re-enforcing in numbers, and general Washing- CHAP. VI.
ton being unwilling to move from the heights 1777.
in order to come to an engagement on the
ground which was the scene of the skirmish,
declined re-enforcing Gist and Morgan; who,
in their turn, were compelled to give way.

->The enemy continued manoeuvring towards
the flank, and in front of the left wing, the
position of which Washington in some degree
changed, so as to prepare to receive their whole
force in that quarter, on which an attack was
every instant expected, and to bring his right
to its support. The day was spent in these
manœuvres; in the course of which, Washing-
ton rode through every brigade of his army,
delivering in person his orders respecting the
manner of receiving the enemy, exhorting his
troops to rely principally on the bayonet, and
encouraging them by the steady firmness of
his countenance, as well as by his words, to a
vigorous performance of their duty. The dis-
positions of the evening indicated an intention
to attack him the ensuing morning; but in the
afternoon of the next day, the enemy suddenly
filed off from their right, which had extended Returns to
beyond the American left, and retreated to
Philadelphia. Light parties were detached to
harass their rear, but could not overtake it.

The loss of the enemy in this expedition, as
stated in the official letter of general Howe,
rather exceeded one hundred, in killed,

Dec. 8.

the city.

CHAP. VI. wounded, and missing; and was principally 1777. sustained in the skirmish of the seventh, in which major Morris fell.

On no former occasion had the two armies met, uncovered by works, with the superiority in point of numbers in favour of the Americans. The effective force of the enemy was stated at twelve thousand men. It has been since declared by an author, who then belonged to it, but who appears to have imbibed strong prejudices against sir William Howe, to have amounted to fourteen thousand. The American army consisted of precisely twelve thousand one hundred and sixty-one continental troops, and three thousand two hundred and forty-one militia. This equality in point of numbers between the Continental troops and the enemy, rendered it a prudent precaution to retain the superiority of position which had been acquired. The two armies having occupied hills fronting each other, neither could attack without giving to its adversary, in some degree, the advantage in point of ground; and that was an advantage which neither seemed willing to part with..

The return of sir William Howe to Philadelphia without bringing on the action which was so entirely in his power, after marching out with the avowed intention of fighting, is the best testimony of the respect he felt for the

* Stedman.

talents of his adversary, and the courage of the CHAP. VI. troops he was to contend with.

His movements were all calculated to preserve in the mind of Washington, the conviction that he should be able to fight on his own ground, and it was not easy to believe that Howe would exhibit to America, the spectacle of withdrawing his whole force from the face of his enemy into Philadelphia, without a general engagement, while his opponents kept the field. This movement was certainly calculated to support the opinion, that he felt no certain confidence of a victory over a Continental army equally numerous with his own.

On the first intelligence that the enemy was in motion, the tents and heavy baggage had been removed, so as to leave the army entirely unincumbered, and expose nothing to loss, if the event should be unfortunate, which was not necessarily put into hazard.

The season was now becoming extremely severe, and it was impossible with an army. not half clothed, and with a very inadequate supply of blankets, any longer to keep the field in tents. It was absolutely necessary to place them in winter quarters; but in the existing state of things, the choice of winter quarters was a subject for serious reflection. It was impossible to canton them in villages, without, in a great degree, uncovering the country, or

1777.

CHAP. VI. being exposed to the hazard of being beaten in 1777. detachment.

To avoid risking the one or the other of these calamities, it was determined to take a strong position in the neighbourhood of the enemy, equally distant from the Delaware above and below Philadelphia; and there to erect huts, in the form of a regular encampment, which might cover the army during the winter. A very strong and commanding piece of ground at Valley forge, on the west side of the Schuylkill, between twenty and thirty miles from Philadelphia, was selected for that purpose; and some time before day on the morning of the 11th of December, the army commenced its march to take possession of it. By an accidental concurrence of circumstances, lord Cornwallis at the head of a very strong corps, had been detached that morning on the west side of the Schuylkill, on a foraging party. Having fallen in with a brigade of Pennsylvania militia under general Potter, which was posted there in order to cover that country from small plundering parties, and to intercept the people who might be going to market, he soon dispersed it. Pursuing the fugitives, he had gained the heights opposite Matson's ford, over which a bridge had been thrown for the purpose of crossing the river, and had posted troops so as to command the defile called the Gulf, and the road from the ford,

just as the front division of the American army CHAP. VI. had gained the western bank of the river. This 1777. movement, which was entirely unexpected, had been made without any knowledge of the intention of general Washington to change his position, or any design of contesting with him the passage of the Schuylkill; but the troops had been posted in the manner already mentioned, merely to cover a party at that time foraging in the country.

The first intelligence induced an opinion that the whole British army was out; and as it would have been extremely dangerous to attempt crossing the bridge in their face, the troops already on the west side were called back, and the army moved rather higher up the river, for the purpose of understanding the real situation, force, and designs of the enemy. The next day, lord Cornwallis returned to Philadelphia, and general Washington crossed Dea 12. the Schuylkill in the course of the night.

Here, the commander in chief for the first time communicated to his army in general orders, the manner in which he designed to dispose of them during the winter. He expressed the strongest approbation of their past conduct, presented them with an encouraging state of the future prospects of their country, exhorted them to bear with continuing fortitude the hardships inseparable from the position they were about to take, and endeavoured to