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CHAP. VI. pensably necessary to carry them all; since, to 1777. leave a part of them to play on the rear of the columns while engaged in front with the enemy in Philadelphia, would be extremely hazardous. Supposing the redoubts carried, and the British army driven into town; yet, all military men agreed that nothing could be more hazardous than to storm a town. The streets would. be defended by an artillery greatly superior to that of the Americans, which would attack them in front, while the brick houses would be lined with musketry whose fire must thin the ranks of the assailants.

A part of the plan, the happy execution of which would be essential to success, was, that the enemy should be surprised in the rear by the corps which was to fall down the Delaware. This would require too many favourable concurring circumstances to be calculated on with any confidence. As the position of general Greene was well known, it could not be supposed that sir William Howe would be entirely inattentive to him. It was probable that even his embarkation might not be made unnoticed; but it was presuming a degree of negligence which ought not to be assumed, to suppose that he could pass down the Delaware to Philadelphia, undiscovered. So soon as he should be observed, it would not be difficult to comprehend the whole plan, and to prepare for it. It would never be conjectured that general

1777.

Greene was to attack singly; and, of conse- CHAP. VI. quence, it would be understood that a correspondent attack would be made on the lines in front.

If the attack in front should fail, which could not be thought even improbable, the total loss of the two thousand men thrown into the rear must follow; and general Howe would consequently maintain his superiority through the winter.

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The situation of America did not require these desperate measures. In the course of the campaign no considerable impression had been made. With great superiority of numbers, the British troops had indeed acquired the possession of some of the principal seaport towns, but they were enclosed in them, and could not obtain the command of the country, without risking a battle on equal terms, unless the army should destroy itself by some such enterprise. That their general would be compelled to risk such a battle, or to manifest his consciousness of inferiority to the American army; that the depreciation of paper money was the inevitable consequence of the immense emissions which had been made without corresponding taxes; and that it was by removing the cause, not by sacrificing the army, the depreciation was to be stopped. The corruption and defection of the people, their unwillingness to serve in the army of the United States, were

CHAP. VI. evils which would be very greatly increased 1777. by an unsuccessful attempt on Philadelphia.

The mischief was admitted and lamented, but it only increased the necessity of preserving the present military force, and not exposing it to useless hazards by attempts from which only loss could be reasonably counted on, and which only a state of despair could justify.

Washington possessed too much discernment to be dazzled by the false brilliant presented by those who urged the necessity of storming Philadelphia, in order to throw a lustre around. his own fame, and that of his army; and too much firmness of temper, too much virtue and patriotism to be diverted from a purpose known to be right, by the clamours of the factious, or the discontents of the ignorant. Disregard. ing the importunities of mistaken friends, the insinuations of enemies, and the expectations of the ill informed, he persevered in his resolution to make no attempt on Philadelphia. He thereby saved his army, and was able to keep the field in the very face of the enemy; while the clamour of the moment wasted in air, and has long since been forgotten.

The determination against attacking Phila delphia being taken, general Greene was directed to fight lord Cornwallis in Jersey; if a fair occasion of doing so to advantage should present itself. But it has been already stated that, before he had been joined by the last brigade from the northern army, his lordship had

taken an unassailable position at Gloucester, CHAP. VL from whence he was passing over the supplies 1777. he had collected, to Philadelphia. In the belief that he would soon follow them with his detachment, and that general Howe, with his whole collected force, would avail himself of the division of the American army to attack December. their camp, Greene was directed immediately to repass the Delaware, and to join general. Washington.

The opinion of the intention of sir William Howe to make some attempt on the American camp, was not ill founded. Scarcely had lord Cornwallis returned to Philadelphia, and Greene rejoined the American army, when unquestionable intelligence was received of the preparations of the enemy to march out with all their strength, and with the avowed object of forcing Washington from his present position, and driving him beyond the mountains.

To prepare for the conflict believed to be approaching, orders were given that all the heavy baggage of the army should be in a condition to be removed at a moment's warning; and the soldiers were exhorted, by every motive of emulation and of patriotism, not to disappoint be high expectations formed of them by their country.

marches

On the night of the fourth of December, sir General Howe William Howe marched out of Philadelphia with his whole force, and encamped on Chesnut

out of Philadelphia.

CHAP. VI. hill, in front of the right of the American 1777. army and distant from it about three miles. Skirmishes A slight skirmish ensued between the Pennsyl

with the

American

army.

vania militia under general Irvin, and the advanced light parties of the enemy, in which the general was wounded and taken; and the militia, with very little other loss, were dispersed.

The range of hills on which the British were posted, approached nearer to those occupied by the Americans as they progressed northwardly.

Having continued the whole day reconnoitring the right, the enemy, in the course of the night, changed their ground, and moving to their right along the hills, took a very advantageous position, within about one mile of the Dec. 7. front of the American left. The next day, they inclined still further to the left, and in doing so approached still nearer that wing of the army. A general engagement was now believed certain, and general Gist with some Maryland militia, and colonel Morgan with his rifle corps, were ordered to attack their flanke ing and advanced parties. A sharp action ensued, in which major Morris of Jersey, a very brave officer in Morgan's regiment, was mortally wounded, and twenty-seven of his men were killed and wounded. A small loss was also sustained in the militia. The parties first attacked were driven in, but the enemy

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