CHAP. VIII. It was, however, not easy, absolutely to de1778. termine the precise object, or course of the

enemy. The preparations making in Philadelphia, were such as equally denoted an expedition to the south, an embarkation of the whole army for New York, or elsewhere, or an intention of marching to that city through New Jersey. The latter was, in the opinion of the commander in chief, the plan contemplated; but those were not wanting who were sanguine enough to hope that the war in the United States was no longer to be prosecuted.

In the mean-time, every exertion was made by general Washington to strengthen his army. The detachments were called in, and the state governments pressed to expedite the march of their new levies.

Although this subject had been taken up immediately after going into winter quarters, and an army of forty thousand men agreed on for the campaign; although the strongest representations were made to the states, of the importance of bringing their quotas into the field early in the spring, and of the dangers to which America had already been exposed from their delaying to furnish their recruits by the time the season would admit of action; yet such were the real difficulties to be encountered by the states in raising men; and such the waste of time unavoidable in a system where the essential powers of government were vested in so many distinct bodies, that the spring was far

advanced before the ranks were strengthened Chap. VIII. by any new levies; and in some instances, 1778. when the soldiers should have been in camp, the legislature was yet deliberating on the means of raising them.

Sensible of the difficulty of recruiting infantry, as well as of the vast importance of a superiority in point of cavalry; and calculating on the patriotism of the young, and the wealthy, if the means should be furnished them of serving their country in a character which would be compatible with their feelings, and with that pride of station which exists every where; it was earnestly recommended by congress to the young gentlemen of property and spirit in the several states, to embody themselves into troops of cavalry, to serve without pay until the close of the year. Provisions were to be found for themselves and horses, and compensation to be made for any horses which might be lost in the service. This resolution did not produce the effect expected from it. The volunteers were few, and late in joining the army.

In the mean-time, the preparations for the evacuation of Philadelphia were expedited as much as possible, and the opinion that it was intended to reach New York through the Jerseys, gained ground.

General Maxwell, with the Jersey brigade, was ordered over the Delaware to take post about Mount Holly, and to join major general

1778.

CHAP. VIII. Dickenson, who was beginning to assemble the militia of that state, for the purpose of cooperating with the Continental troops, in breaking up the bridges, falling trees in the roads, and otherwise embarrassing the march of the enemy, should he attempt to reach New York by land. These troops were ordered to be careful not to expose themselves to a coup de main, and general Dickenson was advised to keep his militia in small light parties, hovering on the flanks of the enemy, so as to gall them on their march, without exhibiting an object of sufficient magnitude to induce any concerted plan against him.

A stronger detachment was requested, and general Gates, who now again commanded in the northern department, called earnestly for a re-enforcement to enable him to guard the highlands on the Hudson: but the state of the army did not admit of such a division. The enemy had given out, that they designed a visit to Valley forge, before they took leave of Pennsylvania; and, although this threat was not to be regarded while the army was kept entire,. it was very probable that such a distribution of the troops as was solicited, would induce them to realize it. The determination, therefore, to keep the army in force, and in its present station, until Philadelphia should be absolutely evacuated, was rigidly adhered to; and while the means to that end were taking, magazines were

laid up to support it in its march either to Fish- CHAP. VIII. Kill, or towards the lower parts of the Hudson. 1778. In this state of things, authentic intelligence June 17. was received that great part of the enemy had crossed the Delaware, and that the residue would undoubtedly very soon pass that river.

The opinion of all the general officers was required on the course now proper to be pursued. As it was an event which had been for some time expected, the subject had of course been naturally considered.

There were no advocates for an attempt to cut off the rear of the enemy while crossing the Delaware. All concurred in deeming it unadvisable to attempt entering the works about Philadelphia, until they should be entirely abandoned.

On the system to be pursued after crossing the Delaware, there was not so much unanimity. General Lee, who had lately been exchanged, and whose military experience gave great weight to his opinions, was vehement against risking either a general or partial engagement. According to the best estimate which could be formed of the strength of the British army, it was computed at ten thousand rank and file, fit for duty; that of the Americans amounted to between ten and eleven thousand. General Lee was decisively of opinion that, with such an equality of force, it would be criminal" to hazard an action. He relied much on the 3 N

VOL. III.

CHAP. VIII. advantageous ground on which their late foreign 1778. connexions had placed the United States, and

strongly contended that only a defeat of their army could now endanger their independence. To this, he said, the army ought not to be exposed. It would be impossible, he thought, to bring on a partial action, without risking its being made general, if such should be the choice of the enemy; since the detachment which should engage must be supported, or be cut to pieces. A general action ought not to be fought, unless the advantage was manifestly with the American army. This at present was by no means the case. He attributed so much to the superiority of the enemy in point of discipline, as to be of opinion that the issue of the engagement would almost certainly be unfavourable.

General Du Portail, a French officer of considerable military reputation, maintained the same opinions: and the baron De Steuben also thought an action ought carefully to be avoided. The American officers seem to have been influenced by the councils of the Europeans, and of seventeen generals, only Wayne and Cadwalader were decidedly in favour of attacking the enemy. Fayette appeared inclined to that opinion, without openly embracing it. General Greene also was disposed to hazard more than the councils of the majority would sanction. The country he thought must be protected;