CHAP. VIII. equally divided. Those who were decidedly 1778. against hazarding a serious action, either. ge

The opinion

of the general

decision.

neral or partial, conceived the number agreed on competent to every purpose which ought to be contemplated; while others, who privately wished to bring on something more than light skirmishing, but had not sufficient confidence in themselves to hazard the responsibility of openly advising the measure, were desirous of augmenting it to two thousand, or two thousand five hundred men.

General Washington still retained his incliagainst this nation to engage the enemy, and finding himself supported by the private wishes of some officers whom he highly valued, he determined to take his measures on his own responsibility, and without calling another council. Hearing that the enemy were on their march towards Monmouth court-house, he resolved still further to June 25. strengthen the forces on the lines; and, in pursuance of this resolution, dispatched brigadier general Wayne with a further detachment of one thousand select men. As the Continental troops now in front of the main army amounted to at least four thousand men, a number believed to be capable of rendering the service expected from them, he deemed it proper to employ a major general to collect and command them.

This tour of duty, major general Lee had a right to claim. But as he was openly and strongly against hazarding even a partial en

gagement, and expected that, in conformity CHAP. VIII. with the advice signed by all the general offi- 1778. cers then in camp, with one single exception, nothing would be attempted further than merely

to reconnoitre the enemy, and restrain plundering parties, he showed no disposition to assert his claim, and very readily assenting to the private wishes of general Washington, that the command should be given to an officer whose view of the service comported more with his own; yielded this important tour of duty to La Fayette. The orders given this general were, to proceed immediately with the detachment, and to form a junction as expeditiously as possible with that under general Scott; to use the most effectual means for gaining the enemy's left flank, and rear, and giving them every degree of annoyance. All the Continental parties on the lines were placed under his command, and he was directed to 'take such measures in concert with general Dickenson, as would most impede the march of the enemy, and occasion them the greatest loss. For these purposes, he was to attack them as occasion might require by detachment, and, if a proper opening should be given, he was to act against them with the whole force under his command.

A letter was at the same time addressed to general Dickenson, placing the militia under the orders of La Fayette.

CHAP. VIL

These dispositions and orders manifest very 1778. conclusively the intention and wish of the commander in chief. They could scarcely fail to bring on an engagement. Wayne had openly espoused that measure, and Fayette, in council, although he joined in the opinion against seeking a general action, had been in favour of a partial one; and would, therefore, if any proper occasion offered, certainly attack with his whole force, which would as certainly produce such measures on the part of the enemy, as would render it proper to support him with the whole army. He was accompanied too by colonel Hamilton, who felt the strongest desire to signalize the detachment, and to accomplish all the wishes of the commander in chief.

Immediately after detaching this additional body of troops, the whole army moved to Cranberry, in order to be sufficiently near to June 26. support them. They reached that place about nine o'clock next morning.

The intense heat of the weather, a heavy storm, and a temporary want of provisions, prevented the army from resuming its march that day. The advanced corps being differently circumstanced, had pressed forward, and taken a position on the Monmouth road, about five miles in rear of the enemy, with the intention of attacking them next morning on their march. It was found too remote, and too far on the right, to be supported in case of action, and orders were therefore sent to the marquis, to

file off by his left towards Englishtown. These CHAP. VIII, orders were executed early in the morning of 1778. the 27th.

Although general Lee had at first been dis

posed to yield the advanced party to La Fayette, June 27. from an opinion that no effective service was intended, and that his station in the army was more honourable, that officer had scarcely marched, when Lee began to regret this decision. He perceived that, in the opinion of all the general officers, a greater importance was attached to this command, than he had allowed it; and that his reputation was in danger of being in some degree impaired, by connecting his strenuous opposition to even a partial action, with his afterwards declining the command of a very strong detachment, which it was expected would fall in with, and engage the rear of the enemy. He therefore now solicited very earnestly for the command he had before declined accepting.

To relieve the feelings of Lee without wounding those of La Fayette, general Washington detached him with two, other brigades to Englishtown, to support the marquis. He would of course have the direction of the whole front division, which would now amount to five thousand men; but it was expressly stipulated, that if any enterprise had been already formed by La Fayette, it should be proceeded with, in like manner as if the commanding

To this condi

CHAP. VIII. officer had not been changed. 1778. tion, Lee acceded, and with two additional brigades joined the front division of the army, the whole of which was now under his direction, and encamped at Englishtown. The main army also moved forward about three miles in his rear. Morgan's corps still hovered on the right flank of the British, and general Dickenson on their left.

Sir Henry Clinton had taken a very strong position. He was encamped on the high grounds about Monmouth court house, having his right flank in the skirt of a small wood, while his left was secured by a very thick one, and a morass running towards his rear. His whole front was also covered by a wood, and, for a considerable distance towards his left, by

a morass.

This position seemed unassailable, and the enemy were within twelve miles of the high grounds about Middletown, after their reaching which, it would be impossible to attempt any thing against them, with a prospect of

success.

Under these circumstances, general Washington determined to attack their rear the moment they should move from their ground. This determination was immediately communicated to general Lee, who was ordered to make his dispositions for the attack, and to keep his troops constantly lying on their arms, that he might be in readiness to take advantage

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