tion, because he believed that some change was necessary, and ought to be made. He was pleased to find so many gentlemen who were able to vouch for the integrity and respectability of the Justices of the Peace in this State; but he found they had presented but one side of the picture.He knew many of them who were highly respectable, and good officers; but he regreted to say, that he, also, knew of some Justices, who were wholly unfit for an office so important-for, in his opinion, it was an important office. This was a subject, as to which his constituents wished some action, with a view to the remedy of existing evils. He was willing to fall in with any proposition, which should offer an efficient remedy. The great, growing, and crying evil complained of, was the great number of Justices. The office was thus made too cheap: and it was no longer regarded as a respectable and responsible situation. The appointment was too easily obtained; for it was not uncommon, nor difficult, in townships, where there were already a dozen acting Magistrates in a township, for the friends of the Executive to procure more appointments for the same township. The number has, in this way, been increased till they had become a curse, instead of a benefit, to the community. He spoke from his own knowledge, as derived in the course of his professional pursuits, when he said that he had no confidence in the Justices, as a body. He had had occasion to examine into their character and conduct; and he would say that there were very many of them who were utterly unfit for their office, and who did much mischief in its exercise.They had lost the confidence of the community, and that was a sufficient reason with him for providing for some other mode of appointment, and for a limitation of their number. It was high time to restore public confidence by a salutary reform. Let us lay the axe at the root of the evil. He asked gentlemen who wanted evidence of the evils of the present system, to refer to the dockets of the several Prothonotaries in the Commonwealth, and ascertain how many writs of appeal and certiorari there were from the Justices' courts, and see how litigation was promoted, and costs accumulated by the ignorant or corrupt conduct of the Justices. Their jurisdiction had been extended, and with it had been increased their power to do injury to the poor man. The great reason urged in favor of increasing their jurisdiction, was to save costs; but the costs had been increased four fold by it, and it had not afforded any of the relief contemplated by the law of 1810. He had stated that there were many incompetent Justices of the Peace, and he would mention a single instance: A Justice issued a summons in a case of slander; and when the defendant was brought before him, he said that there was no bail allowed in the case of slander, and actually made out a mittimus, and sent him sixty-five miles to prison. Justices, of similar qualifications, abounded in the country. He thought the only way was to remove every man, good and bad, to limit their term, and limit their numbers. So long as we continued the present number, it would be impossible to follow out any scheme of reform, or prevent the injustice and errors of their proceedings. Half of the Common Pleas business related to appeals from Magistrates. If we were to have continual appeals and complaints under the present system, why not agree to apply some remedy? Let us have an experiment of reform. If it was thought that the salary would amount to too much, then, as the next remedy for us to try, he would refer to the proposition of the report

from the committee on the fifth article. It was conceded that some reme dy ought to be applied, and he hoped we should adopt an effectual one. He had some objections to all the plans that had been suggested; but he prefered the proposition in the report of the Judiciary committee, which provided a limitation of the number. If no other alteration were made to the Constitution than this, it would be worth all the expense attending this Convention. He was in favor of the amendment now under consideration, and should vote for it; but he would be willing to vote for any feasible plan, having in view the same object.

Mr. SHELLITO said, as the State of Ohio had been alluded to, and as he lived on the borders of that State, he would say, that though he had had much intercourse with the people of Ohio, and had heard their sentiments in regard to the operation of their system of electing the Justices, he had never heard any complaint of the system. Every body appeared to be well satisfied with its results. He heard the people say, they would not exchange it for ours, nor for any other that could be devised. In regard to the proposition of the gentleman from Philadelphia, to pay the Justices' salaries, he said it would have a most mischievous tendency. There were many litigious and quarrelsome people, who would always be ready to go to law, if they could do so at the public cost. Contentious people would have an opportunity, without expense to themselves, to drag their neighbors into the courts, without any reason or excuse. They would take their neighbors from their plough, to carry them before the Magistrate. Such men would be pests to society, if they were allowed such facilities for litigation. Many men would refuse to pay an honest debt, until they were sued, for they would argue that the suit would cost them nothing. There must be some way to make a man responsible for going to law. For these reasons, he objected to the proposed amendment; but there was another reason, growing out of the effect of the provision, upon the Magistrate himself. When he found that he was to have a certain salary, whether he did little business, or much business, he would probably do no business at all. He would not lose his time and quit his private affairs, to attend to the business of any poor man, if he was to be paid the same sum, whether he discharged his duties or not. He was not going to condemn the Magistrates as a body, but it was evident that the people were dissatisfied with the present system, and wished to take the matter into their own hands. He held that the appointing power was very liable to abuse, and that it ought not to be confered on any one man, An absolute power of appointment, exercised by one man, was tyranny. No tyrant could go beyond that. The people wanted to take the election into their own hands, and if they happened to make a bad choice, it would be in their power to remedy it at a subsequent election, by leaving out men who are found to be incompetent and unfaithful. But when they get good men, they could re-elect them. Upon these considerations, he should found his vote.

Mr. READ proposed, he said, for a few minutes, to examine the argument of the gentleman from Lycoming, (Mr. FLEMING,) and see upon what it was founded. His two positions were, first, that some change was necessary; and, second, that the complaints against the present system, proceeded from the circumstance, that there were too many Magis

ment of the gentlemen from Philadelphia, (Mr. MEREDITH). How would these two reasons stand together? Any man who wishes to remedy an evil, would naturally look to the origin of the evil, and propose something that would remove its cause. Those who thought that the evil was in the too great number of Magistrates, would, of course, propose to reduce the number. But how is this to be effected, by changing the mode of compensation? The report of the committee as fully and effectually reaches the evil, which he supposes to lie at the root of all the faults of the present system, as does the amendment of the gentleman from Philadelphia, It does not, to be sure, limit the number of Justices, but it leaves it to the Legislature to carry out the principle, and fix the number, according to the circumstances which may hereafter arise. The Convention cannot fix the number. How can we tell what circumstances may arise, in the lapse of time, to render a change of the number necessary? We can, and perhaps may, allow the Legislature to assign certain numbers to each district, according to the number of taxables. The gentleman seemed not to be aware, as most persons were who had resided in any county, that it would be impracticable to fix a salary which would be adapted to the business and labor of each Justice in the county. Some Magistrates, owing to their peculiar location in the county town, or to other circumstances, were employed their whole time, and took fees to the amount of six or eight hundred dollars a year; while there were other Magistrates, in the same county, who were not employed two days in the whole year, and whose entire receipts did not amount to five dollars. But it was necessary for the convenience of the citizens of every county, that they should have four or five Magistrates in different neighborhoods, to take acknowledgments of deeds, or to take testimony from females, and from the aged and infirm, who could not go to the county town for the purpose. If we undertook to graduate their compensation, according to their business, could we say, half a century before hand, what each Magistrate's salary should be in proportion to his duties? Could we tell, with certainty, what would be the amount of business that each Magistrate would perform? There was a limitation of the number of Justices fixed by the report of the committee. The report made it necessary for the Legisla ture to district the State, and limit the number of Justices to be voted for in each, before the elections; and until they did this, the people would have nothing to vote for, and there could be no election.

Mr. FLEMING said, the gentleman had alleged, that he had fixed the -number of Justices in the report. In what section of it, was there any limitation of the number? Could the gentleman point it out to us? It was not competent, for us to leave this matter to a future Legislature, who might, or might not effect a limitation. We were bound to do it ourselves, and for that purpose, mainly, had this body been assembled, to leave the whole matter to the hazards of future legislation, would be a gross dereliction of our duty. The best way, in his opinion, to effect a practical limitation, was to require the people to pay their compensation, and their interest would then induce them to elect only such a number, as was necessary. We wanted a limitation which was tangible, and which the people could comprehend at a glance. The prospect of limitation by the Legislature, was not sufficient to satisfy them. Unless we

from the committee on the fifth article. It was conceded that some remedy ought to be applied, and he hoped we should adopt an effectual one. He had some objections to all the plans that had been suggested; but he prefered the proposition in the report of the Judiciary committee, which provided a limitation of the number. If no other alteration were made to the Constitution than this, it would be worth all the expense attending this Convention. He was in favor of the amendment now under consideration, and should vote for it; but he would be willing to vote for any feasible plan, having in view the same object.

Mr. SHELLITO said, as the State of Ohio had been alluded to, and as he lived on the borders of that State, he would say, that though he had had much intercourse with the people of Ohio, and had heard their sentiments in regard to the operation of their system of electing the Justices, he had never heard any complaint of the system. Every body appeared to be well satisfied with its results. He heard the people say, they would not exchange it for ours, nor for any other that could be devised. In regard to the proposition of the gentleman from Philadelphia, to pay the Justices' salaries, he said it would have a most mischievous tendency. There were many litigious and quarrelsome people, who would always be ready to go to law, if they could do so at the public cost. Contentious people would have an opportunity, without expense to themselves, to drag their neighbors into the courts, without any reason or excuse. They would take their neighbors from their plough, to carry them before the Magistrate. Such men would be pests to society, if they were allowed such facilities for litigation. Many men would refuse to pay an honest debt, until they were sued, for they would argue that the suit would cost them nothing. There must be some way to make a man responsible for going to law. For these reasons, he objected to the proposed amendment; but there was another reason, growing out of the effect of the provision, upon the Magistrate himself. When he found that he was to have a certain salary. whether he did little business, or much business, he would probably do no business at all. He would not lose his time and quit his private affairs, to attend to the business of any poor man, if he was to be paid the same sum, whether he discharged his duties or not. He was not going to con demn the Magistrates as a body, but it was evident that the people were dissatisfied with the present system, and wished to take the matter into their own hands. He held that the appointing power was very liable to abuse, and that it ought not to be confered on any one man, An absolute power of appointment, exercised by one man, was tyranny. No tvrant could go beyond that. The people wanted to take the election into their own hands, and if they happened to make a bad choice, it would be in their power to remedy it at a subsequent election, by leaving out men who are found to be incompetent and unfaithful. But when they get good men, they could re-elect them. Upon these considerations, he should found his vote.

Mr. READ proposed, he said, for a few minutes, to examine the argement of the gentleman from Lycoming, (Mr. FLEMING,) and see upon what it was founded. His two positions were, first, that some change was necessary; and, second, that the complaints against the present system, proceeded from the circumstance, that there were too many Magis

ment of the gentlemen from Philadelphia, (Mr. MEREDITH). How would these two reasons stand together? Any man who wishes to remedy an evil, would naturally look to the origin of the evil, and propose something that would remove its cause. Those who thought that the evil was in the too great number of Magistrates, would, of course, propose to reduce the number. But how is this to be effected, by changing the mode of compensation? The report of the committee as fully and effectually reaches the evil, which he supposes to lie at the root of all the faults of the present system, as does the amendment of the gentleman from Philadelphia, It does not, to be sure, limit the number of Justices, but it leaves it to the Legislature to carry out the principle, and fix the number, according to the circumstances which may hereafter arise. The Convention cannot fix the number. How can we tell what circumstances may arise, in the lapse of time, to render a change of the number necessary? We can, and perhaps may, allow the Legislature to assign certain numbers to each district, according to the number of taxables. The gentleman seemed not to be aware, as most persons were who had resided in any county, that it would be impracticable to fix a salary which would be adapted to the business and labor of each Justice in the county. Some Magistrates, owing to their peculiar location in the county town, or to other circumstances, were employed their whole time, and took fees to the amount of six or eight hundred dollars a year; while there were other Magistrates, in the same county, who were not employed two days in the whole year, and whose entire receipts did not amount to five dollars. But it was necessary for the convenience of the citizens of every county, that they should have four or five Magistrates in different neighborhoods, to take acknowledgments of deeds, or to take testimony from females, and from the aged and infirm, who could not go to the county town for the purpose. If we undertook to graduate their compensation, according to their business, could we say, half a century before hand, what each Magistrate's salary should be in proportion to his duties? Could we tell, with certainty, what would be the amount of business that each Magistrate would perform? There was a limitation of the number of Justices fixed by the report of the committee. The report made it necessary for the Legisla ture to district the State, and limit the number of Justices to be voted for in each, before the elections; and until they did this, the people would have nothing to vote for, and there could be no election.

Mr. FLEMING said, the gentleman had alleged, that he had fixed the number of Justices in the report. In what section of it, was there any limitation of the number? Could the gentleman point it out to us? It was not competent, for us to leave this matter to a future Legislature, who might, or might not effect a limitation. We were bound to do it ourselves, and for that purpose, mainly, had this body been assembled, to leave the whole matter to the hazards of future legislation, would be a gross dereliction of our duty. The best way, in his opinion, to effect a practical limitation, was to require the people to pay their compensation, and their interest would then induce them to elect only such a number, as was necessary. We wanted a limitation which was tangible, and which the people could comprehend at a glance. The prospect of limitation by the Legislature, was not sufficient to satisfy them. Unless we