CHAP. VII discussion, was at length agreed to, and minis1778. ters were appointed to negotiate the treaties proposed.

Mr. Franklin, mr. Deane, and mr. Jefferson, were elected; but the last mentioned gentleman having declined accepting the appointment offered him, mr. Arthur Lee, then in London was chosen in his place.

These transactions were placed on the secret journals, and no member was permitted to give any specific information concerning them, or to state more than, "that congress had taken such steps as they judged necessary for obtaining foreign alliances." The secret committee were directed to make an effectual lodgment in France of ten thousand pounds sterling, subject to the order of these commissioners.

They assembled in Paris early in the winter, and had an immediate interview with the count De Vergennes. It was perceived that the immense success of the American cruisers, whose captures had been so considerable as to raise the price of insurance higher than it had been at any time during the war with both France ⚫ and Spain, had excited a very favourable opinion of the capacities and energies of the nation; that the ports of France would remain open to their ships, and that the American merchants might freely vend in them every article of commerce, and purchase whatever might be useful for their country; but that the

minister was extremely cautious of giving um- CHAP. VII. brage to England, and was therefore desirous 1778. of avoiding their open reception, of acknowledging them, or entering into any formal negotiation with them, as the ministers from congress. So exactly did the count De Vergennes conform to the cautious system he had prescribed for himself, that, though the fact was well known to the ministers of the United States, that military stores to a considerable amount had been taken out of the king's magazines, in order to be exported to America, yet he affected, in their presence, to know nothing of this operation, and claimed no merit for his court on that account. He also intimated to them that it would be well taken, if they would communicate with no other person about the court but himself, concerning their affairs.

Their applications for naval assistance, bottomed on the advantages France and her colonies would derive from the independence of the United States, were positively rejected; but the rejection was accompanied with reasons, tending to show that the American cause would not be promoted by such aid.

In this state of the negotiation, the utmost circumspection was used with regard to England. Every step was taken publicly to gratify her. The remonstrances of her ambassador were scrupulously attended to; the departure of ships having military stores on board

CHAP. VII. was forbidden, though they were afterwards. 1778. privately permitted to sail, or sailed without

permission; officers, who had leave of absence, and were about to join the American army, were recalled, strict orders were given that American prizes should not be sold in the ports of France; and, on some occasions, they went so far as to compel the cruisers to give up the ships they had captured, and brought. into port, and to give security to return immediately to America, and cruise no more in the European seas. During these public demonstrations of dispositions favourable to England, it was intimated privately to the American ministers by persons about the court, that, though these measures were necessary for the present, they might be assured of the good will of the French government: means were taken to facilitate to them the negotiations of loans; and the owners of American privateers, though forbidden to sell their prizes or to have them condemned, found means privately to dispose of them, and turn them into money."

Matters remained in this fluctuating state from December 1776, to December 1777. Privately encouraged, while publicly discountenanced, the prospects of the American ministers varied according to the complexion of American affairs. A gentleman' whose official

situation gave him an opportunity to inspect all CHAP. VII. the communications of foreign ministers, ob- 1778. serves, "that the defeat on Long Island, the reduction of New York, and the train of disasterous events in 1776 which have already been mentioned, sunk the credit of the Americans very low, and abated much of the national ardour for their support. Their subsequent successes at Trenton and Princeton effaced these impressions, and rekindled active zeal in their behalf. The capture of Burgoyne fixed these wavering politics. The success of the Americans in the campaign of 1777, placed them on high ground. Their enmity had proved itself formidable to Britain, and their friendship became desirable to France. Having helped themselves, they found it less difficult. to obtain help from others. The same interest which hitherto had directed the court of France to a temporizing policy, now required decisive conduct. Previous delay had favoured the dismemberment of the empire,* but further procrastination bid fair to promote, at least such a federal alliance of the disjointed parts of the British empire, as would be no less hostile to the interests of France, than a reunion of its severed parts.

* This sentiment of mr. R. we do not adopt. The delay did not, it is believed, favour the dismemberment, whatever might have been its object.

CHAP. VII. ·

The news of the capitulation at Saratoga 1778. reached France very early in December 1777. The American deputies took that opportunity to press for an acceptance of the treaty which had been under consideration for the preceding twelve months. It was stated to be of the last importance, at this juncture, when Britain would, most probably, make proposals for an accommodation, that congress should know, precisely, what was to be expected from France and Spain.

They were informed by mr. Girard, one of the secretaries of the king's council of state, that it was decided to acknowledge the independence of the United States, and to make a treaty with them. That in the treaty, no advantage would be taken of their situation to obtain terms, which, otherwise, it would not be convenient for them to agree to. That his most christian majesty desired the treaty once made should be durable, and their amity to subsist forever, which could not be expected, if each nation did not find an interest in its continuance, as well as in its commencement. It was therefore intended that the terms of the treaty should be such, as the new formed states would be willing to agree to, if they had been long since established, and in the fullness of strength and power; and such as they should approve of, when that time should come.

That his most christian majesty was fixed in his determination, not only to acknowledge, but