qualities you have displayed-courage, promptitude, organizing faculty, and economy of means. . . .

To Jay Cooke, Philadelphia.

“WASHINGTON, October 19, 1861.

". . . . Mr. Seward's letter is misunderstood. It is indeed too enigmatical in phrase, and there was no necessity for it; but so far from having a discouraging effect, it should have the reverse. It evinces a disposition, simply, to be prepared for all contingencies, and that we shall always have our great cities safe. We are at peace now with Europe, and I hope and believe we shall remain so; but events have taught us that we are not always safe from war when there is no cause for it; not always, indeed, when every interest is against it.

"There is no such intrigue concerning McClellan as that you speak of Somebody's fears or jealousies have misled him.'

To Joseph Cable, Esq., Wyandot, Ohio.

"WASHINGTON, October 28, 1861.

Every exertion has been made to supply our troops in Western Virginia, and I understand that sufficient clothing, blankets, and other equipments, were forwarded long since. . . .

"You may rest assured that there is no sentiment of hostility in the Administration against General Fremont. If he is recalled from command in the Western Department, it will be because the President believes that the army in Missouri and the interests of the cause in Missouri will be safer in other hands than in his. If the President has changed that high opinion of General Fremont which led to his appointment to one of the most responsible positions in the service, it is because the evidence presented satisfies him beyond a reasonable doubt that General Fremont has not proved equal to the charge. You may depend upon it, that in whatever he does in the matter, the President will be governed by a pure sense of public duty; and he will feel it better to perform that duty and be condemned for it by those who do not see the facts as he does, than neglect it and risk serious ill consequences to the country.

"I did not favor General Fremont's appointment, because I feared the financial mismanagement which has actually occurred. I have however supported him to the extent of the power of the Treasury, having forwarded for payments in his department not less than $10,000,000. . . . I shall feel it my duty, of course, to support the President, who will not be influenced in his judgment in the smallest degree by Fremont's proclamation. . . .'

1 In the first paragraph of this letter, Mr. Chase refers to Mr. Seward's Circular of October 14th to the Governors of States advising,sea-coast and lake defenses, and to an intrigue mentioned by Mr. Cooke, the motive of which was the removal of General McClellan,

THE TRENT AFFAIR.

To General George B. McClellan.

“WASHINGTON, December 11, 1861.

433

".... Your time is too precious to be occupied unnecessarily, and mine is too necessary to me to be wasted. I have therefore omitted calling on you, not knowing when you could give me a few minutes, and not desiring to waste any in fruitless endeavors to see you.

"If you can name any hour at which you can see me better than at another, I shall be glad to confer with you occasionally.

"The army and the Treasury must stand or fall together.

[At the Cabinet meeting of December 26, 1861, the matter for consideration being the delivery up to the British Government of Mason and Slidell, the rebel emissaries captured from the Trent streamer, Mr. Chase said that in his judgment "the technical right was clearly on the side of the British Government. As rebels or traitors to our Government, the pretended commissioners would have been safe on a neutral ship; it was in their character as envoys that they were subject to arrest as contraband. But they could not rightfully be taken from the ship till after the judicial condemnation of the ship itself, for receiving and carrying them. However excused or even justified by motives, the act of removing them as prisoners from the ship, without resort to any judicial cognizance, was in itself indefensible. We could not deny this without denying our history. Were the circumstances reversed, our Government would no doubt accept explanation, and allow England to keep her rebels; and he could not divest himself of the belief that, were the case fairly understood, the British Government would do the same thing." Though "it was gall and wormwood" to him to consent to the liberation of these two men, and he would rather sacrifice every thing he possessed, he was consoled by the reflection that the surrender, under existing circumstances, was simply proving faithful to our own ideas and traditions under strong temptation to violate them; and giving to England and the world signal proof that the American people will not, under any circumstances, for the sake of inflicting just punishment on rebels, commit even a technical wrong against neutrals. He gave in his adhesion, therefore, to the conclusion of the Secretary of State.]

28

by the Senate. If this be so, I am sure the President is disposed to nominate Carl Schurz in his place. The nomination of Schurz would be a decided benefit, in my judgment, to the army and the Administration.

"I know nothing of Blencker's case, and do not desire to be understood as expressing any wish in reference to it, except for immediate action. If he is worthy he ought to be confirmed without reference to Schurz; if not worthy, he should be rejected without reference to the question of a successor. But why not act in the matter, and act at once?.

To Colonel Thomas M. Key.

"WASHINGTON, April 18, 1862.

"I am perhaps to blame for not replying immediately to your telegram in cipher; but having no cipher, and thinking it unadvisable to reply otherwise than by telegraph, neglected doing so in any way.

"The object of your telegram bas been much discussed here in my absence, and the President determined, of his own thought, to detain McDowell's corps. Neither General McDowell nor any of his friends was consulted or advised until after the President's resolution had been taken. My own judgment, however, fully confirmed the act, though in such matters I do not like to rely much upon it. I did not think the corps necessary for the defense of Washington, but I did think that acting in conjunction with that under Banks, or at least in coöperation, it would give a much more efficient support to McClellan than if sent into the Peninsula. We are looking earnestly, and I somewhat anxiously, for news from

MCCLELLAN AND MCDOWELL.

435

McDowell, now supposed to be at Fredericksburg, and from Banks and Shields, now probably approaching Staunton.

"I congratulate you on the passage of the Emancipation Bill, and on its approval by the President. It went through almost unchanged from your draft-wholly unchanged in spirit. You never performed a more honorable work, and I wish it could bear your name.1

...

99

To Captain Daniel Ammen, in the Army in Florida.

"WASHINGTON, April 21, 1862.

Thanks for your letter. Before it came we had news of the evacuation of Jacksonville. It was presumably expedient; but it is against the grain.

"All seems to be moving well. Our generals in the West have acquired brilliant honors. In the East the commanding general has been too slow and irresolute to please me; but I feel confident he will not fail.

"McDowell's corps made a brilliant movement on Friday, and Saturday morning, seizing Fredericksburg after a forced march of twenty-nine miles on Friday, and thus obtaining the command of the whole line of the Rappahannock...."

66

To General McDowell.

“WASHINGTON, May 14, 1862.

I have time for but a word. Stanton told me he should release you from the prohibition against advance yesterday. I hope he has done so. I have never exactly seen the cogency of the reason for withholding you, when you had the communication by Belle Plain as well as that by Acquia. But I am not military.

"It has been one of my prime objects of desire that you should advance toward and to Richmond.

McClellan, surrounded by a staff of letter-writers, gets possession of public opinion, and even those who know better, succumb. Then he lags. "If the President, Stanton, and myself, had not gone to Fortress Monroe, all would have lagged there too.

"You want to move, as I understand, but it is not judged wise. Well. "What I saw and heard at Fortress Monroe, on the march to Norfolk, and at Norfolk, taught me not a little.

"I feel sure you can get to Richmond, if you are allowed to move and do actually move. There are disadvantages, I know, but they are not insuperable.

"With 5,000 men and you for a general, I would undertake to go to

1 Judge Thomas M. Key was at the time this letter was written a member of the military staff of General McClellan, and was the author of the bill for the emancipation of the slaves in the District of Columbia, which is the "Emancipation Bill" referred to by Mr. Chase in the text. Colonel Key consulted more or less constantly with Mr. Chase, however, in its preparation.

Richmond from Fortress Monroe by the James River, with my revenue steamers Miami and the Stevens, and the Monitor, in two days.

"It seems certain that our forces are too much scattered. It is useless to hold the coast unless we can break the centre at Richmond.

"My conviction is clear, however, that McClellan has a force which, properly handled, is vastly superior to any that can be brought against him. And I strongly incline to the opinion that with more under his command, he would be practically no stronger. What is needed for him is strong and effective coöperation.

...

From Mr. Chase's Diary, June 26, 1862.

"On Sunday morning, May 11th" (this was immediately after the taking of Norfolk), "the President, becoming uneasy because of his long absence from Washington, determined to return forthwith. The destruction of the Merrimac detained him, however, long enough to go to the spot and ascertain the exact condition of things and return to Fortress Monroe, whence we proceeded immediately toward Washington. On the way up, I remarked the probability that a small force-say 5,000 men-embarked on transports and convoyed by gunboats, might contribute largely to the taking of Richmond if sent immediately up the James River. But nothing was determined upon. After our return I frequently spoke of the matter, and urged the sending of General Wool up the river with all his available force. It was thought, however, that General McClellan could be reënforced more effectually in another direction. General McDowell was ordered to concentrate his whole corps, including Shields's division at Fredericksburg, with a view to an advance upon Richmond from that point. Shields's division, which had been in the Valley of the Shenandoah, was marched across the country and joined McDowell.

"Friday, May 23d, the President and Secretary of War visited the army at Fredericksburg, and returned to Washington on Saturday morning, highly gratified by the condition of the troops, and anticipating an imposing and successful advance on the Monday following. On the afternoon of the same Saturday I was sent for, to go to the War Department, and found that intelligence had been received of the taking of Front Royal and the annihilation of Kenly's regiment on the preceding day. The enemy was reported to have pushed forward and cut off the retreat of Banks, who was supposed to be at Strasburg. An order was immediately dispatched to General Fremont to advance on Harrisonburg, and do all in his power for the relief of Banks. An order was also sent to General McDowell to detach 20,000 men, or one-half his force, and to send them