The Philosophy of Sociality: The Shared Point of View
Oxford University Press, USA, 16 de ago de 2007 - 318 páginas
"The Philosophy of Sociality examines the nature of sociality in its various forms, with special emphasis on collective intentionality. Raimo Tuomela begins with a distinction between the "we-perspective" and the "I-perspective." His study of strong collective intentionality - as expressed by joint intentions, collective commitment, group belief, authority-based group action, and other phenomena - outlines the circumstances under which an individual is required to think and act as a group member. By developing a systematic theory of sociality, Tuomela investigates such topics as social institutions, cooperation, cultural evolution, and group responsibility." "In The Philosophy of Sociality Tuomela asserts that "we-mode" collective intentionality is a conceptual prerequisite for understanding basic social notions. He finds several contexts in which we-mode intentionality is preferable to "pro-group" I-mode intentionality. He ultimately defends a naturalistic view of the social world by arguing that the we-mode is a genetic and cultural adaptation." "The Philosophy of Sociality offers new ideas and conceptual tools for philosophers and social scientists in their analysis of the social world."--BOOK JACKET.
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1 Acting as a Group Member
2 The WeMode and the IMode
3 Shared WeAttitudes
4 Joint Intention and WeIntention
5 Joint Social Action
6 Group Action and Group Attitudes
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