two days in discussing whether or not, there was a drunken man on the election ground in the county of Philadelphia. There was nothing more unjust than these general charges. Here had been a very honest gentleman, who he knew would not state any thing he did not believe; yet he had made a statement derogatory in the highest degree, to the Legislature, which the journals of the Legislature showed to be entirely unfounded, and this arose from introducing assertions of fact here without any examination, upon mere hearsay.

Now there was nothing more dangerous than the adoption of such a course of proceeding. To be sure, if the gentleman from Northampton should be a true prophet, and such a Legislature should never assemble again, it might be that there would never be a word in reply. But his objection to this amendment was entirely different from, and independent of, all such questions and statements. He laid them aside, as of no possible consequence. In the outset he would remark, the words of this amendment are not different from the language of the Constitution as it now stands. Not in the least. Look at the Constitution, read it over, and you will find that it consists of two parts. In the first place it declares that the elective franchise shall be enjoyed by all persons possessing certain qualifications. What is the consequence of that declaration ?— Why, that every man possessing these qualifications shall be entitled to vote. He did not now speak of the Bill of Rights, but of the Constitution, usually so called, as distinct from the Bill of Rights, which, nevertheless, was part of the Constitution. Does not the Constitution say that if a man is qualified he shall have the right to vote. Can the Legislature pass any law contrary to that? Where is the act of the Legislature of Pennsylvania which has attempted to deprive a qualified voter of his right to vote. If it had passed such a law, it would have been a violation of the existing Constitution, and would not require the aid of this amendment. If it had not, the question is altogether different-it is a question of discretion or expediency, which belongs to the Legislature, and not to us. Again, the bill of rights says that elections shall be free and equal. Now what does the amendment say ? It says the elections shall be free and equal throughout the Commonwealth. If this meant that every man should have the opportunity of voting, and that the qualifications of voters shall be equal throughout the Commonwealth, he gave it his full assent. He concured with those who so interpreted the Constitution that the Legislature could not alter the qualifications of voters. This however, did not take from them the power to make a registry law. Such a law did not affect the qualification, it only prescribed the evidence. That, as he understood it, was the opinion of Mr. VAN BUREN in the New York Convention, as read by the delegate from Northampton. He (Mr. SERGEANT) did not value it particularly on account of the quarter it came from. He had no particular respect for Mr. VAN BUREN'S opinions before he was President, and he could not say he entertained more, since he had become President. But, on the other hand, if an opinion was right, he would not reject it merely because Mr. VAN BUREN had adopted or expressed it. He was fully satisfied that the opinion expressed in this case was a sound one, and he (Mr. S.) adopted it not because it was the opinion of the President, but because it was a sound opinion-wherein then, he repeated does this

The argument of the gentleman from Northampton is plain enough. He says the registry law of 1835-'6 is a violation of the present Constitution. If it be a violation of the present Constitution, then it would be contrary to this amendment. If it be not a violation of the present Constitution, then neither would it be a violation of a law made in the very words of this amendment. This is perfectly clear, for the operative words of the amendment are exactly the same as the words of the Constitution. It is useless, therefore. But he objected to this amendment as accumulating, in the Constitution, redundant and unmeaning phraseology. You have already, in the first place, the definition of the qualifications of voters; then you have in the Bill of Rights a provision for preserving the rights, that is, the qualification as defined. Together, they make a complete and adequate provision. Yet, you would now put in a third provision, and that provision is substantially, if not literally, the same as the one in the Bill of Rights. A mere repetition of what is already clear. What is the use of all this? The true plan was this and here he agreed with the gentleman from Northampton;-if the clause in the Bill of Rights be equivocal, amend the article in its proper place in the Bill of Rights, and make it efficacious, but if you introduce a third clause you only make confusion in the instrument, and furnish a pretext for disputes and controversies. But, now suppose this to be otherwise. He meant to take it in either view; that it is equivocal, or that it is clear. If it is equivocal and uncertain, it is objectionable on that account. He thought it was so. Suppose it to be otherwise, the virtue in the amendment will not be in declaring that the elections shall be equal, for that is already in the Constitution-but it will consist in its being an attempt to define what is meant by equality. He would request the Secretary to read that part of the amendment.

Now he thought the language was equivocal. The present Constitution declares that elections shall be free and equal. This amendment declares that the election laws shall be equal. There is not, perhaps, perfect certainty with regard to the exact force of language in the present Constitution, that elections shall be equal; equality cannot with perfect exactness be predicated of elections. Still its construction is sufficiently understood. But when you say the election laws shall be equal, what is meant? Does it mean that elections shall be conducted in the same manner precisely all over the State? If that be the meaning, equal is not the word, because you cannot, with propriety, speak of election laws being equal. The word ought to be uniform, that is, the same. If so, then that word may be introduced. Suppose it to be introduced, the effect of it is to oblige the Legislature to provide that elections shall be conducted in every part of the Commonwealth exactly in the same way. Now, is it expedient that this duty should be imposed on the Legislature? Sir, the Constitution says, as it now stands, that elections shall be free and equal. But are they uniform throughout the Commonwealth? Do not the election laws provide that in some districts the polls shall be opened two hours earlier than in others? Do they not close in some districts sooner than in others? Is there uniformity there? No, sir, there is not. It may be said this is not material. Be it so, but in the Constitution is it expedient so to tie up the Legislature that they shall be obliged to inflict an injury and inconvenience on one part of the State, because they cannot grant relief without inflicting a greater

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restrict the Legislature so that it shall not have power to pass a regist law for some parts of the State? Sir, let us remember that the Constit tion provides that the elections shall be free as well as equal; and he he uniformity to be subordinate to freedom. He held that system or law whic by any construction, would destroy the freedom of elections, to be destru tive of liberty. You are to have both freedom and equality. But suppos in your efforts to obtain both, you sacrifice freedom in some large district because your Legislature are compelled to provide for elections, that is say, election laws, being equal. Then for equality are you to sacrifi freedom? What do gentlemen mean by freedom? He was not satisfie to understand by freedom an ideal thing; an abstraction; a thing to argued about most vehemently and learnedly, and in the conclusion to found about as rational, as to say that all men should wear coats of one siz and shape.

He meant by freedom a practical thing; defined as far as definable, an extended to us to as great an extent as we are capable of enjoying. He d not mean freedom from the oppression of laws merely, nor from the o pression of the majority which might be tyrannical; but from oppressio and wrong of every sort. Then he would ask whether the man enjoye freedom of election who was elbowed away from the window where h vote was to be received? Those who are there before him are in the enjoy ment of freedom, and will not give way for him, and he is turned off wit out having the opportunity of depositing his ballot. He has the right vote, but he cannot vote. Then what becomes of your freedom of ele tion? Will you not leave a power in the Constitution to guard the weal the aged, the timid, who come to the polls, and, after repeated and fruitles efforts to get to the windows, go off in despair. Is that freedom? No, si it is sacrificing the freedom of one man, or may be ten men, in order th another may have a greater quantity of freedom than belongs to him. you take the power from the Legislature to correct this evil, then you leav it no where. He was never present at an election in the county of Phila delphia in his life, therefore, he could say nothing about what occured their elections. One delegate had said he never saw a drunken man there Well, he did not question the truth of this assertion to the very letter. Tha delegate only says he never saw such a man there, but it is but a day two since he said a man had a right to get drunk on the fourth of July. H believed election day was held to be a day of equal license.

Mr. BROWN, of Philadelphia, explained. He had spoken of a particula election day when there were several thousand on the ground and he ha not seen one drunk. He had not pretended to say there were not drunke men there on some other days.

Mr. SERGEANT said, in relation to that, he was not going to enter into a argument about it, unless it become actually necessary, and all he had t say with regard to the election day was, that it was a holiday; labor wa Suspended; the shops were shut up, and a great many went there for frolic and fun, which no doubt added much to the inconvenience of elec tions. But we have certainly heard it asserted, by some, that there has bee intoxication and riot and disturbance and hindrance of voters at the election in the city and county of Philadelphia, and we have heard it denied by other It is quite clear that some regard should be paid to those who make th

The argument of the gentleman from Northampton is plain enough. He says the registry law of 1835-'6 is a violation of the present Constitution. If it be a violation of the present Constitution, then it would be contrary to this amendment. If it be not a violation of the present Constitution, then neither would it be a violation of a law made in the very words of this amendment. This is perfectly clear, for the operative words of the amendment are exactly the same as the words of the Constitution. It is useless, therefore. But he objected to this amendment as accumulating, in the Constitution, redundant and unmeaning phraseology. You have already, in the first place, the definition of the qualifications of voters; then you have in the Bill of Rights a provision for preserving the rights, that is, the qualification as defined. Together, they make a complete and adequate provision. Yet, you would now put in a third provision, and that provision is substantially, if not literally, the same as the one in the Bill of Rights. A mere repetition of what is already clear. What is the use of all this? The true plan was this-and here he agreed with the gentleman from Northampton;-if the clause in the Bill of Rights be equivocal, amend the article in its proper place in the Bill of Rights, and make it efficacious, but if you introduce a third clause you only make confusion in the instrument, and furnish a pretext for disputes and controversies. But, now suppose this to be otherwise. He meant to take it in either view; that it is equivocal, or that it is clear. If it is equivocal and uncertain, it is objectionable on that account. He thought it was so. Suppose it to be otherwise, the virtue in the amendment will not be in declaring that the elections shall be equal, for that is already in the Constitution-but it will consist in its being an attempt to define what is meant by equality. He would request the Secretary to read that part of the amendment.

Now he thought the language was equivocal. The present Constitution declares that elections shall be free and equal. This amendment declares that the election laws shall be equal. There is not, perhaps, perfect certainty with regard to the exact force of language in the present Constitution, that elections shall be equal; equality cannot with perfect exactness be predicated of elections. Still its construction is sufficiently understood. But when you say the election laws shall be equal, what is meant? Does it mean that elections shall be conducted in the same manner precisely all over the State? If that be the meaning, equal is not the word, because you cannot, with propriety, speak of election laws being equal. The word ought to be uniform, that is, the same. If so, then that word may be introduced. Suppose it to be introduced, the effect of it is to oblige the Legislature to provide that elections shall be conducted in every part of the Commonwealth exactly in the same way. Now, is it expedient that this duty should be imposed on the Legislature? Sir, the Constitution says, as it now stands, that elections shall be free and equal. But are they uniform throughout the Commonwealth? Do not the election laws provide that in some districts the polls shall be opened two hours earlier than in others? Do they not close in some districts sooner than in others? Is there uniformity there? No, sir, there is not. It may be said this is not material. Be it so, but in the Constitution is it expedient so to tie up the Legislature that they shall be obliged to inflict an injury and inconvenience on one part of the State, because they cannot grant relief without inflicting a greater

restrict the Legislature so that it shall not have power to pass a registry law for some parts of the State? Sir, let us remember that the Constitution provides that the elections shall be free as well as equal; and he held uniformity to be subordinate to freedom. He held that system or law which, by any construction, would destroy the freedom of elections, to be destructive of liberty. You are to have both freedom and equality. But suppose, in your efforts to obtain both, you sacrifice freedom in some large districts, because your Legislature are compelled to provide for elections, that is to say, election laws, being equal. Then for equality are you to sacrifice freedom? What do gentlemen mean by freedom? He was not satisfied to understand by freedom an ideal thing; an abstraction; a thing to be argued about most vehemently and learnedly, and in the conclusion to be found about as rational, as to say that all men should wear coats of one size and shape.

He meant by freedom a practical thing; defined as far as definable, and extended to us to as great an extent as we are capable of enjoying. He did not mean freedom from the oppression of laws merely, nor from the oppression of the majority which might be tyrannical; but from oppression and wrong of every sort. Then he would ask whether the man enjoyed freedom of election who was elbowed away from the window where his vote was to be received? Those who are there before him are in the enjoyment of freedom, and will not give way for him, and he is turned off without having the opportunity of depositing his ballot. He has the right to vote, but he cannot vote. Then what becomes of your freedom of election? Will you not leave a power in the Constitution to guard the weak, the aged, the timid, who come to the polls, and, after repeated and fruitless efforts to get to the windows, go off in despair. Is that freedom? No, sir, it is sacrificing the freedom of one man, or may be ten men, in order that another may have a greater quantity of freedom than belongs to him. If you take the power from the Legislature to correct this evil, then you leave it no where. He was never present at an election in the county of Philadelphia in his life, therefore, he could say nothing about what occured at their elections. One delegate had said he never saw a drunken man there. Well, he did not question the truth of this assertion to the very letter. That delegate only says he never saw such a man there, but it is but a day or two since he said a man had a right to get drunk on the fourth of July. He believed election day was held to be a day of equal license.

Mr. BROWN, of Philadelphia, explained. He had spoken of a particular election day when there were several thousand on the ground and he had not seen one drunk. He had not pretended to say there were not drunken men there on some other days.

Mr. SERGEANT said, in relation to that, he was not going to enter into an argument about it, unless it become actually necessary, and all he had to say with regard to the election day was, that it was a holiday; labor was suspended; the shops were shut up, and a great many went there for a frolic and fun, which no doubt added much to the inconvenience of elections. But we have certainly heard it asserted, by some, that there has been intoxication and riot and disturbance and hindrance of voters at the elections in the city and county of Philadelphia, and we have heard it denied by others. It is quite clear that some regard should be paid to those who make the