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as distinguished from political power. What the political power may be, if any, is a mere incident, not to be regarded. But further-these offices relate not to those, who are voters only: à man who has property, is concerned in the right management of the recorder's office, and it is established, in part, for him. Every man, knows he must die, and he also has property, or a family to leave, is concerned in the right management of the office of register, and of the orphans' court. And, when he departs this life, who is it that is interested in the proper management of the office? His widow, if he leave one-his children, who have no vote, and who, according to your Constitution, cannot, and ought not, to have any share in the management of political concerns. Is any one so unreasonable as to suppose, that these officers have any thing to do with politics? Every man, who has political rights, is entitled to have them preserved and vindicated, I admit. But cannot every one make a distinction between civil and political rights? And, cannot every one see, especially, that the principal interest, in the right management of these offices, may be in persons, who have not, and never can have, any participation in elections? How do these offices come to subsist? If you go to the right of this matter, the principle I have been rrefering to, will be found to be still more manifest. It is a contract of every society, with individuals, thus circumstanced-men, women, and children-voters or not voters, that their business shall be properly transacted. It is no part of your political arrangement: it is only incidental, in a small degree. It is a part of your contract, with those who live, and who are to die-with those who have property-with those who are helpless-who cannot go to your elections. It is a contract, that you will give them this provision, in the Constitution of your society. For what? Why, for their benefit, and their security. And, in regard to this contract, the question arises, how is the provision to be made for its fulfilment? Sir, the general answer, it appears to me, is one of the clearest in the world, and disposes, once for all, of this idea of rotation in office. The engagement of society is, to do it in a manner that is best suited, best calculated, I should say, for performing the duties of those offices, so that every one who is interested in any act of the officers, shall be secure in having it properly and correctly performed. What I have just said, applies to other offices that are not now in question, but which will come under consideration hereafter. It is a most important principle, which seems to have been entirely lost sight of. As to the political offices, they, of course, will be distributed for political purposes and objects, and ought to be so. But, with respect to all those offices I am now speaking of, it appears to me that you prevent the object of thein, you disregard the fundamental contract, the very moment you suffer any thing of a political character, as far as you can avoid it, to enter into them. What you are to look for, is capacity, including integrity, and nothing else. I think every man can see the injury complained of from a different course, and can trace it exactly to an improper connection with politics. Whereever this connection has been suffered to be formed, it has been injurious to those who have had business to transact in the offices, and at length, the whole matter has come to be put upon false principles. I will take, for example, this rotation in office a principle which has assumed more

principle. If you take into view the object of having the work well done, as the chief end of the appointment. this principle is directly contrary to every man's conduct, in his own affairs. Suppose that a man having a large estate, were to establish a registry and recorders' office for himself, and employ a man to conduct it for him, his functions would be the same, and the duties of his office the same as of the public officer. Would he establish rotation? Did you ever hear of a man fixing a time when he would discharge a useful agent. and that, too, with a certainty that he could not get a better? What man applies the principles to his agents, his physician, his lawyer, or his clergyman? Do not men invariably follow the opposite course? And, if a man were to lay down for himself a rule, that he would never continue a person in his service a longer period than twelve months, he would, on that account, be deemed very eccentric to use the mildest term. If you look to the performance of the duty of the office, the principle is a false one, because it is contrary to that acted upon by every individual. So, in regard to the elective principle.The present Constitution is upon a different principle, in part, from that proposed, but still it is connected with the elective principle. Appointments, under the present Constitution, are made by the Governor, who is himself elected by the people, and removeable by the people. Of late years, this rotation principle has been acknowledged, and rather extensively. It is adopted in the severe political contest now going on. In looking at the newspapers, it will be seen, that the contest is between the ins and the outs, between those who desire to retain their offices, and those who wish to get them. The public is enlisted on one side or the other of the ques tion, and they are to determine it. What is the consequence? The public do not, and cannot feel an interest in the performance of the duties of a particular office, as they ought to do. A man who goes to an office, and has his business well done, is satisfied, and tells his neighbors of it, and they may, perhaps, assent to what he tells them. But, what does that signify? The one who has thus transacted business is the best judge; he is, in fact, the only judge. But, if there be ten men who never had occasion to do business at that office, and have never been there, and they should happen to be importuned to vote for another, they might elect an incompetent man, without thinking of the consequences, or being able to judge of them. And, this would be carrying out the rotation principle -losing sight, for the moment, of the fitness of the person for the office, which ought to be the only consideration. With respect to the political power the will of the people, by means of elections, is paramount and supreme. It is according to the nature of our institutions. It is their right, and I have no disposition to question or detract from it. But, as to offices which are merely civil, which relate to individuals who have nothing to do with politics, and take no part in your elections, and who are more numerous than those who do-women, children, and the like, why should the political power control them? The question is, whether it is consistent with the rights of the widow and the orphan, the stranger, the property owner, that a man who is not competent to discharge the duties of the office shall be appointed, and that merely for the sake of carrying out a principle which probably will have the effect of destroying the value of the office, and defeating the important purposes for which it

tion. It considers too much the advantage of the office holder, and too little the convenience of these interested. I appeal to the members of the Convention, whether it is not the ultimate will of the recple we are 10 lock to, and whether that will is not, that what is right should be done.— I wish every member of this bedy to bring this matter home to himself. If he finds that complaints are made against those who hold office, where he resides that he or his neighbors suffer any inconvenience, let him ascertain what it is owing to. He will generally find it is, because there is an unfit and incapable officer. If the records are lost, who is to suffer? The man who has the care of the titles-the records? No. If widows and children, and strangers, are to be deprived of the security intended to be given them by our register's office, what will be the cause of it? The unfitness of the officer? And, what is that owing to? Plainly, to the connecting the matter with party questions. And how do you propose to remedy it? Are you going to give them a better security-a better compliance with your contract with them? Unless it can be shown that it is better, though you Lave ascertained the fact that there is objections to the existing mode, the arguments fall entirely short, and all the speculation, so far as applied to civil officers, is entirely at an end. Now, I know what the application of the principle is. I have seen in the recorder's off ce, in the city of Philadelphia, a gentlen an performing his duties with exemplary fidelity, with great promptness, and an excellent understanding and appreciation of the duties he had to perform. A new Governor was elected, and down went the officer, and another was put in his place. He might be a good one, or not the principle was the same. The first, however. bowed to the edict of rotation in office, and his successor, who could not be so competent, as he had no experience. was brought in by the operation of the same principle. And why, sir? Why was the operation of this rotation principle connected with the election principle? but so it has been to a great

extent.

I am not satisfied, from any thing I have heard. that the application of this principle, in the node here contended for, will give us better security for good officers in future. I am the less inclined to think so, since I have heard the argument of the gentleman from Mifflin, (Mr. BANKS) which went to show, that the individual in office is to fill his pocket out of the public money, and then let another man fill his! There is, then. no possibility left, according to the gentleman's argument, of continuing an officer in office, even if acsired, and that his term must be limited. Why? Because there is some one else whose pocket is to be filled. I never knew, until now, that an individual took the office, in order to fill his pocket! If the office is too lucrative, lessen the emolument; if the fees are too large, reduce them. But, the other principle is inconsistent with the nature of our Government. It is inconsistent with the purposes for which offices are established, and must end at last, not only in their destruc ion. but that of the republic also. It is this very thirst of office, growing with what it feeds on, is the cause of the undue excitement in elections.— Besides, you have to run the risk of getting incompetent men. Will not this plan, if adopted, have the effect. in a still greater degree, of turning your elections into contests. not about political principles, not about party "principles, which are, to a certain extent, harmless, perhaps salutary, but

plaints in consequence of the excitement on the election for Governor, which excitement, it is contended, grows out of his patronage.

If. then, an indirect connection with the elections has had this effect already, what will it have when there is a direct connection? It has led to unfit appointments, we are told. To whom is he that makes the appointments responsible for the proper exercise of the power? Why, to the very person to whom the election of these officers is now proposed to be given. There will be much more danger and excitement created when the election for these flies is given to the people. But, to return to the immediate question-what will be best for the people, those interested in the offices? I am opposed to any change, unless I can be satisfied that it will be for the better.

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In relation to appointments by the courts. I am not going to theorize about them. I speak here as a witness. I say, then, from experience, that appointments by the courts have heen better than any other mode of appointment with which I am acquainted. They have the benefit of a Court of Examiners, which the gentleman from Northampton has mentioned. There is great propriety in the courts appointing their own clerks, as there is a strict accountability on the part of the latter to the former, and those who have business at the office will have it better done than in any other way. If not. they have immediate appeal to the courts.

Sir. you will be good enough to bear in mind, and so will the Convention, that the Governor, and members of the Legislature, are accountable only to the people-the people are to decide as to their faults. If they inflict an injury upon the public, it is like a steamboat ex losion, suddenly known, and attended by great commotion. This, however, is not the case in reference to an ignorant or dishonest Register. Recorder, or Clerk of the court, who may do a decided wrong to individuals who are humble -not humble, because they are poor, but because they are individuals, and because a great many of them have no political power or influence. They can rally no party to their aid, and cannot combine themselves in relation to great political questions. I say they are humble and helpless. It is the capacity of the officer to wrong them, and their inca aci'y to obtain re. dress, that I speak of. Where, I would ask you, can the individual obtain redress? where make his complaint, in case the amendments, such as are now proposed, should be incorporated in the Constitution, with regard to these offices? The humblest individual may present himself to the Governor, or he may find access to the Legislature, but how is he, or she, who may have no vote to make himself, or herself heard, amid the din and hurry of an election. It is utterly out of the question. It is ten times better, then, that the appointing power should be where it now is, for there is an opportunity of making complaint, and of their being heard. This is a consideration of the highest importance, and doubtless it will have its full weight in the decision of the committee.

Mr. FULLER, of Crawford, said that he was not prepared to say that the amendment proposing to limit the term of office longer than six in any term of nine years, was a proper one to be inserted in the Constitution.He would have no objection to vote for the amendment of the gentleman from Montgomery, as modified by the gentleman from Susquehanna (Mr. READ). He did not know, however, that any restriction was necessary

competent to manage their own affairs, and that they ought to have a direct voice in putting men into office as well as in turning them out. Now, he could not concur in the sentiments expressed by the President of the Convention, who deprecates giving the election of officers to the people. He disapprov ed of rotation in office. He, (Mr. FULLER) on the contrary, thought that it was connected with the very principle of our Government; and he believed that the people, while they possessed the power, would exercise it. And, he was willing that they should be the sole judges as to the appointment of officers, and they should elect all officers when it was prac ticable. They were the best judges of their own servants. The gentleman (Mr. SERGEANT) had spoken of the injury which might be done to the property of widows and orphans by the dishonesty, negligence, or ignorance of the Registers or Recorders, who should be elected, and not appointed, as was at present the case. Why, he (Mr. F.) thought, that every man who would vote for these officers, would do so under the idea that his own rights, as well as those of his children, might be included in the choice. Every man who had a family, would naturally expect some difficulty to arise from having a bad officer, and consequently he would exercise his judgment in the selection of a competent person. The Governor of the Commonwealth now had the power of appointing the officers, He, then, had no interest to appoint good officers, except his own popularity. Could it, he would ask, be supposed for a moment, that an individual would feel his own interest more identified with that of the widow and orphan, than hundreds of thousands of people, who were about to leave property themselves ? He thought that this argument would not be conclusive to the Convention. In his opinion, five thousand interested individuals were much more likely to select better men, than one man clothed with the office of Governor, who was not immediately interested, With regard to the whole provision, he (Mr. FULLER) was perfectly satisfied with it, with the solitary exception of the amendment which was made by the gentleman from Susquehanna relative to the two terms. However, even if the amendment should not be modified, he should feel himself bound to vote for it, as he had already remarked.

Mr. DORAN, of Philadelphia, said that, until he had heard the remarks of the President of the Convention, he had not believed that there was a single member who did not believe that the patronage of the Governor ought to be curtailed. He had thought too, that they did not entertain a doubt that the people had called the Convention for the express purpose of depriving the Executive of a considerable portion of his enormous power. He felt the highest respect for the gentleman's opinions, as well as for his learning and talent. But, when he heard the gentleman make an assertion of so broad a character, and so hostile as he (Mr. D.) believed it to be to the opinions of the people of Pennsylvania, humble as he was, he could not refrain from expressing his opposition to the sentiments of that gentleman, and of stating to this committee the reasons why he believed, with the people generally, that the patronage of the Governor should be curtailed to the extent of the report of the committee on this article of the Constitution. He regarded the patronage of our Governor as more unlimit ed and more uncontrolled, than that of the KING of Great Britain and Ireland. There, nothing could be done without the consent of the Privy

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