CHAP. III.

Public opinion, which a military chief finds 1777. too much difficulty in resisting, and the opinion of congress, seemed to require a second action; but on a temperate consideration of the circumstances of his enemy, general Washington came to the very wise and correct decision of avoiding one for the present.

His reasons for this decision were conclusive. Wayne and Smallwood had not yet joined the army. The continental troops ordered from Peck's-Kill, who had been detained for a time by an incursion from New York, were now approaching; and a re-enforcement of militia from Jersey, under general Dickenson was also expected.

Additional and very powerful motives forbade him now to advance on the enemy. The fatigues and sufferings of the troops had been excessive. During the very active operations which had taken place since sir William Howe had moved from the head of Elk, the army had been separated from its baggage, and was frequently without food. The soldiers had been exposed to heavy rains without shelter, and compelled to march in deep roads, and repeatedly to wade considerable streams, without the possibility of obtaining, while cold and wet, those comforts which are found to be so all essential to the restoration of the spirits and the re-invigoration of the system. An army manoeuvring in the face of a superior enemy,

is unavoidably exposed to extreme hardships; CHAP. III. but in the present instance those hardships had 1777. been greatly increased by the deficiency of those supplies with which soldiers are usually furnished. Many of them had been under the necessity of performing the most severe marches without shoes, of lodging on the ground without blankets, and very often of drying their clothes, of which only the coat was fit for a winter campaign, without fire. These causes rendered the army unfit to make a forced march against the enemy, and determined the council of war which was assembled on the occasion, as they had already determined the commander in chief, to remain on his present ground until the expected re-enforcements should arrive; and to allow his harassed troops a few days repose and refreshment.

for

Immediately after the battle of Brandywine, the distressed situation of the army had been represented to congress, who had recommended it to the executive of Pennsylvania, to appoint discreet persons to take possession of any linens, blankets and other woollens, shoes, spirits, and other necessaries, for the use of the army, which might be found in any stores or warehouses, in the city of Philadelphia; giving a certificate expressing the quantity and value of the goods so taken, which goods were to be conveyed to a place of safety to prevent their falling into the hands of the enemy. The

CHAP. III. measure recommended by this resolution ap1777. peared to the executive of Pennsylvania too strong to be undertaken by them; and they advised rather that the extraordinary powers of the commander in chief should be resorted to on the occasion. In consequence of this opinion, lieutenant colonel Hamilton, one of the general's aids, a young gentleman already in high estimation for his talents and zeal, was employed on this interesting and delicate business. "Your own prudence" said the general in a letter to him while in Philadelphia, "will point out the least exceptionable means to be pursued, but remember, delicacy and a strict adherence to the ordinary mode of application, must give place to our necessities. We must if possible accommodate the soldiers with such articles as they stand in need of, or we shall have just reason to apprehend the most injurious and alarming consequences from the approaching

All the exertions however of this very active officer could not obtain a supply in any degree adequate to the pressing and increasing wants of the army.

While general Washington was making every exertion, and putting much to hazard for the defence of the metropolis, he had also taken those measures of precaution which, should his endeavours to protect it fail, were calculated to diminish as much as possible the

importance of the loss. All the military stores CHAP. II. there collected, and the vessels at the wharves 1777. were directed to be removed higher up the Delaware. This duty also was attended to by colonel Hamilton. In consequence of these arrangements, very little public property fell into the hands of the enemy when they took possession of the city, which was effected with- General out molestation by lord Cornwallis at the head possession of of the British and Hessian grenadiers, on the 26th of September.

Howe takes

Philadelphia.

On the first notification of the defeat of the American army at Brandywine, congress had fixed on Lancaster in Pennsylvania for the place of its session, in the event of being obliged to leave Philadelphia; and the condition to which the army was reduced by the rain of the 16th, having compelled it to move up the Schuylkill and thus open to the enemy the way to that metropolis, the members separated on the 18th in the evening, and reassembled at Lancaster Congress on the 27th of the same month.

The campaign, from the landing of the enemy at Elk ferry on the 25th of August, until they took possession of Philadelphia on the 26th of September, had been extremely active, and the part to be performed by the American general uncommonly arduous. The best English writers who have as yet detailed the events of the war, bestow high encomiums on sir William Howe for the military skill displayed, and the masterly movements made by

remove to Lancaster.

CHAP. III. him, during these operations. At Brandywine 1777. especially, Washington is supposed to have

been "out-generaled, more out-generaled than in any action during the war." Yet let all the operations of this trying period be examined, and the means in possession of both be considered; and no apprehension need be entertained that the American chief will appear in any respect inferior to his adversary, or unworthy of the high place he held in the opinions of his countrymen. With an army decidedly inferior not only in numbers, but in every other military requisite, except courage, in an open country in which not a single fortification was to be found, nor a river which was not, in that season of the year, fordable by infantry almost every where, he employed the enemy near thirty days in advancing about sixty miles. In this time, he fought one general action, and though defeated, was able to reassemble the same undisciplined, unclothed, and almost unfed army, and on the fifth day after his defeat, again to offer battle to the conqueror. When the armies were separated by a storm of rain, which involved him in circumstances the most distressing which can be conceived, he extricated himself from them, with infinite and persevering labour, and still maintained a respectable and improving countenance.

The only advantage he is supposed to have given the enemy was at the battle of Brandywine, and that was produced by the contrariety