E. JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF CLAIMS.
1. When a petition filed in the Court of Claims alleges that a depredation
was committed by an Indian or Indians belonging to a tribe in
amity with the United States, it becomes the duty of that court to
inquire as to the truth of that allegation, and its truth is not deter-
mined by the mere existence of a treaty between the United States
and the tribe, or by the fact that such treaty has never been formally
abrogated by a declaration of war on the part of either, but the
inquiry is whether, as a matter of fact, the tribe was at the time, as a
tribe, in a state of actual peace with the United States: and if it
appears that the depredation was committed by a single individual,
or a few individuals without the consent and against the knowledge
of the tribe, the court may proceed to investigate the amount of the
loss, and render judgment therefor; but if, on the other hand, the
tribe, as a tribe, was engaged in actual hostilities with the United
States, the judgment of the Court of Claims must be that the allega-
tion of the petition is not sustained, and that the claim is not one
within its province to adjudicate. Marks v. United States, 297.
2. Johnson v. United States, 160 U. S. 546, affirmed to the point that, by
clause 2 of section 1 of the act of March 3, 1891, c. 538, 26 Stat. 851,
the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims was limited to claims which,
en March 3, 1885, had either been examined and allowed by the
Department of the Interior, or were then pending therein for exam-
ination. Ib.
See CLAIMS AGAINST THE UNITED STATES.
The court bases its conclusion in this case upon the fact that the record
exhibits such gross laches on the part of complainant, or those with
whom he is in privity, and upon whose rights his own must depend,
as to effectually debar him from a right to the relief which he seeks.
Gildersleeve v. New Mexico Mining Co., 573.
LIMITATION, STATUTES OF.
See BANKRUPTCY, 1.
1. In Alabama a judgment in itself imposes no lien upon the property of
the judgment debtor, but the issue of an execution and its delivery to
the officer are necessary to create a lien. Beebe v. United States, 104.
2. According to the settled rule in Alabama,
when an execution comes to
the hands of the sheriff the lien attaches and continues from term to
term, provided alias and pluries writs are duly issued and delivered,
and while it is so kept alive the lien is, upon levy and sale, paramount
to any intermediate conveyance by the debtor; and as, in this case,
the facts show that valid executions were issued and delivered to the
marshal as early as January 23, 1877, and on return alias executions
were duly issued and duly levied, the subsequent sale related back to
the original issue, and took the legal title out of the plaintiff in error
prior to his deed of March 22, 1877. Ib.
3. When it appears by a memorandum on judgment records that "by
consent execution is stayed until" a date named, and execution issues
before that date, it will be presumed, nothing appearing to the con-
trary, that it was rightly issued, and that either the agreement lacked
consideration, or was not authorized, or had been by mutual assent
annulled, or that the terms of the agreement had not been complied
with by defendant. lb.
4. Arndt v. Griggs, 134 U. S. 316, affirmed to the point that the duty of
determining unsettled questions respecting title to real estate is local
in its nature, to be discharged in such mode as may be provided by
the State in which the land is situated, when such mode does not
conflict with some special prohibition of the Constitution, or is not
against natural justice. Lynch v. Murphy, 247.
5. Upon proceedings under the statute of Texas of March 20, 1848, c. 145,
for the escheat of land of a person who is dead, in which the petition
describes the land, gives his name, and alleges that he died intestate
and without heirs, that no letters of administration upon his estate
had been granted, that there is no tenant or person in actual or con-
structive possession of the land, nor any person, known to the peti-
tioner, claiming an estate therein, and that the land has escheated to
the State of Texas; and an order of notice to all persons interested in
the estate has been published, as required by the statute; and, after a
hearing of all who appear and plead, judgment is entered, describing
the land, and declaring that it has escheated to the State; the judg-
ment is conclusive evidence of the State's title in the land, not only
against any tenants or claimants having had actual notice by scire
facias, or having appeared and pleaded, but also against all other per-
sons interested in the estate and having had constructive notice by
publication. Hamilton v. Brown, 256.
6. The constitution of Texas of 1869, art. 4, sect. 20, declaring it to be the
duty of the comptroller of public accounts to "take charge of all
escheated property," did not affect pending proceedings for escheat
under the statute of March 20, 1848, c. 145, so far as concerned the
vesting of the title to the land in the State, even if it should be held
to repeal the provisions for a subsequent sale of the land by the
sheriff. lb.
7. The constitution of Texas of 1869, art. 10, sect. 6, forbidding the legis
lature to grant lands except to actual settlers, did not affect judicial
proceedings to declare and enforce escheats. Ib.
Claims of deputy marshals against a marshal for services stand upon the
same footing as those of an ordinary employé against his employer.
Douglas v. Wallace, 346.
MASTER AND SERVANT.
See RAILROAD, 1, 2, 3, 4.
MEXICAN GRANT.
See PUBLIC LAND, 2, 3.
1. The defendant in error, a municipal county of Illinois, under authority
from the State, issued its bonds in payment of a subscription to stock
in a railway company, made upon a condition which was never com-
plied with, and which was subsequently waived by the county. It
received certificates for the stock so subscribed for, and still holds
them. It paid interest upon its bonds as maturing, and refunded
them by an issue of new bonds for like amount under legislative
authority. Held, that the bonds originally issued were binding and
subsisting obligations of the county, and having been recognized as
such by the county authorities by lifting them with new bonds under
the refunding act, those funding bonds were valid and binding obli-
gations upon the county in the hands of a bona fide holder for value
before maturity. Graves v. Saline County, 359.
2. Where there is a total want of power to subscribe for such stock and to
issue bonds in payment, a municipality cannot estop itself from rais-
ing such a defence by admissions, or by issuing securities negotiable
in form, nor even by receiving and enjoying the proceeds of such
bonds. Ib.
3. Where a municipality is empowered to subscribe with or without con-
ditions as it may think fit, and where the conditions are such as it
chooses to impose, there seems to be no good reason why it may not
be competent for such municipality to waive such self-imposed condi-
tions, provided, of course, such waiver is by the municipality acting
as the principal, and not by mere agents or official persons. Ib.
4. The recital in a series of bonds, issued by a municipal corporation in
Indiana in payment of its subscription to the stock of a railroad com-
pany, that they were issued "in pursuance of an act of the legislature
of the State of Indiana and ordinances of the city council of said city,
passed in pursuance thereof," do not put a purchaser upon inquiry as
to the terms of the ordinances under which the bonds were issued.
Evansville v. Dennett, 434.
5. The recital in such series that the bonds were issued to the railroad com-
pany, "by virtue of a resolution of said city council passed May 23,
1870," do not put a purchaser upon inquiry as to the terms of that
resolution and charge him with knowledge of its terms. lb.
6. Such recitals in such bonds as against a bona fide purchaser for value of
such bonds estop the municipal corporation from asserting that the
bonds were not issued, for stock subscribed, upon a petition of two
thirds of the resident freeholders of the city, distinctly setting forth
the company in which stock was to be taken, and the number and
amount of shares to be subscribed. Ib.
7. Under the recitals in the bonds issued to the railroad company a bona
fide purchaser for value was not put upon inquiry to ascertain
whether a proper petition of two thirds of the residents of Evans-
ville, freeholders of that city, had been presented to the common coun-
cil, before that body had subscribed for stock in the said railroad
company. Ib.
8. A bona fide purchaser for value of the bonds issued to the Evansville,
Carmi, and Paducah Railroad Company is not charged by the recitals
in said bonds with notice that they were issued in pursuance of an
invalid act, and in pursuance of an election under it; and he had a
right to assume, from the recital, that the prerequisites of both the
valid act and the invalid act had been observed by the common coun-
cil before the issuance of such bonds. Ib.
MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT.
See DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA.
1. After passing into the hands of a receiver, appointed by the Comp-
troller of the Currency, under the provisions of the Revised Statutes,
a national bank remains liable, during the remainder of the term, for
accrued and accruing rent under a lease of the premises occupied by
it, although the receiver may have abandoned and surrendered them;
but if the lessor, in the exercise of a power conferred by the lease,
reënters and relets the premises, the liability of the bank after the
reletting is limited to the rent then accrued and unpaid, and the
diminution, if any, in the rent for the remainder of the term, after
the reletting. Chemical National Bank v. Hartford Deposit Co., 1.
2. Section 130 of chapter 689 of the laws of New York of 1892, providing
for the payment by the receiver of an insolvent bank, in the first
place, of deposits in the bank by savings banks, when applied to
an insolvent national bank, is in conflict with § 5236 of the Revised
Statutes of the United States, directing the Comptroller of the
Currency to make ratable dividends of the money paid over to him
by such receiver, on all claims proved to his satisfaction, or adjudicated
in a court of competent jurisdiction, and is therefore void when at-
tempted to be applied to a national bank. Davis v. Elmira Savings
Bank, 275.
1. The United States have no right to use a patented invention without
license of the patentee or making compensation to him. Belknap v.
Schild, 10.
2. Officers or agents of the United States, although acting under order of
the United States, are personally liable to be sued for their own in-
fringement of a patent. Ib.
3. A patentee has no title in things made by others in violation of his
patent. Ib.
4. In a suit in equity for infringement of a patent, the defendants are
liable to account for such profits only as have accrued to themselves
from the use of the invention. Ib.
5. In a suit in equity for infringement of a patent, if no ground is shown
for equitable relief, by injunction, by account of profits, or other-
wise, the plaintiff should be left to his action at law for damages. lb.
6. Upon a suit in equity by the patentee of an improvement in caisson
gates against officers of the United States, using in their official
capacity a caisson gate made and used by the United States, in
infringement of his patent, at a dry dock in a navy yard, the plaintiff
is not entitled to an injunction. Nor can he recover profits, if the
only profit proved is a saving to the United States in the cost of the
gate. Ib.
POLICE POWER.
See RAILROAD, 14, 15.
1. It was the duty of the Postmaster General to cause all cheques or war-
rants issued under the authority of the act of March 3, 1883, c. 119, 22
Stat. 487, and of the act of August 4, 1886, c. 903, § 8, 24 Stat. 256, 307,
308, to be sent directly to the claimants, and it was his right to call their
attention to the provisions of the act of 1883; and if the legislation to
which attention was thus incited worked injury to an attorney em-
ployed by such claimants to present their claims, in that it gave his
clients an opportunity to evade, for a time, the payment of what they
may have agreed to allow him, it was an injury from which no cause
of action could arise. Spalding v. Vilas, 483.
2. The Postmaster General was directly in the line of duty when, in order
|