army,

CHAP. VI. militia, must always be liable, procrastinated 1778. for some time the arrival of those who had been called out for the succeeding tour of duty; and, when they did arrive, they were without arms. As usual, the greater part of those in the hands of their predecessors were lost, or carried home by the individuals who had used them. In this interval, while the country was necessarily unguarded, the first droves of fatted cattle were passing through it, from Connecticut to camp. One of these was met about thirty miles from -Philadelphia by one of the disaffected, who, as was at the time alleged, passed on the driver for a commissary belonging to the American: and having in this character billetted them at a neighbouring farm, of which the owner held principles alike unfavourable, he gave immediate notice of their situation to the British general, who detached a party of horse to seize and bring them into Philadelphia. During this interval too between the dispersion: of one corps of militia, and the collection of another, the country north of the Schuylkill was only guarded by a few horsemen under major Jameson, who could not possibly prevent the intercourse of the people with the town. It was perceived that the mills in the neighbourhood of Germantown were perpetually employed in manufacturing flour for the enemy, which the favourable dispositions of the people enabled them to receive in spite of every means

which could be used to prevent it. To put an CHAP. VI. end to this source of supply, general Washington 1778. was under the necessity of ordering the mills

to be rendered unfit for use; and this service was executed by major Jameson.

2

At no period of the war had the American army been reduced to a situation of greater peril than during the winter at Valley forge. It has been already stated, that more than once, they were absolutely without food. Even while their condition was less desperate in this respect, their stock of provisions was so scanty, that there was seldom at any time in the stores a quantity sufficient for the use of the troops for one week. Consequently, had the enemy moved out in force, the American army could not have continued in camp. The want of provisions would have forced them out of it; and their deplorable condition with respect to clothes, disabled them from keeping the field in the winter. The returns of the first of February exhibit the astonishing number of three thousand nine hundred and eighty-nine men in camp unfit for duty, for want of clothes. Of this number scarcely a man had a pair of shoes. Even among those returned capable of doing duty, very many were so badly clad, that exposure to the colds of the season must have destroyed them. Although the total of the army exceeded seventeen thousand men, the present effective rank and file amounted to only

1778.

CHAP. VI. five thousand and twelve. The returns throughout the winter do not essentially vary from that which has just been particularly stated.

While the sufferings of the soldiers, first, during a winter campaign, and afterwards, in what were termed winter quarters, filled the hospitals, a dreadful mortality still continued to prevail in those miserable receptacles of the sick where death was often found by those who entered them in quest of health. The provision made for them, which was at best inadequate to their wants, was said to be misapplied. They were crowded in small apartments, and a violent putrid fever raged among them, which carried off much greater numbers than all the diseases of the camp.

If then, during the deep snows which covered the earth for a great part of the winter, the enemy had taken the field, their own sufferings must indeed have been great, but the American loss must have been infinitely greater. General Washington must either have fought them with inferior numbers, and have staked the safety of his army on the issue of that battle, or have retreated further into the country; a measure which could not possibly have been effected without the loss of many of his naked and barefooted soldiers.

Happily, the real condition of his army was not well understood by sir William Howe, and that officer had ever been extremely careful of

1778.

the lives and comfort of his own troops. He CHAP. VI. had on no occasion manifested a disposition to hazard them without a clear advantage, and perhaps his conduct was, in the general, wise and able, as well as cautious. In this particular instance, however, a winter expedition would have infinitely distressed and injured the American army. Fortunately, sir William Howe confined his operations to those small excursions that were calculated to enlarge the comforts of his own army, which, notwithstanding the good disposition of the neighbouring country, was much distressed for fuel, and often in great want of forage and fresh provisions. The vigilance used on the lines, especially on the south side of the Schuylkill, intercepted a great portion of the supplies designed for the Philadelphia market; and corporal punishment was not unfrequently inflicted on those who were detected in attempting this infraction of the laws. As captain Lee was extremely active, and always in the neighbourhood of the enemy, a plan was formed late in January, to surprise Attempt and capture both him and his troop in their captain Lee's quarters. A very extensive circuit was made the gallant by a large body of cavalry, and four of his made by him. patrols were seized without communicating the alarm. About break of day, the enemy appeared, and the few men of the troop who were in the house with their captain were immediately posted at the doors and windows.

to surprise

corps, and

resistance

1

March 28.

CHAP. VI. Though his party was so small as not to fur1778. nish one to each window, they behaved so gallantly as to drive off the assailants without losing a horse, or more than one person. Their quarter master serjeant, who was out of the house, when the attack commenced, after being almost cut to pieces, was taken prisoner. The whole number in the house did not exceed ten.* That of the enemy was said to amount to two hundred. They lost a serjeant and three men with several horses killed; and an officer and three men wounded. On the part of captain Lee, except his patrols and quarter master serjeant, who were captured out of the house, only lieutenant Lindsay and one private were wounded.

The event of this skirmish gave great pleasure to the commander in chief. Throughout the late campaign, Lee had been eminently useful to him, and had given proofs of talents as a partisan, from which he had formed sanguine expectations for the future. He mentioned this affair in his orders with strong marks of approbation, and in a private letter to the captain testified the satisfaction he felt, at the honourable escape that officer had made from a stratagem, which had so seriously threatened him.

For his merit through the preceding campaign, congress promoted him to the rank of

* Major Jameson was accidentally present, and engaged in this skirmish.