by the laws of that State; but if the decision had been otherwise on the constitutionality of the Missouri Compromise, and on the effect of the return of Dred Scott to Missouri, then the Court would have held the plaintiff to be a citizen of the United States and entitled as such to sue in the Federal Courts, and there obtain his freedom. Happy indeed would it have been for our country had the Chief-Justice been able to rise to that moral height; for, though it might have resulted in a civil war, there is no reason to believe that the war would have been such a long and bloody one as that which actually occurred. Backed by the moral power of such a decision by the highest judicial tribunal of the land, the forces of law and order would soon have gained the ascendency.

In being led by, instead of leading the moral sentiment of the times and of the country in which he lived, Judge Taney did what the judiciary are doing now, and what, with rare exceptions, they have done in every age. Let him who is disposed to stigmatize the Chief-Justice for this decision walk backward, and cast a mantle over the nakedness and shame of his country, which this adjudication fully exposed. Instead of casting obloquy upon Judge Taney for not rising above his surroundings, let him rather mourn that those surroundings were what they were; and let him congratulate himself that the decision opened the eyes of the nation to the great wrong and crime which was being perpetrated in a country which had professedly founded its institutions upon the doctrine of the equal civil and political rights of the people.

REFORM IN THE ADMINISTRATION OF

THE CRIMINAL LAW IN THE STATE OF ILLINOIS.

History shows that the constant advance of the human race in intelligence and morality renders it necessary from time to time to change the laws and the penalties of laws in order to adjust them to higher forms of civilization. There is a natural and justifiable conservatism in the modification or even abrogation of laws which have been applied with more or less of success for many centuries. When experience and observation make prominent the defects of existing laws, and their justice and expediency are questioned and the difficulty of their enforcement is rendered apparent, then they should be either amended or repealed. Such a time has come in relation to the system of trial by jury in this country. This system is unquestionably one of the most marked and characteristic features of the common law of England. Having for ages attracted the attention of mankind and protected the constitutional liberties of the land-having been the subject of the most fulsome and extravagant eulogy by its admirers, and the most virulent abuse and sarcasm by its opponents-having extended itself in its entirety over nearly the whole continent of North America, and in a modified shape, over a great part of Europe, the trial by jury has in modern times been brought to stand its own trial at the bar of public opinion in the land of its birth and in foreign lands. Its utility has been questioned by many, its abolition openly advocated by others and the opinion has become very general that it requires modification of some kind to

bring it into harmony with the march of intelligence and the altered state of society.

A recent very able English writer says much misconception has arisen from the expression "trial by jury," which as applied to English law is most certainly a misnomer. Trial by judge is where the judge decides both the law and the facts; and trial by jury is where the jury decide both the law and the facts. But no such tribunal as the latter is known to the law of England. Our common law mode of trial is a trial by judge and jury. The judge, armed with the authority of the law, conducts the entire proceedings, decides all questions of law, and when the cause is ripe for decision, sums up the case to the jury, instructing them in the law respecting it, and commenting upon the evidence; while the jury on their part determine the facts, with the right, however, of applying the law to 'hem by finding a general verdict, i. e., in criminal cases. "guilty" or "not guilty", and in civil cases, "for the plaintiff or "for the defendant." In civil cases a new trial is granted ex debito justitiæ, if an error in law is committed by the judge, or the jury find a perverse verdict, i. e., refuse to listen to the law as correctly laid down to them by the judge; and the court above will also set aside a verdict if in the exercise of a judicial and not an arbitrary discretion, they see that it is so unequivocally against the weight of evidence that it ought not to be allowed to stand. In criminal cases points of law must be reserved by the judge; and new trials are not in general grantable. Such is our celebrated common law tribunal, which with all its faults, real or imaginary, is immeasurably superior to every other; and I firmly believe that evil will be the hour for the people of this land when, seduced by any theory however plausible or deluded by any considerations of fancied expediency however tempting, they consent to part with it.

Trial by jury originated in the adaptation to the administration of justice of the process commonly in use in the eleventh and twelve centuries for obtaining information as to matters of fact, namely, collecting an inquest of body of persons supposed to be acquainted with the subject and taking their sworn statement about it.

The members of the inquest were originally witnesses, they and not their informants, being responsible for the truth of the verdict.

By slow degrees they acquired the character of judges of fact, informed by witnesses.

This process lasted from the first origin of juries in the twelfth or thirteenth centuries down to the sixteenth century, when we have the first fairly trustworthy records of actual trials.

The English colonists seem to have had a deep seated and deep rooted regard for the right of trial by jury and it is quite remarkable that all that is extant of the legislation of Plymouth Colony for the first five years consists of the single regulation "That all criminal facts and also all manner of trespasses and debts between man and man shall be tried by the verdict of twelve honest men, to be impaneled by authority in form of a jury upon their oath."

PREVENTION OF CRIME.-The Code of Criminal law in every well regulated State should be founded on one principle, namely, the prevention of crime; that all offenses should be explicitly and clearly defined, in language generally understood; that punishments should be proportioned to offenses; that the rules of evidence should be ascertained as applicable to each offense; that the mode of procedure should be simple and the duty of magistrates, executive officers and individuals assisting them, should be pointed out by law, and as little left to judicial construction as possible.

The great mass of our legislators have restricted all of their efforts in the protection of society, to waiting, watching for, and punishing crime. Its prevention is something beyond their comprehension. Narrow minded legislators are willing to appropriate millons to erect and maintain penitentiaries and State prisons, while not a dollar can be obtained to establish industrial schools for the helpless, homeless, unfortunate waifs of society who are running wild in our streets and growing up to manhood and womanhood steeped and educated in crime, ready to enter and graduate at our penitentiaries as fast as they are built.

The true system of all penal laws should be comprehensive in

its nature and should deal with the prevention as well as the punishment of crime. They should treat the whole subject in its widest sweep and should have a general control over the whole fabric of society from top to bottom-from turret to foundation, so far as the same relates to the prevention of crime and its punishment. There should be first, the school of the people, the common school; second, the school of reform and manual training; third, the house of refuge and industry; fourth, the house of detention; fifth, the bridewell; sixth. the penitentiary.

We believe in education of the head and the heart, the hands and feet, the mind and body. We believe in teaching our children that labor, industry and economy are necessary to success in life, and that plodding industry and contentment, with perseverence and steady push, are better than the eternal scheming of demagogues whose constant endeavor seems to be to avoid all work or work just as little as possible and receive the same pay as the most skilled and most industrious portion of mankind.

The care, education and proper training of the youth of our country are matters of the deepest concern to this State and nation.

"There is" said one of England's most illustrious men, a class in community who seem to think that government is simply a great hangman, and government ought to do nothing except by harsh and degrading means. That the one business of government is to handcuff, and lock up and scourge, and shoot, and stab, and strangle. That it is odious tyranny in a government to attempt to prevent crime by informing the understanding and elevating the moral feeling of the people."

The Supreme Court of this State, in a decision rendered by it in 1870, formally adopted this view, and gave to it their sanction.

That decision was rendered in the case of The People v. Turner, 55 Ill., 280.

It practically repudiated the doctrine of parens patriæ, and denied all power to the State to either care for or restrain the ungoverned children of misfortune in our midst. The court