approached the fort as near as possible, against CHAP. IV. which they kept up an incessant fire. The 1777. batteries from the Pennsylvania shore also were opened on the garrison, but night soon put an end to the cannonade. Very early next morning, it was recommenced, in the hope that under cover of the fire from the vessels and from the batteries, the Augusta and the Merlin might be got off. It was soon discovered that they were on ground, and four fire ships were sent against them, but without effect. Meanwhile a very warm cannonade was continued on both sides, in the course of which the Augusta took fire, and it was found impracticable to extinguish the flames. In this state of things it became necessary to take out the men, and to withdraw the frigates, to prevent the injury they might sustain when she should blow up. This being in a great measure effected, and the Merlin, which could not be removed, being set on fire, the Augusta blew The Augusta up, and in her were lost a few of the crew, up. among whom were a lieutenant Baldock," and the chaplain, and gunner. For their continuance in the vessel, no reason has been assigned. The repulse of the detachment commanded by count Donop, inspired congress with the most flattering hopes respecting the permanent defence of the posts on the Delaware. That * Annual Register.... Stedman. frigate blows CHAP. IV. body expressed its high sense of the merits of 1777. colonel Greene, who had commanded in fort Mercer, of lieutenant colonel Smith who had commanded in fort Mifflin, and of commodore Hazlewood who commanded the gallies; and to each of these officers, an elegant sword was presented, as a mark of the estimation in which his services were held by the public. The evacuation of Germantown by the British, so immediately after general Washington had re-occupied his old camp on Skippack creek, having rendered that position too remote to be any longer eligible, the American army takes post at advanced to White marsh, within fifteen miles of Philadelphia. General Washington The objects of the commander in chief were still the same. He counted on enfeebling, in some degree, the operations of the enemy against the forts on the Delaware, on fighting them, if he could do so to advantage, and on restraining their foraging parties, and cutting off their supplies from the country. His parties of light horse, who with indefatigable vigilance watched their motions, gave him early intelligence of all their movements. On being informed that count Donop had crossed over into Jersey, he could not conceive that his design was to carry Red Bank by storm, but supposed that he intended to invest it, and to force the garrison by regular approaches and bombardment, to capitulate. Immediate mea sures were taken to raise if possible, the militia CHAP. IV. of New Jersey, in order to form such a force 1777. in his rear as would disable him from prosecuting the siege; but they had been already so harassed by repeated calls during the invasion of their own state, and were still drawn so frequently from their homes for the purpose of guarding their eastern frontier, in defending which they felt a more immediate interest, that it was found impracticable to bring a sufficient number of them into the field,* to derive from their services any essential advantage. While the dispositions of the American army were such as to embarrass as much as possible the communication of the enemy with the country, it was essentially important to the present views of the commander in chief to intercept all supplies coming from their ships. This was rendered extremely difficult by the present position of the British army. They were in possession of the Schuylkill, the mouth of which was commanded by their batteries, * The usual difficulty of obtaining the service of the militia, was at this time very much increased, by an event, by no means common. The time for which the governor was elected had expired, and no new election had been made. The late executive, therefore, did not think itself authorized to take any measures as an executive, and had not general Dickenson ventured to order out the militia by his own authority, they could not have been put in motion. CHAP. IV. and over which they had thrown a bridge. 1777. They were also in possession of Province and Carpenter's islands, on each of which a body of troops was stationed. Boats laden with provisions could deposit their cargoes opposite the chevaux-de-frize, from whence they were conveyed through the islands to Philadelphia. Thus was their intercourse with the fleet kept up, which, though precarious and difficult, yet, greatly relieved them. An intercourse between the rich country below Chester and Wilmington, was maintained, nor was it practicable to destroy it, while its preservation was wished by the inhabitants themselves. To this mode of communication the commander in chief in part directed his attention. General Potter, a very vigilant and judicious officer, who commanded a small body of militia on the south of the Schuylkill, first discovered the passage of several parties by this route; and captain Lee of the cavalry, who had already greatly distinguished himself by his activity as a partisan, and by the accuracy of his intelligence, was directed to cross the Schuylkill and obtain correct information of the position of the enemy in that quarter, of the force of their several stations, and of the exact route which was pursued by the convoys from the fleet to Philadelphia. This service he accomplished soon after engaging in it. Being possessed of the necessary information, general Potter was directed to move at one time, and with the utmost secrecy, all the run- CHAP. IV. ning stones from the mills in the neighbour. 1777. hood of Chester, and on the Brandywine, in order to prevent supplies of flour from that source; and a strong detachment of militia was ordered to his assistance, for the purpose of enabling him to break up the waggon road, along which the convoys of provisions had passed. The service concerning the mills was executed by captain Lee, who at the same time captured a small foraging party, about twelve miles below Chester. The situation of the forts still continued extremely critical. That on Mud island had been wretchedly constructed, and required, in the opinion of the commandant, and of major Fleury, a very excellent officer belonging to the French service who was engaged as an engineer, and was employed in the defence of it, at least eight hundred men fully to man the lines in case of an assault, to which it was greatly exposed. Mud island is about half a mile in length. At the lower end of it was placed fort Mifflin, having its principal fortifications in front for the purpose of repelling ships coming, up the river. The defences in the rear consisted only of a ditch and palisades protected by two block-houses, the upper story of one of which, had been destroyed in the late cannonade. Above the fort were two batteries opposing those constructed by the enemy |