CHAP. VIII. militia, seldom amounting to six hundred, and 1778. sometimes not exceeding fifty, watched the roads leading to Philadelphia on the north side of the Schuylkill, and was generally posted within twenty miles of that town.

General Lacy

surprised.

This expedition was entrusted to colonel Abercrombie and major Simcoe, who avoided all the posts Lacy had established for his security, and threw a body of troops in his rear before he discovered their approach. After a very short resistance, he escaped with the loss of a few men killed, and all his baggage. Had he been apprized that the enemy were advancing on him, he might have retired, and saved his baggage; but the force he possessed, by no means enabled him to maintain his ground. The militia were entirely dispersed, and general Lacy was soon afterwards relieved by general Potter who, although he had rendered' considerable service during the preceding campaign and the early part of the winter, had made himself unacceptable both to the militia and inhabitants, by his endeavours to introduce discipline among the former, and by the severe corporal punishment he inflicted on the latter, when detected in attempting to violate the laws, by carrying supplies to the Philadelphia market.*

*This, however, did not deter him from resuming the practice, when he resumed the command.

Congress had felt so severely the conse- CHAP. VIIL quences resulting from the entire command of 1778. the water being possessed by the enemy, as to have made great exertions to gain an ascendency on that element wherever it was practicable, and to avail themselves, partially, of the advantages of a naval force. For this purpose they generally sunk impediments in the rivers of common use, so as to obstruct the passage of the enemy up them, and constructed frigates and other smaller vessels to be employed above those impediments, or elsewhere, as the occasion might require.

Several of these vessels, in addition to those engaged in the defence of fort Mifflin, had been commenced above Philadelphia, but were not entirely completed when the enemy obtained possession of the river. General Washington was extremely apprehensive for their safety, and feared before the evacuation of forts Mifflin and Mercer, that the enemy would possess them, and use them to advantage against the first of those places, and against the small fleet which assisted in its defence. He had repeatedly expressed these apprehensions, and his desire that the frigates should be sunk in such a manner as to be weighed with difficulty, if an attempt to raise them should be made. The persons, however, intrusted by congress with their superintendence, supposed it would be equally secure to put plugs in different parts of

CHAP. VIII them, which might be drawn out on the ap1778. proach of the enemy, and the vessels sunk before they could be removed or destroyed.

May 18.

Against these vessels, and some stores collected at Bordentown, an expedition was plan. ned, which ended in their entire destruction. General Dickinson was in the neighbourhood, but his force was too small to interrupt the execution of the design; and general Maxwell, who had been ordered out by the commander in chief on the first intelligence that the enemy were advancing up the Delaware, was retarded in his march by a heavy rain, which continued falling for several hours; but which did not obstruct the movement of the British detachment, which passed up the river in vessels prepared for the purpose.

To cover the country effectually on the north of the Schuylkill, and restrain as much as possible the parties detached in various directions from Philadelphia, who most generally effected their object, and returned before they could be opposed by the army lying at Valley forge; to form an advance guard for the security of the main army, and to be in readiness to annoy, if practicable, the rear of the enemy, should they evacuate Philadelphia, an event which a great variety of circumstances combined to prove was in contemplation, the marquis de La Fayette was detached with somewhat more than two thousand choice troops, and a few

pieces of cannon, to take post near the lines. CHAP. VII. As this corps formed a very valuable part of the 1778. army, the instructions of the general recom. mended the utmost attention to its safety, and particularly advised him to avoid any permanent station, since a long continuauce in one position, would enable the enemy to concert their measures successfully against him.

With this detachment, the marquis crossed the Schuylkill, and took post at Barren hill, about eight or ten miles in front of the army at Valley forge. Immediate notice of his arrival was given to sir William Howe, who reconnoitred his position, and formed a plan to surprise and cut him off.

In execution of this plan, on the night of the 19th, general Grant with five thousand select troops, took the road which leads up the Delaware, and consequently diverges from Barren hill. After marching along this road some distance, he inclined to the left, and passing by White marsh, where several roads unite, took one leading to the position he was directed to occupy, something more than a mile in the rear of the marquis, between him and Valley forge. He reached his point of destination about sun-rise, entirely undiscovered. Here, the roads fork; the one leading to the camp La Fayette, and the other to Matson's ford over the Schuylkill. In the course of the night, general Gray with a strong detachment, had

of

May 20.

CHAP. VIII. advanced along the south side of the Schuylkill, 1778. and taken post at a ford, two or three miles in front of the right flank of La Fayette, while the residue of the army encamped on Chesnut hill.

Thus perilous was the situation of the marquis, when he first discovered the danger which threatened him. It was about the same time perceived from the camp at Valley forge. Alarm guns were fired to announce it to him, and the whole army was put under arms to act as circumstances might require.. Thus surrounded with danger, Fayette took, with promptitude and decision, the only course which could have preserved him. He put his troops instantly in motion and passed over at Matson's ford, which was rather nearer to general Grant than himself, without being intercepted by that officer, or sustaining a greater loss than nine

men.

Having crossed the river, and taken possession of the high grounds on the other side, he sent back a small party to bring over his field pieces, which were also secured.

General Grant, who had reached the ground lately occupied by Fayette, soon after it was abandoned, followed his rear, and appeared at the ford just after the Americans had crossed it; but finding them very advantageously posted, he did not choose to attack them, and the whole army returned to Philadelphia, having effected nothing.