CHAP. IV. and ordered that it should be defended to the Never were orders better

1777. last extremity.

Nov. 11.

executed.

Several of the garrison were killed, and among them captain Treat, a very gallant officer who commanded the artillery. Colonel Smith received a contusion on his hip and arm, which obliged him to give up the command, and retire to Red Bank. Major Fleury was also slightly wounded, but not sufficiently to prevent his continuing to perform, with unremitted exertions, the arduous duties of his Twelfth station. His report to the commander in chief was, that though the block-houses were beaten down, all the guns in them except two disabled, and several breaches made in the walls, the place was still defensible; but the garrison was so unequal to what was required by the extent of the lines, and was so dispirited by watching, fatigue, and constant exposure to the cold rains, which were almost incessant; that he dreaded the event of an attempt to carry the place by assault. Fresh troops were ordered to their relief from Varnum's brigade, and the command was taken first by colonel Russell, Fourteenth, and afterwards by major Thayer. The artillery of the fort commanded by captain Lee, since the death of captain Treat, was extremely well served. The enemy was several times thrown into evident confusion, and a floating battery, which opened in the morning was entirely

silenced in the course of the day. Intelligence CHAP. IV. was received that efforts were making to bring 1777. up a frigate in the channel between the islands, followed by a sloop carrying her guns, and this intelligence, obtained from a reconnoitring party, was immediately communicated to the commodore, with orders to sink a hulk to obstruct the passage; but the difficulty of executing this order prevented its being attempted. The defence being more obstinate than had Nov. 15. been expected, the enemy brought up their ships as far as the obstructions in the river permitted, and kept up from them, as well as from their batteries, a most tremendous fire. The cover for the troops being now greatly impaired, they sustained much more injury than in the commencement of the siege. The brave garrison, however, still maintained their ground with the most unshaken firmness. In the midst of this severe and trying conflict, the Vigilant and a sloop of war were brought up the inner channel between Mud and Province islands, and taking a station within one hundred yards of the works, not only kept up a most destructive cannonade, but threw hand grenades into them; and with musketry from her round top, killed every man that appeared on the platform.

Major Thayer applied to the commodore to remove these vessels, and informed him that it would be impracticable longer to maintain the fort, if they kept their station. The commo

1

CHAP. IV. dore ordered six gallies on this service; but, 1777. after reconnoitring the situation of the vessels,

Fort Mifflin evacuated,

and posses

sion taken by

they returned without effecting any thing. Their report was, that these ships were so covered by the batteries on Province island, that it was impossible to remove them.

The fort was now apparently no longer tenable. The works were all in ruins, and afforded the British. no protection to the garrison, which had already suffered very much. The position of the Vigilant rendered any further continuance on the island a useless and prodigal waste of human Nov. 16. life; and about eleven o'clock in the night, the garrison was withdrawn.

f

Seventeenth.

Another attempt was made to drive the vessels from their stations, with a determination if it should succeed, again to take possession of the island, but the gallies effected nothing, and a detachment from Province island soon occupied the ground which had been abandoned.

The day after receiving intelligence of the evacuation of fort Mifflin, general Washington detached generals St. Clair, De Kalb, and Knox, to confer with general Varnum and the officers at fort Mercer; and, after viewing the ground and the river, to report on the practicability of continuing to defend the obstructions in the channel, and to state the force which would be necessary for that purpose. A council of the officers of the navy had already been

1777.

called by the commodore, in pursuance of a CHAP. IV. request of the commander in chief made before the evacuation had taken place, who were unanimously of opinion that it would be impracticable for the fleet, after the loss of the island, to maintain its station, or to assist in preventing the chevaux-de-frize from being weighed by the ships of the enemy. This service, however, they conceived might be effectually performed by batteries from the Jersey shore. The general officers who had been requested to view the situation of the works on that shore, and of the river, reported in favour of maintaining them. General Varnum and colonel Green appeared disposed to abandon the fort, as they believed it incapable of being defended against an attack by land, and were also of opinion that it had been in a great degree deprived of its importance by the loss of Mud island; since which, the vessels of the enemy navigated the water between Mud and Province islands, unmolested, and in full day. They were also apprehensive that by persevering to hold an indefensible place, the garrison would probably be lost, since the enemy might cross the Delaware, both above and below them, and a retreat by water was no longer practicable. Fort Mercer is situated between Manto and Timber creeks, which are impassable several miles, so that the retreat of the garrison could only be in one direction. F f

VOL. III.

CHAP. IV.

Their anxiety on this subject was increased 1777. by certain intelligence that lord Cornwallis with a very strong body of troops, reported to be from three to five thousand, had been detached from Philadelphia, and that his destination was avowed to be fort Mercer.

Nov. 18.

General Howe had now completed a line of defence from the Schuylkill to the Delaware, and a re-enforcement, ordered from New York, had arrived at Chester. These two circumstances enabled him to form an army in the Jerseys sufficient for the reduction of fort Mercer, without weakening himself so much in Philadelphia as to be apprehensive of danger from an attack on his lines. He still deemed it of the utmost importance, to open completely the navigation of the Delaware. Notwithstanding the supplies from the adjacent country, and the communication he had kept up with the ships through the passage along Province and Carpenter's islands, his army and the inhabitants of the city had suffered severely, both for provisions and fuel. He was therefore still determined to carry this favourite point.

Every preparation being now made, lord Cornwallis about one o'clock in the morning of the 17th, marched with a strong detachment to Chester, from whence he crossed over to Billingsport the next day, and was joined by the re-enforcement from New York:

General Washington received immediate intelligence of the march of this detachment,