they are the persons who suffer, if the entries are not correctly made, or if the records are destroyed. Then, it was the people at large who were interested in this matter, and it was with them that the election of these officers should be left. The judges having little or no interest in the matter, the offices should be made elective, so that the people might have the opportunity of saying who they would trust with the discharge of this important duty. It was his firm belief, if the election was left with the people, that in a great majority of cases, they would look to the qualifications of the man, rather than to the party to which he belonged, or the party services which he might have rendered; and, furthermore, he believed we would have as good officers as though the appointments were left with the courts. If he thought that this mode of election of these officers by the people, was going to be productive of any very great evil, he would hesitate long before he would vote for it, whether the people of his county were favorable to it or not; but he believed it was the best mode which we could adopt. He believed the people of his county were in favor of it, and he believed the people would make such selections as would do credit to themselves. For these reasons, he should vote against the amendment to give the appointments to the courts, and in favor of giving the election to the people.

Mr. FORWARD was sorry his friend from the city had misunderstood the argument, which he had briefly addressed to the committee a short time ago. His desire was to remove the Judiciary as far as possible from all political influence, and to keep it as much separated from party politics as possible; and he believed, the confering upon the courts these appointments, would have the tendency to connect them more closely with party politics, and with the parties to which the Judges might belong before they were raised to the bench. He felt disinclined to confer on them this power, even though they were better calculated to judge of the qualifications of these officers. He admited there was a better chance of having men selected to perform the duties of the office with skill, than if we leave the election to the people. He would not withdraw or modify the concession he had made, and he would still oppose the appointment by the courts. What was it which had brought into bad repute the tenure of the Judiciary? He believed it was our political Judges; he believed the tenure of office had been brought into disrepute by the Judges intermeddling and interfering in the party politics of the country. He believed it would lead to favoritism, if these appointments were confered on the courts, which would still further tend to bring the Judiciary into disrepute.Men, in our State, have been called from the ranks of party politics, to administer justice; men who could not command the respect of their fellow citizens, and who could not rest on their legal profession for reputation, but must lean on the arm of some party to sustain them. This brought the tenure itself into disrepute, and if we connected them still closer with party politics, what would be the effect? If you give a Judge two or three of these appointments to make, he will be governed by party feelings, precisely in the same manner in which the Governor is governed, and we will have a set of political partisans, who make politics a trade, thrust into all these offices; not high-minded, honorable men, in many instances, but the tools of the parties. The bands of political parties would

parties of each district. Then, why place the courts in this situation, which must lead the people to place less confidence in them? It would, in his opinion, be impolitic and unwise, and the power ought not to be given to them; therefore he should vote against the amendment.

Mr. BONHAM was opposed to the amendment submited by the gentleman from the city, (Mr. MEREDITH). He found that there were many

Then,

here, who were in favor of the election of life officers, and if that amendment prevail, all these Judges in the different districts, and counties, will be to appoint, and who supposes, that the Governor, whosoever he may be, at the time, will not reward his political friends? and in some cases, perhaps, his own relations. Then, again, if the appointment of these officers should be confered on the Judges, it is natural to suppose, that they would, in the first place, look to their own family for persons to fill these situations, and if they had in their families, persons who could fill it, the strong probability was, that they would receive the appointment. according to this plan, the judges might confer on their own families the whole of the offices for the county, which would be continued during life, or during the term of office of the Judge. This would, most certainly, meet the dissatisfaction of the people, as it would be creating a kind of family aristocracy, in every county or district. The people, in his opinion, ought to have the selection of these officers themselves, and he took them to be as capable of judging of the qualifications of the officers in a majority of cases, as the courts; and if they do make a bad selection, the officer will be continued but for the shortest term. He believed, it would be most satisfactory to the people generally, that the election of these officers should be given to them, and he would not give them to the courts, because it would lay the courts open to censure, which ought to be avoided. If the courts should make such appointments as he had refered to, they would be liable to be reflected upon, and censured by the public, which would have an evil tendency. They should be as far removed from censure as possible, therefore, he would throw nothing in their way, which would lead them into temptation. For these reasons, he should vote against the amendment of the gentleman from the city.

Mr. SERGEANT (President) had no manner of doubt, but this whole subject was one of great difficulty; it deserves and requires careful consideration, and he must confess, that he had not found that difficulty lessened by the discussion, to which he had not been inattentive. He had been particularly struck by a part of the observations of the gentleman from Franklin, (Mr. DUNLOP). He wished to illustrate his idea, by refering in the first place to a remark made by the gentleman from Franklin, (Mr. DUNLOP) being itself an exhibition of the state of things, presented first by the gentleman from Northampton, (Mr. PORTER) as to what was to arise out of the change proposed in the Constitution, with regard to the appointing power, so as to make the county officers elective, in place of the present mode of appointing them. That remark was this, that heretofore, the majority in the State through the Governor, had the appointment of every county officer in the Commonwealth, and that hereafter, if the alteration is made, the majority in each county will have the appointment of the county officers; and that then, the officers in the county will be appointed according to the will of the majority of the whole State. He supposed,

be regreted; but it was more so still if it be true, that the appointments heretofore, have been made without sufficient regard to qualifications.They have admited, nevertheless, that the test of qualifications will be still the same, only altering the locality; that is to say, that the appointment of these officers will be in accordance with the will of the majority -in one instance, in accordance with the will of the majority of the State, and in the other, in accordance with the will of the majority of the county -but still in accordance with the will of the majority. At present, these officers are appointed, as it is said, in accordance with the will of the majority of the whole State, and that principle, according to the argument, has been found vicious in its operation: and he took it exactly as it is presented. Is not the same principle likely to be vicious, when you come to restrict it in point of locality? Is it to be changed by transfering it to the counties, instead of leaving it with the whole State? It is still the same principle which is to operate upon the officers; namely, the principle which is to determine the people in the election, and to determine the Governor after he is elccted; for it is the will of the people operating upon him, that finally produces the result. He could not see any change which was to be produced, excepting this, that in some counties, where the officers are now appointed from one side in politics, they will hereafter, perhaps, be elected from the other side. Possibly, this might be some gain to the party to which he belonged, for it had so happened, that he had been most frequently in the minority, as regarded the whole State, and in the majority in the city, where he resided. Then he ought to be in favor of this doctrine, he supposed, if he looked to the benefiting his party. But .he did not value it a feather, neither did he think it would be valued by the Convention. This matter had ouly led us off from the true inquiry, namely, how you can get the best officers, and whenever gentlemen made that discovery, and were prepared to act upon it, he would go along with them, let the manner of appointment be as it might.

He would say a word, presently, with regard to the courts appointing these officers, and he should say it, not to the same extent as the gentleman from Allegheny, (Mr. FORWARD,) but still adopting his idea. He would, say, however, that he conscientiously believed, that the theory of the Constitution was perfect. When he said perfect, he meant human perfection, and the Convention would understand him to say, that it was the theory of the Constitution which was perfect. What the practice under it had been, was another question. When he said it was perfect in theory, he should endeavor to go to the root of the matter; and the first thing which struck him, with regard to county officers, was, that they required to fill them, some peculiar qualifications, different from those which might fit men for other offices, and especially elective offices. If any person were to ask him if it required a man to write a good hand, or to spell well, to qualify him to be a member of the Legislature, he should say that it did not; for it might be that some men, who could neither write nor spell well, were at the same time, possessed of a great deal of native good sense, which would enable them to throw light upon every subject. But he did not believe that an iron-master, if he wanted a clerk, would take a man who could not read or write whatever good sense he might be possessed of.— We have instances, it is said, of very eminent men, who could not spell

and if they were not appointed, the fault did not lie in the Constitution.He was now speaking of the theory of the Constitution, and he contended it was perfect. A single man was invested with this power of appointment for the whole Commonwealth. He had every opportunity of inquiry, as to the qualifications of the persons to fill these offices, and he was not limited to a point of time, so that he can make all necessary examination, and appoint those best qualified to fill the situation.

Then I want to know why he does not do it. That question is answered, as it has been, over and over again, and for that answer I am not responsible further. It appears to be owing to the undue influence of party considerations-to the mixture of the elective principle. He could inform himself, if he would; but he is not allowed to do so, because he must consult his popularity. This is the statement. Will it be better in case of direct election? Certainly not. You will have all the evils of election, in greater force, and an additional one of great importance. The public can inform themselves of the general qualifications of a prominent man. But how and when are they to inquire as to the particular qualifications of a clerk, whether he is competent to hold a county office? I wish to draw the attention of the Convention to this view of the question. When, Sir, is the particular inquiry to be made, as to the particular qualifications? By whom is it to be made? The gentleman from Susquehanna, (Mr. READ), said yesterday with perfect truth, that there was a difference between an appointment by an individual, of an agent, to serve him, and an appointment of an agent to serve the public. And, what was it? Why that an individual had a deep interest in what his agent did, and therefore would look closely to his character and qualifications. But, that the public had not the same sort of interest in what was done by their agent. This, to a certain extent, is true; and it is a practical distinction made by sound sense, and I should be glad to see it applied, and carried out. It is, indeed, If, then, they have not that sort of interest which will awaken their attention in some degree, in the same manner, as the attention of an individual is awakened, where they are very much interested, how are you to expect it where they are not interested at all? Every man is interested in political offices. Our Government, in relation to all such offices, works by means of party, adopting certain general principles, when they are honest and pure, which they endeavour to carry out by the election of men who will agree with them. That is the best use you can make of party. And with respect to political parties, which act faithfully, and with no undue or sinister influence, they carry their own principles out by means of elections. But how is it in regard to county officers? The electors of the Commonwealth are themselves the possessors of the whole political power of the State. That I acknowledge. But they are not the possessors of the civil interests and rights of the whole people. Your Constitution says, where the political power shall reside, and where it does reside; and so far as you have gone, you have decided that the political power resides in the taxable inhabitants-the qualifications to vote being ascertained by the payment of a tax, however small. Now, are the taxable inhabitants, considered in regard to private or civil rights, the whole people? The largest calculation you can make, is, that they are one-fifth of the population of the Commonwealth: the other four-fifths are minors, women, strangers and aliens, who have no connexion with the exercise

true.