CHAP. II. arms with them. The effect of these promises 1777. had been seriously felt, and their future operation, especially among the servants who had been recruited, was greatly dreaded. To diminish this operation and to allure in turn, from the service of the enemy, those misguided Americans who had engaged with them, but might now wish to be again received into the bosom of their country, general Washington had urged on congress the policy of allowing all the advantages of freemen to the servants who had inlisted; and of giving full pardons to all Americans who would quit the service of the enemy. These recommendations, like almost every other proceeding from the same source, received the ready attention of congress, and resolutions were passed in conformity with them.

It was by no means an unimportant part of the plan of the campaign, as a movement by land towards Philadelphia was thought probable, to constitute on the western bank of the Delaware, an army of militia, strengthened by a few continental troops, under an experienced officer, to defend, in front, the passage of that river. Arnold was then in Philadelphia, employed in settling his accounts; and this service was intrusted to him.

General Sullivan also lay at Princeton with a body of continental troops, increasing in number by the recruits arriving from the southward

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and with some Jersey militia. He had been CHAP. II. directed to hold himself in perpetual expecta. 1777. tion of the enemy, to send his baggage and provisions to places less exposed, and to be in readiness to move at any instant to a place of greater security, where his left could not be so readily turned, and from whence he might harass the flanks of the enemy on a march, and preserve a communication with the army at. Middlebrook. He was directed by no means to risk a general action of his whole detachment, but to act entirely as a partisan corps, and on the first movement of the enemy to place his main body in security, and to harass them with parties detached for that purpose. Measures were also taken to put the militia of Jersey in readiness to take the field so soon as offensive operations should commence. It was intended, not that they should remain embodied for the purpose of strengthening and acting with the continental army, but that, ranging the country in small parties, they should hang upon, and harass the flanks of the enemy.

The first and real object of the campaign, on the part of general Howe, was the acquisition of Philadelphia. It had been proposed to renew the plan, which had been partly executed the last year, of marching through Jersey, and, after securing the submission of that state, crossing the Delaware on a portable bridge constructed in the winter for the purpose, and

CHAP. II. proceeding by land to that city. It was sup1777. posed that if, in the execution of this plan,

the Americans could be brought to a general action on equal ground, the royal army possessed advantages which must ensure a victory; but that if Washington, declining an engagement, should again be pressed before them over the Delaware, their object would yet be certainly obtained.

Had the enemy taken the field at the first opening of the season, before the continental troops were assembled, it is probable that this plan might have been executed without any serious obstruction; but the tents, and camp equipage, expected from Europe, not arriving until about the last of May; general Washington had, by the most indefatigable exertions, collected his army, and taken possession of, and in some degree fortified, the very advantageous post on the heights of Middlebrook, before the British army was in motion. On ground so advantageous as this it would be dangerous to attack him; for although his camp might be forced, yet victory would most probably be attended with such loss, as to have the consequences of a defeat, and totally disable the victor from reaping its fruits.

If it was deemed too hazardous to attack the strong camp occupied by general Washington at Middlebrook, it was an experiment not less dangerous to attempt to cross the Delaware, to

dispute the passage of which an army was col- CHAP. II, lecting on its western bank, while that under 1777. the command of general. Washington remained unbroken in his rear. It comported, therefore, with the cautious temper of sir William Howe to devise some other plan of operation, to be resorted to in the event of being unable to draw the American general from his present advantageous position.

The two great bays of Delaware and Chesapeak, which run deep into the country, and into which the whole fleet could be securely brought, so as to co-operate in a great degree with the land forces which might be safely transported within a few days march of Phila. delphia, and landed at a place from whence their march would be obstructed by no rivers, and only opposed by the American army on equal ground, readily suggested the alternative of proceeding by water, should he be unable to manœuvre general Washington out of his present encampment.

Having settled the plan of the campaign, and received some small re-enforcements with the necessary camp equipage from Europe, such of the troops still remaining in New York, as were designed for active service, began about the beginning of June, to pass over into Jersey, and were soon followed by general Howe in person; who, having left a guard for the defence of Amboy, assembled his army at Brunswick,

June.

June 12.

CHAP. II and gave strong indications of an intention to 1777. penetrate through the country, to the Delaware; and thus reach Philadelphia by land. He brought with him a number of waggons, and flat bottomed boats, supposed to be intended for the passage of that river.

Thirteenth.

Persuaded from these appearances that an expedition up the Hudson could not be at present contemplated, and believing himself too weak either to act against the enemy or to, defend his own camp, general Washington ordered to his immediate aid the continental troops assembled at Peck's-Kill, except one thousand effectives, who, with the assistance of the militia were deemed adequate to the protection of the passes in the highlands from any force which could now be brought to act against them.

In the mean time, a select corps of riflemen was formed under the command of colonel Morgan, an officer who had greatly distinguished himself in the unfortunate attempt to storm Quebec. To great personal courage, he added all that watchfulness, that indefatigable exertion, and that happy mixture of caution and enterprise, so peculiarly requisite in the formation of a character intrusted with the command of a partisan corps, designed to act on the lines of a formidable enemy.

He was ordered to take post at Vanvighton's bridge on the Raritan, just above its confluence with the Millstone river, and watch, with very