who unanimously concurred in this opinion. CHAP. IV. At that time, the effective force of the British 1777. army, according to the best estimate the general could make of it, amounted to at least ten thousand rank and file. He supposed this estimate to be more probably too low, than too high.

The effective force of the continental army in rank and file, including Varnum's brigade, amounted to eight thousand three hundred and thirteen regulars, and two thousand seven hundred and seventeen militia, of which nineteen hundred and eighty-six, being the militia of Maryland and Virginia, would be discharged in three days. The garrisons of forts Mifflin and Mercer, consisting then of about six hundred and fifty continental troops, and three hundred Pennsylvania militia, and the detachment of about five hundred militia on the other side of the Schuylkill under general Potter, were not included in this computation.

To expedite as much as possible the re-enforcements from the north, colonel Hamilton was immediately dispatched to represent fully to general Gates the condition both of the British and American armies in Pennsylvania, and to urge him if he contemplated for them no other service of more importance, to send immediately to his aid the fifteen regiments of Massachussetts, and three of New Hampshire, which had been employed in the northern

CHAP. IV. department. His orders were not peremptory, 1777. because it was not impossible that some other

object (as the capture of New York) still more interesting than expelling general Howe from Philadelphia, might be contemplated by Gates; and with the accomplishment of any such object he meant not to interfere.

While these exertions were making by the American general to accelerate the aids expected from the north, sir William Howe perseveringly prosecuted his preparations against fort Mifflin. In the mean-time, it was discovered that a regular communication by water was kept up with the fleet, by boats which passed in the night with muffled oars between Province and Mud islands, very near the shore of the former, up to the mouth of the Schuylkill. This was communicated to the commodore, who thought it impracticable to prevent the intercourse.

The preparations for the meditated attack on fort Mifflin from floating batteries, and from Province island where very extensive and efficient works had been erected, were now nearly completed; and there appeared to be no mode of certainly preventing its success but by driving the enemy out of the island. Such an enterprise, after being contemplated for some time, was deemed too hazardous, and was therefore abandoned. To ensure success, the party must have amounted to at least fifteen

1777.

hundred men, who could only enter the island CHAP. IV. by marching towards Chester, as far as the Bell tavern near Darby, from whence it was necessary to turn down to the Delaware, and 'march four miles up a narrow neck of land, to the works to be attacked. The enemy had constructed a bridge over the Schuylkill within four miles of the Bell tavern; and, consequently, on their first alarm in Province island it would be in their power to throw a body of troops into the rear of the American party which would effectually cut off its retreat.

The attempt then could not be made without a covering party sufficiently strong to secure the retreat of the detachment which should enter Province island, or a removal of the whole army to the other side of the Schuylkill.

The first measure would so weaken the camp as to leave it with all the artillery and stores exposed to the enemy, who might turn their whole force either against the covering party, or the portion of the army remaining in camp, and obtain a sure and easy victory over either.

To the second there were many and great objections. A removal to the west side of the Schuylkill, would uncover the stores at Easton, Bethlehem, and Allentown, as well as several hospitals which were within the reach of the enemy. It would also, by placing the Schuylkill between the two armies, the passage over which general Howe commanded, enable him

CHAP. IV. to make larger detachments against Red Bank, 1777. than could be hazarded, while the American army lay in full force within twelve miles of him, without any intervening impediment.

November.

These considerations compelled the general to abandon the enterprise against Province island, though he was aware of its importance to the enemy, and the danger to fort Mifflin from the fortifications constructed on it. He was under the necessity of quietly looking on, and observing the progress of the work, without being able to obstruct it.

When their batteries both on the island and water were completed, intelligence was received that a grand attack would be made, for which purpose it was expected that a considerable force would be detached from the army in Philadelphia. In the opinion that such a measure would afford an opportunity of engaging with advantage those who should remain, a council of general officers was once more summoned, who unanimously declared against such an attempt, and it was consequently relinquished.

Early in the morning of the 10th, a new and large battery on Province island, of twenty-four,. and thirty-two pounders, and two howitzers of eight inches each, opened about five hundred yards from fort Mifflin, which kept up through the day, and for several successive days, an incessant fire. The block-houses were reduced

to a heap of ruins; the palisades were beaten CHAP.IV. down; and most of the guns dismounted, and 1777. otherwise disabled. The barracks were battered in every part so as to render it impracticable for the troops to continue in them. They were under the necessity of working and watching the whole night to repair the damages of the day, and to guard against a storm of which they were in perpetual apprehension. If in the day, a few moments were allowed for repose, it was taken on the wet earth, which was rendered by the heavy rains that fell about this time, a soft mud. The garrison was relieved by general Varnum, with fresh men every forty-eight hours; but his brigade was so weak that half the men were constantly on duty.

Colonel Smith was decidedly of opinion, and in this general Varnum concurred with him, that a storm, if attempted, would certainly succeed, and that the garrison ought to be withdrawn; but general Washington still cherished the hope that the place might be maintained until he should be re-enforced from the northern army. He conceived that a storm would not be attempted until the works were battered down, and therefore recommended that the whole night should be employed in repairs. To make them the more expeditiously, he directed drafts from the militia every night, with a promise that they should be permitted to return every morning to Red Bank;