rapid retreat in the night, up the Hudson, and CHAP. V. by recrossing that river, at, or above fort Ed- 1777. ward, to save the remainder of his army. To deprive the enemy of this last resource, a part of the troops on the east of the Hudson was ordered up to guard those fords, and, in the event of their being attempted, to defend their passage until the arrival of the army. In addition to this precaution, an intrenched camp furnished with artillery was formed on the high grounds between fort Edward and fort George.

Gates was not mistaken in supposing that the enemy would resort to this their last refuge. In a council of general officers called to deliberate on their situation, the resolution was taken to abandon every thing but their arms, and a sufficient quantity of provisions merely to support them until they should reach fort George, which might be carried on their backs; and by a forced march in the night, up the river, to extricate themselves from the American army: and crossing either at fort Edward, or at a ford above it, to press on to fort George.

This desperate resolution being taken, scouts were sent out to examine the route, who returned with information that those fords were already defended by strong parties. It would certainly have been found extremely difficult, if not impossible, to force them without artillery. This plan of retreat therefore was abandoned as impracticable.

CHAP. V. An account of the provision on hand was now 1777. directed to be taken, when it appeared that, even on short allowance, only a supply for three days remained in store.

Nothing could be more hopeless than the present condition of the British army, or more deplorable than that of their general, as described by himself.

In his letter to lord George Germain, secretary of state for American affairs, he says, "A series of hard toil, incessant effort, stubborn action, until disabled in the collateral branches of the army by the total defection of the Indians; the desertion, or timidity of the Canadians and provincials, some individuals excepted; disappointed in the last hope of any co-operation from other armies; the regular troops reduced by losses from the best parts, to three thousand five hundred fighting men, not two thousand of which were British; only three days provisions, upon short allowance in store, invested by an army of sixteen thousand men, and no appearance of retreat remaining; I called into council all the generals, field officers, and captains commanding corps, and by their unanimous concurrence and advice, I was induced to open a treaty with major general Gates."

A treaty was opened with a general proposition from Burgoyne, stating a willingness to spare the further effusion of blood, provided a negotiation could be effected on honourable

terms.

This proposition was answered by a demand' CHAP. V. on the part of general Gates, that the whole 1777. army should ground their arms in their encampment, and surrender themselves prisoners of war. This demand was at once rejected, with a declaration that, if general Gates designed to insist on it, the negotiation must immediately. break off, and hostilities recommence. On receiving this decided answer, the rigorous Surrender terms at first proposed were receded from, and under a convention was signed, by which it was agreed that the British army, after marching out October 16. of their encampment with all the honours of war, should lay down their arms, and not serve against the United States until exchanged. They were not to be detained in captivity, but. to be permitted to embark for England.

The situation of the British army considered, these stipulations were unquestionably highly honourable to their general, and favourable to their nation. Their services were indeed lost for the residue of the present campaign;. but, in the next, they might be replaced with other troops, whose stations they might fill without violating the treaty.

of the army

Burgoyne.

a Remem.

* The army of general Gates consisted of nine thousand and ninety-three continental troops. The number of the militia fluctuated; but they amounted, at the signature of the convention, to four thousand one hundred and twentynine. The sick exceeded two thousand five hundred men.

CHAP. V.

It is probable that terms so advantageous to 1777. them would not have been acceded to by general Gates, had he entertained no apprehensions from sir Henry Clinton, who was now making the promised diversion in the North river, up which he had penetrated as far as Esopus.

The draughts made of continental troops from Peck's Kill for both armies, had left that post in a situation to require the aid of militia for its security.

On the arrival, in September, of a reenforcement of Europeans at New York, fears were immediately entertained for the highlands; and general Putnam, in conformity with his instructions, called for assistance on Connecticut and New York, the governor of which latter state was also the commanding officer in the forts. His requisitions were complied with, but the enemy not marching immediately against those posts, and the services of the militia being necessary at home to seedtheir farms, they became extremely impatient: many of them deserted, and general Putnam was induced to discharge the residue.

Impressed with the danger to which the forts were exposed from this measure, and entirely convinced, from the present state of both the British armies, that the attack must be made very soon, if at all, governor Clinton immediately ordered out half the militia of New York, with assurances that they should be relieved in one month by the other half. This order, to

which a reluctant, obedience was paid, was ex- CHAP. V. ecuted so slowly, that the forts were carried 1777. before the militia were in the field.

That post had always been, in the opinion of the commander in chief, an object of the first importance; and, in no state of things, under no pressure of a superior force on the army commanded by himself, had he ceased to view it with interest, and to be attentive to its safety. When therefore his orders were given to make detachments from thence, in order to repel the incursions into Jersey, and to re-enforce the army in Pennsylvania, so as to leave, according to the returns, less than three thousand men, including the militia; he, in the most explicit terms, stated his apprehension that the enemy would attempt something up the North river. Under this impression, he directed that two thousand militia should be immediately called for from Connecticut to guard the passes through the mountains, while the forts themselves should be sufficiently garrisoned with the best troops. Great pains had been taken, and much labour employed, to render this position, which is by nature very strong, still more secure. The defences most relied on were forts Montgomery and Clinton, on the western bank of the Hudson, on very high ground, extremely difficult of access, and separated from each other by a small creek which runs from the mountains into the river. These forts were too much

1