and if in doing so an engagement should become CHAP. VIII. unavoidable, it would be necessary to fight the 1778.

enemy.

army

Philadelphia, and march

Jerseys.

In the morning of the 18th, Philadelphia was The British evacuated, and in a few hours, all the British evacuate troops were encamped at Gloucester point on dough the the Jersey shore. Although they availed themselves to a great extent of the facility of transporting their effects by water, yet their line of march was so lengthened and incumbered by baggage, and the weather was so intensely hot, that they were under the necessity of proceeding very slowly. Indeed their movements wore the appearance of purposed delay, and were well calculated to favour the opinion, that sir Henry Clinton was willing to be overtaken, and wished for a general engagement.

He proceeded slowly through Haddonfield, Mount Holly, Slabtown, and Crosswick, to Allentown, and Imlaytown, which places he reached on the 24th. General Maxwell who had been posted at Mount Holly, retired on his approach, and joined general Dickenson, who was collecting the Jersey militia, but they were able to give very little other interruption to the march of the enemy, than was produced by breaking up the bridges in his route.

Thus far the road taken by sir Henry Clinton June 24. left his future destination entirely uncertain. Admitting New York to be his immediate object, he might either take the direct course

1778.

CHAP. VIII. to Amboy, or pursue the lower and rather more circuitous route to Sandy Hook. It was believed by some that he designed to occupy the high country, and to bring on a general engagement, or to seize the passes through the highlands of the Hudson. He had not yet diverged from the course proper for the attainment of either of these objects.

As his line of march, until he passed Crosswick, lay directly up the Delaware, and at no great distance from it, general Washington, who was in motion the day on which Philadelphia was evacuated, found it necessary to make an extensive circuit, and cross that river higher up, at Coryell's ferry. The movements of the enemy were so very slow, as to strengthen the opinion, that a general engagement was wished for; and as this, according to the plan settled in council, was to be avoided by the American army, he kept possession of the high grounds in Jersey, which enabled him to retain a choice, either of coming to, or avoiding an action; and at the same time, to continue in the direct course to cover the important passes in the highlands, if there should be any indications of an intention to make a rapid movement against them. He crossed the river on the 22d, and remained the 23d at Hopewell, in the high country adjacent to the ferry.

General Arnold, whose wounds were not yet sufficiently healed to fit him for active service, was appointed to take possession of Phi

ladelphia. He was directed to detach from CHAP. VII. thence about four hundred Continental troops, 1778. and as many militia as could be collected in the city, and the adjacent country, to advance on the rear of the enemy. If general Cadwalader could be prevailed on to command them, he was named by Washington for that service, as an officer in whom full confidence might be placed. Cadwalader engaged in it with alacrity, but could only add to his Continental force about fifty volunteers from Philadelphia, and about forty militia from the neighbourhood, who came out under general Lacy.

While at Hopewell, Morgan was detached June 23. with orders to gain the right flank of the enemy, and use his utmost endeavours to annoy it.

Sir Henry Clinton was now encamped at and June 24. about Allentown. The main body of the American army was in Hopewell township, about five miles from Princeton. Major general Dickenson with the Jersey militia, consisting of about one thousand men, and a brigade of Continental troops commanded by Maxwell, hung on the left flank towards the rear of the enemy. General Cadwalader with Jackson's regiment, and a very few militia, was entirely in their rear; and colonel Morgan with his regiment of six hundred men, was on their right. These detachments were furnished with guides by general Dickenson, and were ordered to harass the enemy as much as possible, and to

CHAP. VIII keep up a constant communication with the 1778. commander in chief, who proposed to regulate his movements by those of the hostile army.

Notwithstanding the almost concurrent opinion of the general officers against risking an action, Washington appears to have been very strongly inclined to that measure. With a mind of uncommon firmness, he possessed-a temper enterprising, as well as cautious, and could not readily be persuaded that, with an army he believed to be rather superior in point of numbers to the enemy, he put too much in hazard by fighting him. His general officers therefore were again assembled, and the situation of the two armies once more submitted to them. His own, exclusive of Maxwell's by general brigade, was stated to amount, according to a decide field return received a few days before, to ten tacking the thousand six hundred and eighty-four effective their march. rank and file. The force of the enemy could

Council of war called

Washington;

against at

enemy on

not be so accurately stated, but was believed to be rather less than ten thousand. This was the seventh day since the evacuation of Philadelphia, and in that time, the British army had marched less than forty miles. They were by the latest advices in two columns, the one on the Allentown, and the other on the Bordentown road.

Under these circumstances, he asked, whether it would be advisable, of choice, to hazard a general action? and if it would,

whether it should be brought on by an imme- CHAP. VIII. diate general attack, by a partial attack, or by 1778. taking such a position as must compel the enemy to become the assailants?

If the council should be of opinion that it was unadvisable to hazard an engagement, then he asked what measures could be taken, with safety to the army, to annoy the enemy in his march, should he proceed through the Jerseys?

The same opinion respecting a general action which had been given the day before the movement from Valley forge, was repeated. The proposition was peremptorily and decidedly negatived. But it was proposed to strengthen the corps on the left flank of the enemy, with a re-enforcement of fifteen hundred men, to act as occasion might serve; and that the main body of the army should preserve a relative position, so as to be able to act as circumstances should require.

In pursuance of this opinion of his military council, a detachment of fifteen hundred select men, under brigadier general Scott, was immediately formed, and marched to the lines; and the next day the army moved forward to King

ston.

Though every general officer except Wayne had signed the opinion given on the 24th, respecting the strength of this last detachment, yet the council had on that point been nearly