number, we might as well do nothing on the subject. Any regular system that was now adopted, could be carried into effect, a century hence, just as well as now. There could be no difficulty about the details. Of all the plans which had been suggested, as yet, there was none which was so well adapted to the wants and interests of the people, as that which had been offered by the Judiciary committee, and he trusted, that it, with some modifications, would be adopted. He would go for any practicable reform, which would answer the object of removing this evil, and he had no doubt, that the proposition of the gentleman from Philadelphia, would tend to limit the number of the Justices; to raise their character; to render them more independent, and impartial; and to restore public confidence in the Magistracy. He conceived this to be a subject of vast importance. It was a question, whether we should break up a corrupt and tyrannical system, from which the most mischievous effects daily proceeded; whether we should suffer men, of moderate circumstances, and poor men to be daily dragged before the Justices, and robbed of their money, for the emolument of those men. He knew that there were many Justices of the Peace, who were honest and respectable men; but, he also knew, that there were many who oppressed the people, and created business for the sake of their own emolument. The worthy and respectable of the Magistracy, were not those who got the money, but it was those who were guilty of extortion and oppression, some of whom got rich by their offices. To deprive them of their fees and perquisites, would have the effect to withdraw the inducement, which they now have, to promote litigation. The gentleman from Susquehanna, objected that the compensation by fixed salary, would, necessarily, be unequal; but either the Legislature or the county Commissioners, could easily regulate the salary, so as to equal it in proportion to the amount of business done by each Justice. There could be no better protection, against the number, and the extortions and corruptions of the Justices, than to allow them a salary, instead of fees of office. The people would not, then, ask for such a number, as would be a burden to them, and the officers themselves, would have no inducement to abuse their power.

Mr. DUNLOP said, when this proposition was first offered, he was disposed to vote for it, out of respect to the judgment of the gentleman who offered it, and from a conviction, that something should be done, to correct the evils of the present system. But, in this, as well as any other subject, he kept his mind open to conviction, and, after listening to the argument, he had concluded to vote against it. The people of Pennsylvania were not disposed to increase the number of salaried officers. There was something odious to them in the very name. The number of Justices, as stated in the document before us, was now three thousand six hundred and thirty-six. It would not be tolerated, that such a number of salaried officers, should be thrown on the treasury; and even this number, great as it was, might be increased. It was said, that the Legislature might direct, what salaries should be paid; but could they not also direct the mode of paying them? They might direct whether they should be paid by the counties, out of the public treasury, by fees, or that they should not be paid at all. The Legislature had this power now, and he was not prepared to take it out of their hands. He doubted whether the people would

Now, the burden of compensating them was thrown on the litigants, them. selves, who were obliged to pay for the indulgence of their litigious propensities. As the Legislature had control of the subject, he did not think it necessary for the Convention to act upon it; and that principle he ap-. plied to every subject which was brought before us. It was not necessary for us to undertake the functions of Legislation.

The Convention adjourned.

WEDNESDAY AFTERNOON, 4 O'CLOCK.

SIXTH ARTICLE.

The Convention again resolved itself into a committee of the whole on the 6th article of the Constitution, Mr. CHAMBERS of Franklin in the chair.

The question pending, being on the motion of Mr MEREDITH, to amend the amendment offered by Mr. REED.

Mr. REED said, that the gentleman from Lycoming (Mr. FLEMING,) had asked him a question, which he had answered before. His reply had not been understood, and he could answer him again. The gentleman had asked where was the limitation to the number of justices? It was to be found in the nature of the case. No other power than the Legislature can limit them, because we cannot foresee every contingency, when we say in the report, that they shall be elected in every township and borough, it would be impossible to know how many there will be to vote for. That must be determined by the Legislature. If the gentleman thinks the language is not sufficiently clear, he can move to amend. He himself could not make such motion, because under his amendment the Legislature would fix the number.

Mr. M'DOWELL said, before the vote was taken, he begged leave briefly to suggest to the Committee his views upon the subject before them. As a reformer, he felt an earnest desire that great caution should be exercised upon all occasions; and that, although individual inembers might have a strong bias in favor of certain forms of amendment, still he hoped their minds were open to the force of truth, and possibly to conversion. Every material innovation upon the present Constitution was of vast importance, and before it met the sanction of the Committee, should be carefully and deliberately weighed. It was going very far, when, by a pretty decided vote, the Commitee determined to elect Justices of the Peace, but since that important change was likely to be made, he deemed it of the highest interest to guard the integrity and faithfulness of those inferior Courts in every possible manner.

He believed the question before the House to be one of the highest importance, and involving a principle of equal interest with any that would come before the Convention. It embraced, in fact, the independence and purity of the Judiciary: and, although the application of the principle was to a Court of inferior jurisdiction, it nevertheless carried with it in its consideration, all the weight and all the consequences that could follow its adoption in the regulation of a higher tribunal. It was deeply to be re

But it

Justices of the Peace, had received that attention nor commanded that re spect, which the present Constitution intended to create and confer. Their Judicial tenure and functions lay at the very root of the Judicial system of the commonwealth, and their action within the scope of the same, brings them to pass upon the most important rights and interests of the commu nity So much had been said about the rich and the poor, that he felt some distrust in introducing the claims and rights of the poor man even in their proper place. But he said it became us to speak of men and things as they exist, in the proper spirit and at proper times. The poor man had his rights, and it was the office of Government to protect them. He regarded those inferior tribunals of Justices of the Peace, as more especially the poor man's Court, and the nature and extent of their action brought them mainly into the interest of the humbler classes of society. did not follow, because their jurisdiction was limited, and, consequently. they were not brought to act upon large claims, that they ought not therefore to act correctly and honestly. A Magistrate's Court was a Court of the last resort, and as absolutely so, within certain limitations, as the su perior tribunals of Common Pleas, or the Supreme Court. From his decision, within a certain amount, there was no appeal: his judgment was absolute. An erroneous judgment in a sum of five dollars and thirty-three cents, involved as great a principle and affected as large a right to the poor man, as an erroneous judgment in a sum of nine hundred and ninety-nine dollars and ninety-nine cents did to the rich man; although the one might be commited by a Justice of the Peace, and the other by the Supreme Court. It was the principle of right and wrong that was implicated, and not the amount of claim. The number of rights passed upon by these inferior tribunals-the incalculable number of subjects of litigation necessarily thrown before them by legal restrictions, made them the most universally important tribunals of Justice in the Commonwealth-and it was for these reasons they were entitled to what they of late years, at least, had never claimed nor received-the greatest possible perfection in their or ganization, and the most scrupulous exercise of their powers.

Did these tribunals sustain, in character and usefulness, what was originally conceded to them in principle and importance? Certainly not. He was surprised to find so predominant a spirit of complaint. The whole western section of the State seemed to be arrayed against the Justices of the Peace, as against a prevailing evil. And it was a singular fact, that, in proportion as their Judicial functions were enlarged from time to time hy the Legislature, the character of the office became diminished, both in dignity and usefulness. From whence springs the evil? In answer to this, there was but one opinion. It arose from the abuse of the appointing power. That power, to the extent exercised, was perhaps never in contemplation by the framers of the Constitution. Since its adoption, the jurisdiction of these subordinate Magistrates has been enlarged from fory shillings to one hundred dollars. Whether that jurisdiction was wisely extended, was debateable ground. Wise or unwise, it was a tribunal to whose judgment seat nine-tenths of the disputed concerns of mankind were brought for decision. And, notwithstanding this, it was a tribunal constituted by the Governor of the Commonwealth carelessly, recklessly, corruptly. It was a part of his patronage, more than any other, that had been bascly

pointed; and, SECONDLY, in the number of appointments that had been made from time to time to repay party services performed, or secure those that were to be performed.

In practice, he inquired what was the process in creating Justices of the Peace? Was it to consult the people. FIRST, whether a Magistrate was necessary; and, SECONDLY, who was their choice? Not at all.

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There

were certain Kitchen Cabinets" in every county of the Commonwealth, composed of the "wise men of Gotham"-the pure in faith-the King's Counsellors", to whom homage" must be paid by the people in the first place. They were the dispensers of public favors; and, no difference what party was in power, the process was the same. The honest yeomanry of a neighborhood, pursuing their business in peace and quietness -not dreaming that they were in want of an additional Magistrate among them, were often surprized and paralized by the pouncing down upon them, all of a sudden, a new Justice of the Peace-a fellow with a commission in his pocket from the Governor, who is, thenceforth and forever, a great man, though he was never heard of before; or, if heard of, it was during some electioneering campaign, where, perhaps, he was more dexterous at playing the demagogue than any other man. In all this, was the voice or wishes of the PEOPLE Consulted? No-their rights were violated, and themselves insulted! It was these abuses and inal-practices in the appointing head, that had brought the Judicial character of subordinate Magistracy into disrepute and odium. A large portion of the Justices of the Peace were competent and worthy men; but there were those among them, and they not a few, whose character and qualifications threw a shade over the whole.

He did not know a greater curse that could be fastened upon an orderly and peaceful neighborhood, than a meddling, officious, business-seeking, pimping, pandering Justice of the Peace-a man, too, whom the people over whom he presides, contemn and despise. There was no worse visitation, unless it be an excess of Magistracy.

Here Mr. M'DoWELL went into an argument of some length, to show the evils resulting from the existence of so many Justices of the Peace.He believed litigation was multiplied exactly in proportion with the increase of Magistrates. A majority of them were ambitious to acquire business, and he who obtained most, was of course highest in judicial excellence and importance. It unfortunately too often happened, that those who were least worthy and least competent did the most business, and, consequently, injured and fleeced the greatest number of people. He believed it to be generally true, that the Justice of the Peace in the county, who made his Magistracy an exclusive business-a means of livelihoodwas an injury to the community in which he lived. He meant the man who sought business as some of them did. People needed no prompting to litigation-there was too much tendency to the law for the peace of society, or the interests of individuals. He did not believe in bringing justice to "every man's door"—at least, he did not believe in bringing a Justice of the Peace to every man's door. He was opposed to offering facilites to litigation-he would not increase the opportunities of a man to get into a law suit. It was better that many obstructions should lie in a man's way before he was permited to sue another. No man should en

solute necessity for it. He believed hundreds-nay thousands of little, petty, malicious actions were brought, because of the ease and convenience which attended them. A difficulty arises between a man and his neighbor-they dispute-a Magistrate is in sight, and while the blood is heated they sue. He had said a Justice of the Peace was a great man from the date of his commission; he was fit to counsel his neighbors, by virtue of the great seal of the State-his counsel generally ended in bringing a suit as the most judicial mode of settling a dispute, which a little time, or inability to get to a Magistrate, would have settled itself. But Justices are so thick, a man has not time to cool or reflect, before he runs against one.— In matters of consultation, they become the agent of the consulting party, and if a suit is brought, they are bound in honor to make good their advice; consequently, judgment is given for plaintiffs, and hence has arisen that approbrious saying, "that Justices of the Peace always give judg ment for the plaintiff, unless the defendant is unable to pay the costs”. He spoke of those Justices who abused and disgraced the office.

He went into a further examination, to show how oppressively the abuse and prostration of the subordinate Magistracy of the country operated upon the humble classes of society-and how important it was, that these tribunals, inferior as they might be, should be respected and respectable, and those who fill them, should be men of sound heads and pure hearts.

Such being the state of things, and the people of this Commonwealth seeing that the evil was growing upon them, and that it was getting beyond endurance, claim to have a change in their fundamental law in this respect. They ask, by a large majority, if the opinions of the members of this Convention are evidence of the will of their constituents, that the creation of Justices of the Peace be given back to them. If it is their will, they have the right to elect them. The experiment is about to be tried, and it is said the hazard is not great, inasmuch as the result cannot be worse. Time will test the change.

The amendment offered by the gentleman from Philadelphia, (Mr. MEREDITH) presented to his mind a subject worthy of great consideration.The proposition was to give to the Justices of the Peace a fixed salary, instead of the fees of office. Inasmuch as the door was thrown open for improvement, he was favorable to the amendment; it struck him with great force. There were two principal evils to get rid of in the amelioration of the system; the first was the number of Justices; the second the abuse of the office. The first evil must be eradicated, or all amendments are vain. Unless some limit is fixed in the Constitution as to number-if the Legislature is to say how many Justices of the Peace are to be elected in each township, ward, or district-if they are to determine when and where a new Justice is necessary, he feared there would be nothing gained by the change. He had no faith in Legislatures, and he would sooner trust matters of patronage with the Governor, much as it was abused, than with the Legislature. He would not make the Legislative Hall a political arena, where office hunters were to assemble to contest their claims to office. Members of that body would have the same inducements to abuse the power as the Executive; they would strew their districts with newly made Magistrates, to reconcile present and secure future promotion. He had heard enough about legislative encroachments and