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NECESSITY OF TAXATION.

417 success, I do not doubt that the Treasury can be supplied till the meeting of Congress. The State banks must then be induced to come into the national system, or required to cease from issuing notes for circulation; and such taxes must be imposed as will bring the amount to be raised by loans within the limit of the natural demand for bonds. Such legislation by the last Congress would have saved many millions. By the next Congress it will be indispensable to the success of the Treasury. .

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CHAPTER XLI.

MR. CHASE AND THE WAR-EXTRACTS FROM HIS LETTERS AND

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DIARIES.

1861.

To John T. Trowbridge, Somerville, Mass.

"WASHINGTON, March 81, 1864. MMEDIATELY after the organization of the cabinet, the question of what should be the policy of the Government toward the seceded States, demanded the most serious attention. Anderson, with his little company of soldiers, was holding Fort Sumter, and the first question was, "Shall he be relieved?" General Scott declared that complete relief was impracticable with a less force than 20,000 men. He thought, however, that the fort might be defended for several months if reënforced and provisioned; but that reënforcements and provisioning were impracticable, as the fire of the enemy's batteries would be concentrated upon any vessel which might make the attempt, both while entering the harbor, and especially when endeavoring to land men and cargoes at the fort. The President finally determined to make the attempt to send provisions to the garrison.

"Information that the attempt would be made was transmitted to the Governor of South Carolina, and its receipt was promptly followed by an order from the rebel authorities to reduce the fort. How this was accomplished is historical, and it is also historical how the country was aroused by the rebel guns which opened on the fort. The call for 75,000 men immediately followed. It soon became evident that nothing beyond the mere defense of Washington was to be accomplished by this force.

"I took the liberty of urging upon General Scott to occupy Manassas and compel the rebels to evacuate Harper's Ferry and the Valley of the Shenandoah. It has since become evident that this might have been then done, and it is even probable that a vigorous use of the force then at the disposal of the Government might have driven the rebels from Richmond.

GREAT IRREGULARITIES.

419 The action proposed, however, was thought to involve too much risk. The rebels were suffered for weeks to occupy Alexandria with an insignificant force, to incite insurrection in Baltimore, and to destroy the national property at Norfolk, except that which was destroyed under orders by ourselves. At last, after long delays, Baltimore was recovered, Alexandria was occupied by national troops, and the rebels were driven from Harper's Ferry. Meanwhile, it had become evident that the 75,000 men originally called for would be insufficient. To replace them I took the liberty to prepare a call for 65,000 volunteers. This proposition, after having been modified so as to include an increase of the regular army, was sanctioned by the President, who, with the consent of the Secretary of War, directed me to prepare also the necessary orders. I invited to my assistance Colonel Thomas, Major Irwin McDowell, and Captain W. B. Franklin. After a good deal of consideration the orders since known as Nos. 15 and 16 were framed; one for the enlistment of volunteers and the other for regular regiments. Major McDowell contributed the largest amount of information and suggestion, while the other two officers were by no means wanting in both. It was my part to decide between different opinions, and put the whole in form.

"The object I had in view in all this was-as there was no law authorizing the raising of the force required-to prepare to make a regular system and plan in conformity with which all new enlistments should be made clear and intelligible in itself, and capable of being laid before Congress in a form which would be likely to receive its sanction. These orders were promulgated in May, 1861.

"There were wide departures from this plan, however. Great irregularities prevailed. Regiments were raised under verbal authority from the President and Secretary of War, and under written memoranda of which no record was preserved. So that the orders failed to secure the objects I had in view-beyond the simple provision of force-which were, order and system, and through these efficiency and accountability.

cess.

"During this time great efforts were made in Kentucky and in Missouri to precipitate those States into rebellion, and I was called on to take a very considerable part in the measures adopted to prevent their sucThe President and Secretary of War, indeed, committed to me for a time the principal charge of what related to Kentucky and Tennessee, and I was very active also in promoting the measures deemed necessary for the safety of Missouri. When Rousseau, then a Union Senator in the Kentucky Legislature from Louisville, came to Washington to seek means of raising men for the defense of the Union, I took his matters in charge; obtained for him a colonel's commission and an order, which I drew up myself, authorizing him to raise twenty companies. I was also charged with the care of Nelson's work; drew most of the orders under which he acted; and provided the necessary means to meet expenses. So, also, I was called on to frame the orders under which Andrew Johnson was authorized to raise regiments in Tennessee. These duties brought me

into intimate relations with those officers; particularly with the first two. They were worthy of the confidence reposed in them by the President. I doubt if more valuable work has been done with so much activity, economy and practical benefit in raising men, by almost any others. Nelson's movement into the interior of Kentucky and the establishment of the Camp Dick Robinson, was especially most opportune. I think that this movement saved Kentucky from secession. I am quite sure that, without the organization of Nelson and Rousseau, the State would not have been saved from that calamity.

"While he was Secretary of War, General Cameron conferred much with me. I never undertook to do any thing in his department, except when asked to give my help, and then I gave it willingly. In addition to Western Border-State matters, the principal subjects of conference between General Cameron and myself were slavery and the employment of colored troops. We agreed very early that the necessity of arming them was in-. evitable; but we were alone in that opinion. At least no other member of the Administration gave open support, while the President and Mr. Blair, as least, were decidedly averse to it. The question of the employment of the colored people who sought refuge within our lines soon became one of practical importance. General Butler wrote from Fortress Monroe in May, 1861, asking what disposition should be made of such persons. The Secretary of War conferred with me, and I submitted my suggestions to him in the form of a letter, which he adopted with some slight modification. General Butler wrote again in July, and being again consulted, I again submitted suggestions which were adopted. In the first of these letters, General Butler was directed to refrain from surrendering alleged fugitives from service to alleged masters. In the second he was directed to employ them under such organizations and in such occupations as circumstances might suggest or require.

"It will be observed by the reader of those letters that at the time they were written it was expected the rebellion would be suppressed without any radical interference with the domestic institutions or internal affairs of any State, and that the directions to General Butler contemplated only such measures as seemed then necessary to suppression. He was not to interfere with laborers whether slaves or free, in houses or on farms. He was to receive only such as came to him, and, regarding all laws for reclamation as temporarily suspended, was to employ them in the service of the United States, keeping such accounts as would enable loyal owners to seek compensation from Congress....

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To Alphonso Taft, Cincinnati.

“WASHINGTON, April 20, 1861. To correct misapprehensions, except by acts, is an almost vain endeavor. You may say, however, to all whom it may concern, that there is no ground for the ascription to me by Major Brown of the sentiment to which you allude.

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"True it is that before the assault on Fort Sumter, in anticipation of an attempt to provision famishing soldiers of the Union, I was decidedly in favor of a positive policy and against the notion of drifting-the Micawber-like policy of waiting for something to turn up.

“As a positive policy two alternatives were plainly before us: 1. That of enforcing the laws of the Union by its whole power and through its whole extent; or, 2. That of recognizing the organization of actual government by the seven seceded States as an accomplished revolution-accomplished through the complicity of the late Administration, and letting that Confederacy try its experiment of separation; but maintaining the authority of the Union and treating secession as treason everywhere else.

แ "Knowing that the former of these alternatives involved destructive war and vast expenditure and oppressive debt, and thinking it possible that through the latter these great evils might be avoided, and the union of the other States preserved unbroken; the return even of the seceded States, after an unsatisfactory experiment of separation secured; and the great cause of freedom and constitutional government peacefully vindicated -thinking, I say, these things possible, I preferred the latter alternative.

"The attack on Fort Sumter and the precipitation of Virginia into hostility to the national Government, made this latter alternative impracticable, and I had then no hesitation about recurring to the former. Of course I insist on the most vigorous measures, not merely for the preservation of the Union and the defense of the Government, but for the constitutional reestablishment of both throughout the land.

"In laboring for these objects I know hardly the least cessation, and begin to feel the wear as well as the strain of them. When my criticisers equal me in labor and zeal, I shall more cheerfully listen to their criticisms.

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To Dr. William Wirt, Richmond.

“WASHINGTON, March 10, 1861.

“ . . . . A friend has placed in my hands a number of the Baltimore Exchange of the 7th inst., containing an article from the Richmond Dispatch which purports to give an account of the conversation between us, to which you refer in yours received last Friday.

"The article is very far from a correct statement of what was said. A great deal essential to any true understanding of the conversation is omitted, and what is stated is so stated as to convey a totally erroneous idea of its spirit and substance.

"You called on me, and I welcomed you as a friend—as a former pupil -as a son of William Wirt, my friend and instructor in other days—as a member of a family for every individual of which I have long cherished the warmest regard. I understood you also to be a friend of the Union, although earnest in maintaining what you believed to be the rights of the slave States. The Peace Conference was in session, and I was a member deeply interested in the objects of its discussions.

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