small scouting parties, the left flank of the CHAP. II. British army. His attention was particularly 1777. directed to the roads leading from Brunswick towards Millstone, Princeton, and the country generally through which it would be necessary to pass, either to go to Philadelphia, to turn the right wing of the army at Middlebrook, or to make any attempt on general Sullivan. On any movement of the enemy, he was instructed to seize every opportunity to fall on their flank, and to gall them as much as possible; but to take especial care never to permit himself to be surrounded, or to have his retreat to the army cut off.

General Sullivan, also, was ordered to change his position, and to occupy the high grounds of Rocky-hill, as a place of greater security.

Howe moves

Somerset

Early in the morning of the 14th, the British army, leaving two thousand men under the command of general Matthews at Brunswick, advanced in two columns towards the Delaware. The front of the first, under lord Cornwallis, Sir William reached Somerset court-house, nine miles from out to Brunswick, by the appearance of day; and the court-house second, under the command of general De Heister, about the same time reached Middlebush, which lies between Somerset court-house and Brunswick, on a road to the east of that taken by lord Cornwallis.

This movement is stated by sir William Howe to have been made with a view of in

in great force

CHAP. II. ducing general Washington to quit his fortified 1777. camp at Middlebrook, and approach the Delaware, in which event, he expected to bring on a general engagement on ground less disadvantageous than that now occupied by the American army. That officer, however, was too well acquainted with the importance of his present position to abandon it, and throw away the advantages it gave him. On the first intelligence that the enemy was in motion he drew out his whole army, which he posted to great advantage in order of battle, on the heights in front of his camp. This position was constantly maintained. The troops remained in order of battle during the day, and in the night, they slept on the ground to be defended. In the mean time, the militia of Jersey, with an alacrity heretofore unexampled in that state, obeyed the orders given them, and took the field in very great numbers. They principally joined general Sullivan, who had retired behind the Sourland hills towards Flemingtown, where an army of some respectability was forming, which could readily join, or otherwise co-operate with that under the more immediate inspection of the commander in chief.

The settled purpose of general Washington was to defend his camp, but not to hazard a general action on other ground, by advancing from the heights he occupied into the open country, either towards the enemy or the

Delaware. Had his numbers even warranted CHAP. II. offensive operations, general Howe had taken 1777. a position by no means assailable. His right and front were covered by the Raritan, and his left by the Millstone river. That officer seems not to have had it in contemplation to tempt the American general to attack him, by exposing any part of the British army; but to act on his anxiety for Philadelphia and thereby induce him to quit the strong ground about Middlebrook, for a position nearer the Delaware, in order to defend the passage of that river. After. succeeding in this, he had little doubt of being able to bring on an engagement, in which he counted with great certainty on victory. The motives, however, which had decided general Howe not to attempt a march through Jersey, leaving the American army in full force in his rear, had determined Washington to allow him to proceed to the Delaware, if such should be his intention, throwing in his way only those impediments which might harass and delay his march; but maintaining, with his main army, the high and secure grounds north of the road to be taken by the enemy, until an opportunity should be given him of striking with manifest advantage some important blow.

He was not long, however, in penetrating the designs of his adversary. He soon perceived the intention of his present movement. "The views of the enemy," he writes in a letter of

CHAP. II. the 17th, to general Arnold, "must be to des 1777. troy this army, and get possession of Philadelphia. I am, however, clearly of opinion that they will not move that way, until they have endeavoured to give a severe blow to this army. The risk would be too great to attempt to cross a river, when they must expect to meet a formidable opposition in front, and would have such a force as ours in their rear. They might possibly be successful, but the probability would be infinitely against them. Should they be imprudent enough to make the attempt, I shall keep close upon their heels, and will do every thing in my power to make the project

fatal to them.

"But besides the argument in favour of their intending, in the first place, a stroke at this army, drawn from the policy of the measure, every appearance contributes to confirm the opinion. Had their design been for the Delaware in the first instance they would probably have made a secret, rapid march for it, and not have halted so as to awaken our attention, and give us time to prepare for obstructing them. Instead of that, they have only advanced to a position necessary to facilitate an attack on our right, the part in which we are most exposed. In addition to this circumstance, they have come out as light as possible, leaving all their baggage, provisions, boats, and bridges at Brunswick. This plainly contradicts the

idea of their intending to push for the Dela- CHAP. IL

ware."

Having formed this opinion of the designs of the enemy, the plan of general Washington was to collect at Middlebrook all the force which could properly be drawn from other quarters, so as to reduce the security of his army, in its present position, to the greatest possible certainty; and to be in a condition to embrace any fair opportunity which might offer to make an advantageous attack. In the meantime, with his rifle corps, and with light bodies of militia, countenanced by a few continental troops, he proposed to harass them, and weaken their numbers by continual skirmishes. He had, on their first collecting in force at Brunswick, ordered strong detachments of continentals from Peck's-Kill, of whom only two brigades, one under general Parsons, and another under general Varnum, had as yet arrived; and in further execution of his present plan, he now directed a part of the troops under general Sullivan to re-enforce his right, which he continued to fortify; and the residue to maintain their station about the Sourland hills, with orders to endeavour, in the event of a movement against him by the enemy, to join the main army; or if that should be impracticable, to fall briskly on their flank, or rear.

Finding that the American army could not be drawn from a position in which he deemed ૧.

VOL. III.

1777.