Unicameral Legislatures BY C. E. DAGGETT1 During the past few years this subject has been treated and discussed by some of the leading publicists and statesmen of this country. However, the writer feels secure in the assertion that very few members of the bench and bar are familiar with it. The proponents of the unicameral system of legislation are not offering an innovation, for the system is as old as any other in use in our form of government, and, such being the case, neither can it be said that the plan is radical. On the other hand, to oppose the dual system of legislation, which is so firmly imbedded in our state governments, is to challenge a prevailing creed and to establish the unicameral system in lieu thereof it is necessary to over-turn one of the most firmly established precedents in our form of government. However, the poorest argument is the one which assumes that because a specified thing has not been done, it cannot, or should not, be done. In the adoption of the initiative and referendum we over-turned precedent as old as the government itself, and it was looked upon as an innovation inapplicable to our form of government, although, after a thorough trial, the usefulness of the measures, and their adaptability to a democratic form of government, can no longer be seriously denied. The purpose of this article, is, therefore, to present to the bench and bar a legislative scheme, which, although not original with the writer, is the result of careful consideration and study, both from an academic and professional viewpoint, extending over a period of several years, to the end that if the plan be found feasible, an endeavor may be made to give it a thorough trial. The unicameral system of legislation is found in its most efficient form in the cantons of Switzerland, the source from which came the initiative and referendum. The system is also in use in Norway, Luxembourg, Greece, Servia, a few of the smaller German states, in practically all of the Canadian provinces and also in England in the County Councils, bodies very similar to our state legislatures, being somewhat different in form, however, in the various countries named. Three of the original states of the Union,-Pennsylvania, Vermont, and Georgia, tried the unicameral legislature, but, under the pressure of the example set by the other states in the Union, eventually abandoned it. The fact that these states tried the system and abandoned it is not an argument against the use of it in the present 'Of the Marianna, Arkansas, bar. age, however, for it is to be noted that the unicameral system was not then fortified by the initiative and referendum, without which, it cannot be advantageously used. Some of the greatest men of the revolutionary period advocated the single house system for our state legislatures, among them Benjamin Franklin, who was responsible for it being written into the constitution of Pennsylvania, and whose definition of a bicameral state legislature,-"It is a cart with a horse hitched to each end and both pulling in opposite directions," still very forcibly applies to our present day method of legislation. The "bi-furcated," or "split-session," plan is, in so far as the writer has been able to ascertain, original with State Senator Caminetti of California, who several years ago proposed that the session of the California State Legislature be held in two sessions, the first of which should be devoted to receiving proposals for legislation, and, after a period of adjournment, during which time the legislation proposed should be given publicity, the second session should be held for the purpose of enacting or rejecting the proposed legislation. Combining the two suggestions, the writer recently proposed to the constitutional convention which was held in the State of Arkansas in 1917-1918, that the legislative power of the state be vested in a house of delegates consisting of thirty-six members, thirty of whom should be elected from districts, and six from the state at large. The body to be presided over by a Lieutenant-Governor, elected at the same time and in the same manner as the Governor of the state, whose duty it would be to study the legislative needs of the state and report to the legislative body, at regular or call sessions. The session of the assembly to be held biennially or at the call of the Governor, subject to the approval of two-thirds of the membership concurring in the necessity for the call, under the "split-session" plan. Immediately after organization, the assembly should remain in session for a certain time for the purpose of receiving proposals for legislation, which proposals should be referred to committees and reported back with recommendations. Thereafter, the assembly should adjourn for a period of sixty days and during the interim, a synopsis of all proposed legislation should be given the widest publicity, and at the expiration of the adjourned period, the assembly should again convene for the sole purpose of enacting or rejecting the legislation proposed at the first half of the session. Proper limitations should be placed on the assembly, preventing it from considering any other legislation than that proposed at the first half of the session, and also preventing the amendment of a proposed bill during the second half so that its general purpose would be changed. Salaries of the members of the assembly were to be made sufficiently attractive, and proper mileage allowances provided for. The initia tive and referendum were to be carried to the counties and municipalities in such a manner as would enable them to provide for purely local legislation. It is the opinion of many students of the question that the adoption of the bicameral system by the federal government, and, in turn, by the state governments, was purely a matter of precedent. England, following the political principles advanced by Montesquieu in 1748, which principles were founded on considerations peculiarly applicable to then existing conditions, had adopted the bicameral system. In other words, the division of the population of England into classes, the nobility and the commons, was the moving cause for the bicameral system, the upper house being composed of and representing the nobility, while the lower house was composed of and represented the commons. While the writer is not prepared to agree wholly with the viewpoint that our Federal Government adopted the bicameral system for the reason that it was then in use in the "mother country", it may be admitted that such fact was persuasive. Probably other and better reasons demanded the bicameral system in our federal government. The existence of the dual or confederate principle and the unitary or national principle, that is, the right of each state to equal representation as a state sovereignty and also the right to representation in proportion to their separate importance, was, no doubt, just cause and fundamental reason for the adoption of the bicameral system. However, such reasoning does not apply to state governments. Neither in theory nor in practice have we any classes in the states, nor have we any confederate principle combined with unitary principle, and, therefore, from either viewpoint, whether the precedent be set for us by England or by the federal government, we find it absolutely inapplicable to state governments. Neither does the fact that the dual chamber system is now in use in England, as well as in the federal government, present any logical reason why the unicameral system cannot be better applied in state governments. In Bryce's American Commonwealth the author says: "In Europe there is always a difference of political complexion generally resting on a difference of personal composition. There the upper chamber represents the aristocracy of the country, or the men of wealth, or the high officials, or the influence of the crown and court; while the lower chamber represents the multitude.” In our federal government it is necessary that we have the bicameral system for the following reasons: (1) states are equal in sovereignty and, therefore, equal representation is necessary and a body providing "Vol. I, p. 186. such equality of representation must be provided, otherwise, the more densely populated states would control those of less population; and (2) the federal congress can exercise its power of legislation on only such subjects as are expressly or impliedly granted it by the constitution; therefore, when a state delegates its power of legislation it should be equally represented with other sovereignties in order to prevent abuse of the power delegated. The field of legislation in the federal government is extremely wide and the interests of the different states are diverse to a marked degree, thereby necessitating a legislative body composed of a number of representatives and, at the same time, giving to each state representation according to population and individual importance. The House of Representatives provides such a body and the Senate provides the method whereby equality of representation is had. However, when this reasoning is endeavored to be applied to state legislative bodies, it will be noted that the necessity for such does not exist. The diversity of conditions existing in the union does not exist within the individual states and there are no sovereign powers within the state requiring equality of representation. It cannot be seriously contended that a citizen of a given part of any state is not just as capable of legislating for another part thereof, on questions effecting the state as a whole, as he would be for that part of the state within which he resides. Therefore, the reasons for the adoption of the bicameral system by England and the Federal Government do not now exist and it is no longer logical that the precedent established be followed. As said in Gettell's introduction to Political Science, "The bicameral system belongs to a transitional stage in political development, and as ideas of confederacy and class spirit are replaced by National Democracy a single chamber, composed and proceeding in such a way as to represent the real wishes of the people, would be the logical law-making body." A stock argument invariably used in support of the bicameral system is that it is necessary to provide the proper "check and balance." This argument falls to the ground when carefully analyzed and considered under present day conditions. The "check and balance" theory was also the product of class divisions existing at the time the bicameral system was established, and the design of the twochambered body was to check legislation by the one class which would encroach on the rights of the other. The necessity then existing, undoubtedly warranted a system of "checks and balances," but in the present age one cannot well deny that such necessity does not exist. 3P. 239. Nor can it be well denied that on many occasions at the present time our state legislative bodies provide a check each against the other in a manner that the framers of our form of government did not in the least contemplate. The "check" now largely used (I might almost say solely used) is simply that one house says to the other, "You have bills that you desire enacted. So have we. Enact ours, or else, whatever be the merit or demerit of yours, in the words of the gallant French at the Marne, 'They shall not pass'.' Every person who has had legislative experience, either as a member of the house or the senate, or as a paid representative of some special or local interest in an endeavor to enact or defeat a proposed law, is cognizant of the fact that the greater portion of our legislation is purely the child of barter and trade and not in any manner the product of a deliberative body. We further know that ofttimes at representative of a particular county is elected by one party or faction, and the senator from that particular district by another party or faction, the result of which is immediately to array one against the other, and the local legislation of that community is then enacted by representatives selected by other voters from other communities, dependent entirely upon whether the Senator or Representative has made himself solid with the powers that be. Again, ofttimes, there is a personal animosity and jealousy between the member of the upper and the member of the lower body representing the same community. In many cases they are men of different ideas, different habits, and different ability, and the result is the same as above outlined. * The "check and balance" theory is not applicable to present day conditions. The same kind of men who compose the upper house compose the lower; we have no classes and the membership of both houses is elected by the same electors, at the same election. We, therefore, get duplication and nothing more. In speaking of the "check and balance" theory Judge Story in his Commentaries, says: "This check will be most effectually obtained by a co-ordinate branch of equal authority, and different organization. * If each branch is substantially formed on the same plan, the advantages of division are shadowy and imaginative. * * It may be safely asserted that, for all the purposes of liberty and security, of stable laws and solid institutions, of personal rights, and of the protection of property, a single branch is quite as good as two, if their composition is the same and their spirits and impulses the same. It will only be a duplication of the evils of oppression and rashness, with a duplication of obstructions to effective redress." * * "Vol. I, sec. 699. See also Morgan's Contemporary Review, Vol. 97, p. 543: Message of Governor Hodges to Kansas Legislature, 1913. |