he appropriated the extra and unearned money to his own use. The Court held that he had innocently received the money and that, although he had subsequently fraudulently appropriated it, he was not guilty of larceny at common law, because there was no animus furandi at the time of the taking. But in Queen v. Middleton, L. R. 2 C. C. 38, where a depos itor in the Post Office Savings Bank was paid eight pounds, sixteen shillings, and ten pence, by mistake, on an order to withdraw ten shillings, and he retained and appropriated to his own use the money he was not entitled to, a conviction of larceny was affirmed because the moment the defendant took up the money and went away with it he was possessed of an animus furandi-from the beginning he had the intention of stealing the money.

If we regard the cases from Michigan and Wisconsin from the stand-point of the heathen philosopher, in the light of the doctrine and teachings of Antipater, we must say that Sherwood sought to steal Walker's cow as much as Ashwell sought to and did steal Keough's sovereign, and that Boynton did steal the poor woman's diamond as much as Middleton stole the money of the Post Master General. But according to the precepts of Diogenes, the Babylonian, the transaction of the jeweler with the poor and needy woman was entirely legitimate, and the effort of Sherwood to obtain Walker's cow, worth $750 to $1,000, for a nominal sum—a mere trifle, was unobjectionable.

Which is right and which will you follow-Diogenes or Antipater, which?

James M. Kerr.

SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA.

SNYDER V. CITY OF LANCASTER.

▲ house which is injured by the removal of the adjoining building in opening a new street, is within the constitutional provision as to consequential damages caused by the exercise of the right of eminent domain by municipal corporations.

Error to the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster county. Caroline Snyder was the owner of a house and lot 16 feet and 2 inches front on St. Joseph's Street, in Lancaster. Adjoining it on the north was another house and lot owned by Ambrose Worth. The City of Lancaster opened a street through these properties in such a way as to take a part of each, but, as the line of the street was not parallel to the sides of the lots, the effect of the taking was to remove the Worth house, but not directly to disturb Mrs. Snyder's, whose lot at that point was about three feet from the new street. Her house was so built, however, that the joists rested upon the wall of Worth's, and there was evidence that it would be materially injured by the removal of the latter. She appealed from the award of the viewers, on the ground that she was entitled to damages under an Act approved in 1854, P. L. 352, which provides that "if any house....be removed or injured by the opening or extension of any street or alley as aforesaid, the said jury shall estimate the value of such building or the injury done thereto, and present a statement thereof in their report, which amount, after confirmation by the court, shall be paid out of the City Treasury."

The court, however, at the trial, charged the jury that "she will not receive any injury or sustain any damage by the opening of Filbert Street, which the City of Lancaster is liable to pay. It is only liable to pay for buildings taken or injured by the opening of streets in said city.

Her house not being taken or injured by the opening of this street, your verdict should be for the defendant." This instruction was assigned for error.

Opinion by GREEN, J. October 3, 1887.

As we understand the facts of this case the Worth house must be taken down in order to open Filbert Street. It is testified that the plaintiff's house will have no gable when the Worth house is taken down. If such is the case the plaintiff's house will certainly be injured by the removal of the Worth house, and as the removal is a necessary part of the opening of Filbert Street, we cannot avoid the conclusion that the opening of the street is, or will be, the direct cause of injury to the plaintiff's house. This being so the case comes within the operation of section 8, Article 16, of the Constitution of 1874, and should have been submitted to the jury with proper instructions.

Judgment reversed and a new venire awarded.

(24)

THE 16th AMENDMENT-SENATOR INGALLS

IN "THE FORUM."

At the last session of Congress the proposed amendment to the Constitution of the United States, declaring that the right of suffrage shall not be denied or abridged on account of sex, was lost in the Senate, by a vote, including pairs, of 23 to 41. Mr. Plumb, of Kansas, said that if he had been present he would have voted yea, and two or three other Senators who were absent are understood to be in favor of it. The measure has for a number of years past, been gaining in public favor, and will undoubtedly before long pass both Houses.

In deciding as to the propriety or necessity of such action on the part of Congress, members are not called upon to pass upon the merits of the question further than to determine whether it is such an amendment as ought to be submitted for State action.

It is claimed by the advocates of the Sixteenth Amendment that inasmuch as our government is founded upon the theory that its citizens should participate generally in its management, which participation cannot be effectual without the suffrage, women, being citizens, have therefore, or should have the right of suffrage, subject to the same regulations as are made in regard to the other sex.

It is claimed further that self-protection and the protection of their property and family interests, and of the interests of their children, require that women should exercise the right

of suffrage. They point to the statutes, so unjust to them, which until a late day have been in force all over the Union and which still exist in some States, as evidence of the propriety and necessity of their being directly represented in the State legislatures.

They claim that suffrage would have an important effect upon wages and upon many other things connected with the industrial pursuits of women, and the fact that women are now freely employed in nearly every department of business, is looked upon as a result of the agitation which has been carried on for the last forty years. It is claimed that the beneficial results already attained, sufficiently justify the rightfulness of the agitation which led to such results.

Justice demands that taxation and representation should go together, and inasmuch as women are largely property holders, and are obliged to pay taxes, it is insisted that they should have a voice in the election of those who assess the property and levy the taxes, and of those who say how the taxes shall be expended.

It is claimed that the ballot is an educator, and that women are entitled to the benefit of that education as well as the other sex. That they have too long been kept in ignorance of their rights and duties as citizens, and should now be accorded all the benefits which would result from full political freedom. That history has shown the capacity of women to govern -witness the glorious reigns of Elizabeth and of Maria Theresa, and the long and successful reign of Victoria. That if women can govern great nations, they can be trusted to govern themselves in a republic.

That the extension of the suffrage is not, upon the whole, an evil; that experience has shown the contrary. That while they as a class, keenly felt the degradation of having the suffrage extended to the negroes while it was withheld from them, yet they are willing to acknowledge the uno jectionable manner in which, upor the whole, the colored people have exercised the right which was accorded them. That even in regard to other classes of citizens, more objectionable, who already had the suffrage, since they were in the country, it is

believed that their influence upon the State as voters, is less deleterious than it would have been had they been deprived of the suffrage.

That suffrage without distinction of sex, would be a benefit to the State, inasmuch as it would bring to the administration of public affairs, the male and female element combined. That if the combination of those elements is essential in the management of a family, it is equally so in the State, which is but a family on a more extended scale.

That the women are in ordinary matters as intelligent as the men, which is universally conceded, and therefore are, or soon could become as capable of making an intelligent use of the ballot. That there would be no reason to fear that they would not make a proper use of the suffrage. Their votes would be on the side of law and order, on the side of morality, temperance, purity and justice.

The objections most frequently urged are:

That feminine delicacy and morality would be endangered by thus breaking down such an important barrier between the sexes. That to bring them together at the polls and caucuses, and in the various departments of political life, would have a corrupting effect and undermine the safeguards of female virtue.

To this it is replied that such has not in the past been the effect of bringing the sexes together. That both in the matter of education and in the various industrial pursuits expeperience has shown that upon the whole, the safeguards of virtue, instead of being weakened are strengthened by the independence and self-protecting knowledge which are thus acquired.

That politics are debasing; that the polls are not a fit place for woman, &c.

This objection is akin to the other, and in reply it is said, if the polls are not fit piaces they can easily be made so, or others established. It is denied that there is any thing in political life which is necessarily degrading or that there is any necessity for continuing practices which have given it that character.

That it would interfere with home duties. The reply is,