CHAP. IV. on Province and Carpenter's islands, both of 1777. which were in their possession and were sepa

rated from Mud island only by a narrow passage between four and five hundred yards wide. This passage was, in a great degree, commanded by the English batteries. They had driven out of it the moveable water force which had been originally relied on for security from that quarter. In addition to this, that force found itself compelled in rough weather to take shelter under the high bank on the Jersey shore.

The vessels of war engaged in the defence of the Delaware, were partly continental, and partly in the service of the state of Pennsylvania, under a commodore who held his commission

from the latter. A misunderstanding prevailed between the commodore and lieutenant colonel Smith who commanded the garrison at fort Mifflin, and also between the commodore and the officers of the navy in continental service. Colonel Smith required that guard boats and gallies should be continually stationed in the channel between the fort and the enemy, which the commodore frequently refused.

That garrison consisted only of three hundred continental troops, a number insufficient to place a single line round the works. They were in perpetual apprehension, lest, in the nights, the darkness of which was greatly increased by thick fogs, the enemy should pass

over in boats from Province island, and, filling CHAP. IV. up the ditch with fascines, carry the place by a 1777. coup-de-main, or take possession of the upper

part of the island and from thence batter down the slight defence which covered them in that direction.

The authority and exertions of the commander in chief, were necessary to prevent the differences between the officers from essentially injuring the service: and to induce commodore Hazlewood to make such a disposition of his little fleet as would best cover fort Mifflin from the real danger with which it was threatened. It was readily to be conjectured that if an attack from the islands should be meditated, the attention of the vessels would be called from that quarter by an attempt from below on the chevaux-de-frize. To prevent the mischief which might thus be occasioned, the general earnestly requested that he would never permit himself to lose sight of the passage from Province to Mud island, but would continually station a part of his fleet in such a manner as immediately to act with the most effect on any body of troops attempting that passage. This important duty he conceived might be attended to with the less hazard to other parts of the service, because the solidity of the obstructions in the river was such, that a few redhot balls from a part of the flotilla judiciously posted, would be sufficient to protect the che

CHAP. IV. Vaux-de-frize while the danger from the islands 1777. should continue.

Finding the difficulties of drawing the militia of Jersey to the Delaware to be so great, that the exertions of generals Dickenson and Forman could not surmount them, it was determined to strengthen the garrison still further from the continental army. Three hundred Pennsylva

nia militia were detached, to be divided beOctober 29. tween the two forts; and a few days afterwards,

general Varnum with his brigade, was ordered to take a position about Woodbury, near Red Bank, and to relieve and re-enforce the garrisons of both forts as far as his strength would permit, and the necessity of their situation. should require. General Forman, with such militia as he could bring into the field, was directed to join him; and the hope was entertained that so respectable a continental force would induce the militia to assemble in greater numbers. Sixteen hundred men had now been detached on this service, and a larger force could not be spared from the army without too much disregarding its safety.

It was not from the opposite shore alone that danger to fort Mifflin was apprehended. The enemy being in possession of the river above, it was greatly feared that preparations were making at Philadelphia to proceed down the Delaware, and by attacking the upper part of Mud island, to facilitate the operations which

might be meditated from Province, and Car- CHAP. IV. penter's islands. To guard as much as possible 1777. against these dangers, the fleet was again re-enforced by seamen drawn from the army, and great exertions were used in cutting the banks, so as to inundate the grounds on the islands occupied by the enemy, and to embarrass all their plans. Directions were also given to lay the upper parts of Mud island, where the ground is low, under water, so as to prevent the enemy from making a lodgment there.

General Washington had always felt the peculiar advantage which must result from a victory over the enemy before a junction between their fleet and army could be effected, and had been determined to risk much to gain one. He had therefore fought the battle of Germantown, and after receiving some small re-enforcements, had again taken a position from which it might be practicable once more to attack them to advantage. By withdrawing to Philadelphia, sir William Howe had taken a position so much stronger than that at Germantown, and so much nearer the point against which his operations. were now to be directed, as very much to diminish the hope inspired by his former situation, of being able to seize some moment when his force might be so divided as to afford a fair probability of attacking him with success. Yet the American army approached within fifteen miles of the city, and from that camp had

CHAP. IV. anxiously sought an occasion of giving the 1777. enemy some blow which might compel him to abandon the metropolis. The circumspect caution of general Howe afforded none. After the repulse at Red Bank, he took his measures slowly, but with certainty, to obtain possession of the forts, without again encountering the hazards of an assault.

In this state of things, intelligence was received of the successful termination of the northern campaign, in consequence of which, great part of the troops employed against Burgoyne might be drawn to aid the army in Pennsylvania. But it was feared before these re-enforcements could arrive, the enemy would succeed in obtaining possession of the forts, and removing the obstructions to the navigation of the Delaware. This consideration furnished a strong motive for risking much in order to raise the siege of fort Mifflin; but the relative force of the armies; the difficulties attending an attack in their present situation; and, above all, the danger that a defeat might so weaken him, that he might be disabled from meeting the enemy, even after the arrival of the troops now expected from the northern army, determined general Washington not to hazard a second attack while under his present circum

stances.

A council of general officers was called the day before Varnum had crossed the Delaware,