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to promote the public good. No officer should receive more for his ser vices than was adequate, and he should be kept in or turned out, whenever the people thought it their interest to do so, without regard to the wants or wishes of any one in or out of office; and, he thought his colleague was wrong, in supposing the democratic principle of rotation in office, had any view to the distribution of the benefits of offices, or was intended to extend to every office; if it did, the proper place for the restriction would be in the Bill of Rights. It would then extend to all, the highest and lowest-but this he thought was not called for by the people. They had asked not to be restricted, but to give them more freedom of choice. They had asked for the election of their officers, but had not asked for any dictation. They had not asked to be bound themselves, lest they might do wrong; but merely to bind their agents, lest they might do wrong. If the democratic principle did extend to such offices, he thought his colleague ought to have applied it to the Coroner; but he had not offered to restrict him; and yet he (Mr. EARLE) knew how important and lucrative that office was in Philadelphia-being worth, he believed, three thousand dollars a year; and yet the democratic party, if he was rightly informed, had elected Mr. DENNIS twenty years in succession, to fill it. He, therefore, did not think the democratic party intended to carry the principle of rotation in office, so far as he (Mr. EARLE) supposed. If it did, it could easily carry its wishes into effect, without any Constitutional provision on the subject; and he. (Mr. B,) was willing to trust them. He agreed with his colleague, (Mr. INGERSOLL) that democracy meant "trust in the people", and he (Mr. B.) would not, by any vote of his, sanction the doctrine that they were not to be trusted. He said, many good principles had been destroyed and abused by excess; and illustrated his views by allusion to the natural passions of mankind, which were, he said, all good, if regulated by reason; but, if carried to excess, were destructive of the object for which they were intended, and became a curse instead of a blessing. He also stated that, for many years, banks and corporations were deemed democratic, at least, they were instituted year after year by the democratic party; but, to such an extent had they been carried, that it was now one of the great struggles of democracy, to remedy or remove the evil, which the democratic party had thus been, in part, instrumental in bringing upon itself. He hoped, therefore, the principle of rotation, which he held as essential to the pure administration of all Governments, would not be impaired in its value by its misapplication.He had voted for it in relation to Governor and Sheriff, and would do so for all officers, whose office it was necessary thus to restrict, to ensure a faithful performance of duty-but these restrictions were on the officer, and he would not vote for any restriction, when no such necessity existed, as such would be a restriction only on the choice of the people. When the people had made a fair experiment in the election of those officers, (said Mr. B.) they could, if they desired it, or found it necessary, have a Constitutional provision of ineligibility at the end of one term, or two terms, as they might then think best; but, he did not think it was required now, and he should therefore vote against it.

Mr. BELL had hoped, he said, that we might approach this question and decide it, without any reference to party names. But the gentleman, (Mr.

to call in question the democracy of some of the delegates on this floor.He had directed ur attention to what he was pleased to denounce as the false principles of some of those delegates who profess to be democrats.The gentleman had repeated, as a trueism, the remark of an English writer, that a great lawyer is never a great politician; and he wished it to be infered, he presumed, that because he himself was not a great lawyer, he was a great politician. But, the gentleman might be assured that, however small he might be as a lawyer, he was not necessarily a very great politician. The gentleman had indulged in a eulogy on the beauties of consistency. It was not surprising to hear such remarks from him, as men often admire that which they most lack themselves. He did not wish to remind the Convention of the sinuosities of the gentleman's course, and it would be a waste of time to relate all the anecdotes he had heard of the gentleman's tergiversations and inconsistencies. They would serve well, however, to admonish the gentleman not to set himself up as a judge of the principles of others, and a censor of democracy. The gentleman had made some ill natured comments on the course of those with whom he (Mr. B.) acted with. We are to be denounced as conservatives, because our notions of reform do not exactly square with those of the gentleman from the county. He was a radical, in a certain sense, for he differed with the gentleman from Northampton, as to the import of radicalism. He thought every change of the Constitution was a radical change. The change of one word or letter of the Constitution was a radical change. He was no destructive; but a calm, deliberate, and he trusted, prudent and reflecting radical.— Sir, the question before the Convention, is one of deep importance. It is beyond all considerations of expediency. It is not a question, important merely, as connected with the prosperity of the State, nor as it related to the fitness or unfitness of the people of Pennsylvania to cho se competent officers, but it is a broader and deeper question. It lies at the very foundation of democracy. As a general rule, the people should exercise all power themselves, and depute no power to agents, when they can conveniently exercise it themselves. The whole power of the State was in the people, and, if practicable, he would wish to have it exercised by them. He would be willing to see the principle carried out, and to have the whole people of Pennsylvania assembled, for the purpose of making and executing their own laws. But that was impossible in the nature of things, and in the nature of man. This was not, therefore, a pure, but a representative democracy. But, why should not the people exercise all the power that they can exercise with convenience. Why should they not choose all their own public agents. Why should they delegate to others, the choice of their own officers and agents? To carry that prac tise of delegating the power of election too far, would be, to abandon the foundation on which a representative democracy stood. For the people to elect their own officers in this Commonwealth, was not a new experiment. They elected their Sheriffs, and other officers, before the revolution. Are they to be told that, because they may make some improper appointments, that they are not capable of exercising this power? Why, sir, in nine cases out of ten, their selections are better than those made by the Governor. The President had paid a deserved compliment to the

who was turned out to make room for a party favorite. But who turned him out? The people? No: they would have kept him in, as a good and faithful officer, but the Governor, the very officer, in whose hands the gentleman wishes to leave the power of appointment and removal. Incompetent officers had frequently been appointed by the Governor. Complaints of this kind had been common since the present Constitution was adopted. They have selected them, not because they were acquainted with the duties of the office, but because they were influential political partizans, and this is the rule of selection; and can there be a more corrupting principle or practice? There is yet virtue and inteligence in the vast mass of the people, and he who denies it, proves himself to be ignorant of the great body of the people of Pennsylvania. He must live in a close corpora tion where corruption stalks abroad, and is easily seen; but in the mass of the people of the country, you find honesty and great virtue. Now, putting it upon this ground, that whenever the people can conveniently exercise the power, they ought to exercise it, he could not distinguish be tween political agents, and n.inisterial agents. The principle is universalit extends to all, whatever may be his title. The principle extends to all, whether to the Executive officers, or the legislative officers, or the mere ministerial officers dispensing the ordinary business of society. It is universal in its character, and universal in principle: and until gentlemen can show why, in any particular instance, the people ought not to exercise this power-he, for one, would give to them immediately, the exercise of it. Perhaps it was not necessary to have gone thus far at this time, on the introduction of this principle; but it will, without doubt, be introduced into the Constitution, in some form or other. The President of the Convention had thought proper to call into notice, that it limited the arguments of some, to urge this matter, of giving up the privilege of appointing all these officers. Now, it was well known that the democratic party had had the dispensing of all this patronage, for nearly the whole time since the adoption of the Constitution; but he took it to be a settled principle, that that party was disposed to give up that which they have heretofore enjoyed for the benefit of the public at large. The democratic party, which has almost universally enjoyed the peculiar advantages arising from the patronage exercised by the Executive, are willing now to sacrifice all selfish considerations: and, we stand here ready to relinquish these advantages, which we have heretofore enjoyed, because the people have required it at our hands. In his own county he knew his friends would be losers by it, because it was not to be expected they would be elected to those offices, when the majority of the county were opposed to them, while they would generally receive the appointments, if the Gevernor had the making of them; therefore he thought he might lay claim to the merit of acting in this matter, entirely disinterestedly, as he was advocating a principle which must go to deprive himself, and his friends, from the advantages to flow from Executive patronage in his own county. He must say, however, that he was proud to find himself surrounded by gentlemen, who were willing, for the sake of principle, to make this sacrifice. But to come to the question more immediately before the committee. Although the gentleman from Susquehanna (Mr. READ) acknowledged this

gentleman to say, whether, although he recognized this democratic princi ple, he was not, by his amendment, widely departing from it. On the one hand, he says, the people should exercise all power in the election of their officers; and on the other hand, he says, the people shall not judge of the persons they shall appoint to fill these offices. This was holding up the word of promise to the ear, while it was breaking it to the hope It was saying to the people, you shall not elect those officers, who have discharged their duties, faithfully, and honestly. He could not perceive how gentlemen could advocate two principles, so entirely at variance with each other. He could not see how any gentleman could advocate the giving of the elec tion of these officers to the people, and then advocate the principle of restricting them in the exercise of that right. He was entirely at a loss to understand how it was, that a gentleman of the acuteness of mind, and experience, of the gentleman from Susquehanna, could advocate principles of this kind. But, we are told, because we find a similar restriction in the present Constitution, in relation to the Governor, and Sheriffs, that we should extend it. This was, in his view, a false position. There might be some good reasons, why the term of one of these officers should be restricted, but the principle of restriction of the people, which was introduced into the Constitution of 1790, was founded on an entirely different basis. That principle, was founded upon the fear of the people; and it was introduced, because, at that day, there were some doubts as to whether the people were, entirely, capable of self-government; there was a disinclination, at any rate, to acknowledge the fact. He was of opinion, that every circumstance, attending the engrafting of these restrictions in the Constitution, showed that such a belief was entertained. As to the Sheriff, there was no reason why a restriction should be placed on his term of service. Gentlemen say, that he is entrusted with the collection of large sums of money, and, therefore, it was convenient, and necessary, that, at the end of his three years' term, he should be called to a settlement of his account. Why, there was no necessity for this, because we can, at all times, call the Sheriff to account, and compel him to pay over any money. in his hands, or hold his sureties liable for it. The Sheriff is the mere creature of the law, and the courts, whose mandates he executes. There is no reason, why this restriction should apply to the Sheriff, more than to any other officer of the county. Now, is there any reason, why it should apply to the Governor? There is a good reason, and one which does not apply to any other officer in the Commonwealth. He is an officer of vast power, and possesses that which gives to royalty all its efficiency, and without which, a King would be a mere Executor of the law. He holds in his hand, a tremenduous power of appointment, which he might use to perpetuate himselfin office. He possesses a power which if used for ambitious purposes might inflict a lasting injury on the Commonwealth. When, however, we strip the Executive of this inordinate power which he never ought to have exercised, it might become a serious question how far we ought to place limitations even on his term of office. As there would be left with the Governor still a good deal of patronage, there might, be a good reason, why his term should be restricted; but with that of the Sheriff there was no reason at all. But it is said that unless you place this restriction in the Con

who was turned out to make room for a party favorite. But who turned him out? The people? No: they would have kept him in, as a good and faithful officer, but the Governor, the very officer, in whose hands the gentleman wishes to leave the power of appointment and removal. Incompetent officers had frequently been appointed by the Governor. Complaints of this kind had been common since the present Constitution was adopted. They have selected them, not because they were acquainted with the duties of the office, but because they were influential political partizans, and this is the rule of selection; and can there be a more corrupting principle or practice? There is yet virtue and inteligence in the vast mass of the people, and he who denies it, proves himself to be ignorant of the great body of the people of Pennsylvania. He must live in a close corpora tion where corruption stalks abroad, and is easily seen; but in the mass of the people of the country, you find honesty and great virtue. Now, putting it upon this ground, that whenever the people can conveniently exercise the power, they ought to exercise it, he could not distinguish be tween political agents, and n.inisterial agents. The principle is universal— it extends to all, whatever may be his title. The principle extends to all, whether to the Executive officers, or the legislative officers, or the mere ministerial officers dispensing the ordinary business of society. It is universal in its character, and universal in principle: and until gentlemen can show why, in any particular instance, the people ought not to exercise this power-he, for one, would give to them immediately, the exercise of it. Perhaps it was not necessary to have gone thus far at this time, on the introduction of this principle; but it will, without doubt, be introduced into the Constitution, in some form or other. The President of the Convention had thought proper to call into notice, that it limited the arguments of some, to urge this matter, of giving up the privilege of appointing all these officers. Now, it was well known that the democratic party had had the dispensing of all this patronage, for nearly the whole time since the adoption of the Constitution; but he took it to be a settled principle, that that party was disposed to give up that which they have heretofore enjoyed for the benefit of the public at large. The democratic party, which has almost universally enjoyed the peculiar advantages arising from the patronage exercised by the Executive, are willing now to sacrifice all selfish considerations: and, we stand here ready to relinquish these advantages, which we have heretofore enjoyed, because the people have required it at our hands. In his own county he knew his friends would be losers by it, because it was not to be expected they would be elected to those offices, when the majority of the county were opposed to them, while they would generally receive the appointments, if the Gevernor had the making of them; therefore he thought he might lay claim to the merit of acting in this matter, entirely disinterestedly, as he was advocating a principle which must go to deprive himself, and his friends, from the advantages to flow from Executive patronage in his own county. He must say, however, that he was proud to find himself surrounded by gentlemen, who were willing, for the sake of principle, to make this sacrifice. But to come to the question more immediately before the committee. Although the gentleman from Susquehanna (Mr. READ) acknowledged this

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