CHAP. V. made great exertions to repair its losses and to 1777. re-enforce it. The utmost industry was used

to procure a supply of tents; artillery and ammunition were dispatched from Massachussetts; the remaining troops of that state were ordered to that department; and general Lincoln, who possessed in a very high degree the confidence of the New England militia, was, on that account, directed to raise and command them. General Arnold, so often distinguished for his gallantry in the field, was now ordered to the northern army, in the hope that his presence and reputation would serve to reanimate the troops; and, some time afterwards, colonel Morgan, with his corps of riflemen, was detached on the same service. Through the present dark gloom, Washington discerned a ray of light, and already cherished the hope that, with proper exertions, much good might result from present evil. "The evacuation of Ticonderoga, and mount Independence," said he, in a letter of the 15th of July to general Schuyler, "is an event of chagrin and surprise not apprehended nor within the compass of my reasoning. This stroke is severe indeed, and has distressed us much. But, notwithstanding things at present wear a dark and gloomy aspect, I hope a spirited opposition will check the progress of general Burgoyne's arms, and that the confidence derived from success will hurry him into measures, that will in their

consequences be favourable to us. We should CHAP. V. never despair. Our situation has before been 1777. unpromising, and has changed for the better. So, I trust, it will again. If new difficulties arise, we must only put forth new exertions, and proportion our efforts to the exigency of the times."

On receiving a letter from general Schuyler of the 17th, stating the position of the enemy, and informing him that a part of their force lay at Skeensborough, a body of between one and two thousand at Castletown, and that another had returned to Ticonderoga, in order to come by that route across lake George; and that there was also an advanced post near fort Anne; he seemed to anticipate the event, which afterwards occurred, and to suggest the measure which first commenced that torrent of misfortune with which Burgoyne was overwhelmed. "Though our affairs," said he in reply to this information, "have for some days past, worn a dark and gloomy aspect, I yet look forward to a fortunate and happy change. I trust general Burgoyne's army will meet sooner or later an effectual check; and, as I suggested before, that the success he has had will precipitate his ruin. From your accounts he appears to be pursuing that line of conduct which, of all others, is most favourable to us......... I mean, acting in detachment. This conduct will certainly give room for enterprise on our

CHAP. V. part, and expose his parties to great hazard. 1777. Could we be so happy as to cut one of them off, though it should not exceed four, five, or six hundred men, it would inspirit the people, and do away much of their present anxiety. In such an event, they would lose sight of past misfortunes; and, urged at the same time by a regard for their own security, they would fly to arms and afford every aid in their power."

Having allowed a short and necessary repose to his army in the neighbourhood of Skeensborough, while parties were employed in bringing up tents and provisions, general Burgoyne, much elated at the success which had hitherto attended him, proceeded with ardour to complete the remaining objects of the campaign. He soon perceived the toils and delays which must be encountered in reaching the Hudson. He found it necessary to open Wood creek, and, which was a work of much more difficulty and labour, to repair the roads and bridges which Schuyler had broken up and rendered for the present entirely impassable. Immense numbers of trees had been cut so as to fall in layers across the road, with their boughs interlocking with each other in places where it was impossible to find any other way than that which they covered. Besides removing these, above forty new bridges were to be constructed, and others to be repaired, one of which was entirely of log work, over a morass nearly two

miles in extent. Such was the labour and the CHAP. V. unavoidable delay of opening these difficult 1777. roads, that the army, though very little harassed on its march by the Americans, did not arrive on the Hudson in the neighbourhood of fort Edward until the 30th of July. Here it was necessary again to halt in order to bring from fort George, provisions, batteaux to be used on the Hudson, artillery, and other materials necessary to enable him to proceed in the expedition.

The time afforded by this delay had been employed by Schuyler to the utmost advantage. Some re-enforcements of fresh continental troops, though not all which were expected, had been received from Peck's. Kill; and though the critical season of the year, it being harvest time, together with the dislike to him prevailing in New England, prevented the militia from turning out in considerable numbers, they appeared in sufficient force to make a respectable addition to the regular army. But the loss of all the salt provisions was severely felt. Unaccustomed to the use of fresh meat only, the American soldiers when confined to it, became very sickly; and this cause tended still more to diminish a force already too inconsiderable to afford a reasonable prospect of suc- Burgoyne cess in a contest with the enemy opposed to fort Edward, them. On this account, as Burgoyne ap- retires to proached fort Edward, Schuyler retired over

approaches

and Schuyler

Saratoga.

1

CHAP. V. the Hudson to Saratoga, a few miles below that 1777. place:

From thence to Stillwater.

1

From thence, general Lincoln was dispatched to take command of the militia assembling at Manchester under colonel Warner, but who had not yet appeared in sufficient force to enable that officer to inspire the enemy with fears for their rear.

From Saratoga, general Schuyler retired to Stillwater, not far from the mouth of the Mohawk, where he ordered general Lincoln to join him, and fortified his camp, in the hope of being strong enough to defend it, before the enemy could approach him.

While at Stillwater, information was obtained that general Burgoyne had entirely evacuated Castletown, so that no communication was kept up with Ticonderoga, but through lake George, from whence nearly all his supplies were at present drawn; and that the garrison of that important place consisted only of three hundred men. In consequence of this intelligence, the orders to general Lincoln were countermanded, and he was directed with the militia of New Hampshire, of Massachussetts, and of the Grants, making, as was understood, a total of between two and three thousand men, to fall entirely in the rear of the enemy, and, if possible, cut off their communication with the lakes. This movement, it was supposed, would compel Burgoyne to weaken his