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1777.

CHAP. V. Having been augmented by those who, unable to keep up with the main body, had fallen out of the line of march, it amounted, according to a statement made by St. Clair, to somewhat more than one thousand men.

July 7.

ner attacked

Frazer, and obliged to

retreat.

The next morning at five o'clock, they were Colonel War- overtaken and attacked by general Frazer with by general eight hundred and fifty fighting men. The action was warm and well contested. In its commencement, orders were given to two regiments of militia, which had separated the evening before from the main body, and were lying within two miles of colonel Warner, to move up to his assistance. Instead of obeying these orders, they consulted their own safety, and pressed forward to Castletown with the utmost expedition. General St. Clair was of opinion that had these orders been executed, the corps which attacked Warner would have been cut to pieces. While the action was kept up with great spirit on both sides, general Reidisel arrived with his division of Germans, and the Americans were compelled to give way in all directions.

In this action, colonel Francis, several other officers, and upwards of two hundred men, were, according to the account given by Burgoyne, left dead on the field; and one colonel, seven captains, ten subalterns, and two hundred and ten privates were made prisoners. Near six hundred are supposed, on the same

authority, to have been wounded; many of CHAP. V. whom must have perished in attempting to escape through the woods towards the inhabited country, now Vermont. The enemy state their own loss at thirty-five killed, among whom was one field officer; and one hundred and fortyfour wounded, among whom were two majors and five inferior officers. From the length and sharpness of the conflict, it is scarcely to be supposed, notwithstanding the difference in arms, that the disparity in the killed could have been so considerable. It is the less probable as the pursuit was not kept up for any length

of time.

In general St. Clair's statement of this affair, he supposes about fifty to have been killed and wounded; but as the whole corps except Warner's regiment was entirely dispersed, he could only speak from conjecture, and most probably he was mistaken.

General Burgoyne represented colonel Warner's numbers at two thousand men, and gave much credit to Frazer and his party for having so long maintained so unequal a conflict; but, if the statement made of the strength of the garrison be correct, Warner's corps could not have exceeded twelve hundred, and at that number general St. Clair estimated it. The opinion they gave the British commander of their strength, is evidence of the gallantry with which they fought. Colonel Francis, who fell

CHAP. V. in the action, was spoken of in terms of great 1777. praise, by both armies. Just as he received intelligence of this defeat, St. Clair was also informed of the disaster at Skeensborough.

July 7.

To avoid the enemy, it was now necessary for him to change his route, and he sent orders to Warner to retire to Rutland, where he would join him. At Rutland, he fell in with many soldiers who had been separated from the corps, and two days afterwards, at Manchester, he was joined by Warner, at the head of about ninety men. After dispatching officers to Bennington, and Number Four, to collect the stragglers who, it was supposed, would pass through those places in their way to New England, he proceeded to join general Schuyler at fort Edward.

Colonel Long having retired from Skeensborough up Wood creek to fort Anne, was directed by Schuyler to defend that place. The ninth regiment of British under lieutenant colonel Hill, had been detached against it. On hearing that the Americans were in some force, two other regiments under brigadier Powell were ordered to support the first party. Before the arrival of this re-enforcement, the Colonel Long ninth regiment was attacked by colonel Long, and retires to and a sharp skirmish ensued, in which the Brifort Edward. tish kept their ground, and the advantage was

evacuates

claimed by both sides. Hearing that re-enforcements were coming up, Long set fire to

the works at fort Anne, and retired to fort CHAP. V. Edward.

1777.

At Stillwater, on his way to Ticonderoga, July 7. general Schuyler was informed of the evacuation of that place, and at Saratoga, the same day, the total loss of the stores at Skeensborough, was also reported to him. From general St. Clair he had heard nothing, and the most serious fears were entertained for the army commanded by that officer. His force, after being joined by colonel Long, consisted of about fifteen hundred continental troops, and the same number of militia. They were dispirited by defeat, without tents, badly armed, and had lost a great part of their stores and baggage. That part of the country was generally much alarmed, and even those who were well affected discovered, as is usual in such circumstances, much more inclination to take care of themselves, than to join the army.

In this gloomy state of things, it is impossible that any officer could have used more diligence or judgment than was displayed by Schuyler.

After the evacuation of fort Anne, Burgoyne found it absolutely necessary to suspend for a time all further pursuit, and to give his army some refreshment. In the active service in which they had been engaged, many of the soldiers had been two days without provisions, and they were all without tents. The troops

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CHAP. V. were in some derangement; distinct corps were 1777. intermingled, and the detachments were far apart from each other. He determined therefore to halt a few days at Skeensborough, in order to reassemble his army, and again arrange it. The baggage, artillery, and military. stores were brought up; and preparations were made, with the utmost dispatch, to move forward to Albany.

In the present state of things, unable even to look the enemy in the face, it was of unspeakable importance to the American general to gain time. This short and unavoidable interval from action, was therefore, seized by Schuyler, whose head quarters were at fort. Edward, and used to the utmost advantage.

The country between Skeensborough and fort Edward was almost entirely unsettled, covered with thick woods, of a surface extremely rough, and much intersected with creeks and morasses. As far as fort Anne, Wood creek was navigable with batteaux; and of course, very useful in the transportation of artillery, military stores, provisions, and heavy baggage.

The first moments of rest, while the enemy were assembling at Skeensborough, were employed by Schuyler in destroying the navigation of Wood creek, by sinking numerous impediments in its course; in breaking up the bridges, and otherwise rendering impassable

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