residue of his force to stop the British column on that ground, and the commander in chief rode back himself to arrange the rear division of the army.