mendation for the payment of a certain sum upon that claim, but for
the payment of which Congress has made no appropriation, support
an action by the attorney against the principal for part of a less sum
recovered upon that claim from the United States in the Court of
Claims under the subsequent act of March 3, 1891, c. 358, out of which
the attorney has been allowed and paid less than twenty per cent of
that sum, as provided by that act. Ib.
3. The party who, under the provisions of § 4 of the act of March 3, 1891,
c. 538, 26 Stat. 853, elects to reopen before the Court of Claims a case
under that act heard and determined by the Commissioner of Indian
Affairs, thereby reopens the whole case, irrespective of the decision by
the Commissioner, and assumes the burden of proof. Leighton v.
United States, 291.
4. The jurisdiction conferred upon the Court of Claims by the first
jurisdictional clause in the first section of that act is confined to
property taken by Indian tribes in amity with the United States;
and as it appears in this case that the Indians who committed the
injury to the claimant were at the time engaged in hostilities against
the United States, the Court of Claims was without jurisdiction to
render a judgment against the United States, even though the hos-
tilities were carried on for the special purpose of resisting the opening
of a military road. Ib.
5. The same result is reached practically if the claim is regarded as
within the jurisdiction of that court under the second jurisdictional
clause of the first section of that act. lb.
6. There is nothing in the legislation prior to the act of 1891 which binds
the government to the payment of this claim. Ib.
7. In an action brought by a Circuit Court commissioner for the district
of Louisiana to recover fees for alleged services rendered the United
States in prosecutions under Rev. Stat. § 1986, the Court of Claims
found that the prosecutions were the result of a purpose on the part of
party managers to purge, as they alleged, the register of illegal voters;
that the commissioner made no inquiry or examination of witnesses
to satisfy himself of probable cause, but simply issued warrants on
the affidavits filed; that the warrants issued were not signed by himself
but by a number of clerks who used a stamp, which was a fac-simile of
his signature, until the stamp was broken, and then simply wrote his
name; that in the issuance of warrants the commissioner exercised no
discretion, and made no personal examination of the complaints or
witnesses, but issued a warrant in all cases in which a complaint was
made; that the warrants were issued generally for the purpose of
affecting the register of votes to be used in the election, and not to
arrest and punish offenders; that in a large majority of the 1303 cases
in which the defendants were discharged it did not appear that the
commissioner performed any service in investigating the offences
charged, nor in judicially determining the guilt or innocence of the
parties. Held, that these findings justified the further finding of that
court that "from said facts the court finds the ultimate fact to be that
the claimant's testator did not perform the services for the United
States in good faith for the purpose of enforcing the criminal law,"
and the judgment entered thereon in favor of the United States.
Southworth v. United States, 639.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.
A. OF THE UNITED STATES.
1. The constitutional right of a defendant to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation against him entitles him to insist, at the outset,
by demurrer or by motion to quash, and, after verdict, by motion in
arrest of judgment, that the indictment shall apprise him of the crime
charged with such reasonable certainty that he can make his defence
and protect himself after judgment against another prosecution for
the same offence; and this right is not infringed by the omission from
the indictment of indecent and obscene matter, alleged as not proper
to be spread upon the records of the court, provided the crime charged,
however general the language used, is yet so described as reasonably
to inform the accused of the nature of the charge sought to be estab-
lished against him; and, in such case, the accused may apply to the
court before the trial is entered upon for a bill of particulars, showing
what parts of the paper would be relied on by the prosecution as
being obscene, lewd and lascivious, which motion will be granted or
refused, as the court, in the exercise of a sound legal discretion, may
find necessary to the ends of justice. Rosen v. United States, 29.
2. The provision in the charter of the plaintiff in error that "said institu
tion shall have a lien on the stock for debts due it by the stockholders
before and in preference to other creditors, except the State for taxes,
and shall pay to the State an annual tax of one half of one per cent
on each share of capital stock, which shall be in lieu of all other
taxes," limits the amount of tax on each share of stock in the hands
of the shareholders, and any subsequent revenue law of the State
which imposes an additional tax on such shares in the hands of share-
holders impairs the obligation of the contract, and is void. Farring
ton v. Tennessee, 95 U. S. 679, affirmed to this point. Bank of Commerce
v. Tennessee, 134.
3. The decision of the Supreme Court of North Carolina, made in an
action to recover on bonds issued by the State in 1868, that the con-
stitution of 1868, (in force when the bonds were issued,) giving the
Supreme Court of the State jurisdiction to hear claims against the
State, but providing that its decision should be merely recommenda-
tory, to be reported to the legislature for its action, had been repealed
by an amendment to the constitution made in 1879 which forbade the
general assembly to assume or provide for the payment of debts
incurred by authority of the convention of 1868, or by the legislature
that year or in two sessions thereafter, unless ratified by the people
at an election held for that purpose, and that the court was without
jurisdiction to render judgment of recommendation on a claim against
the State whose validity was thus denied by the state constitution, did
not in any way impair the obligation of contracts entered into by the
State when the constitution of 1868 was in force. Baltzer v. North
Carolina, 240.
4. In an action against importers brought to recover from them the value
of merchandise, originally belonging to them, and alleged to have been
forfeited to the United States under the provisions of the Customs
Administrative Act of June 10, 1890, c. 407, § 9, the defendants can-
not demand, as of right, that they shall be confronted, at the trial, with
witnesses who testify in behalf of the government. United States v.
Zucker, 475.
5. The provision in the General Statutes of Connecticut, (Revision of 1888,
§ 2546,) that "no person shall at any time kill any woodcock, ruffled
grouse or quail for the purpose of conveying the same beyond the
limits of this State; or shall transport or have in possession, with
intent to procure the transportation beyond said limits, any of such
birds killed within this State," is legislation which it is within the
constitutional power of the legislature of a State to enact. Geer v.
Connecticut, 519.
6. There is an indisputable legal presumption that a state corporation,
when sued or suing in a Circuit Court of the United States, is com-
posed of citizens of the State which created it, and hence such a
corporation is itself deemed to come within that provision of the
Constitution of the United States which confers jurisdiction upon the
Federal courts in "controversies between citizens of different States."
St. Louis & San Francisco Railway Co. v. James, 545.
7. It is competent for a railroad corporation organized under the laws of
one State, when authorized so to do by the consent of the State which
created it, to accept authority from another State to extend its rail-
road into such State and to receive a grant of powers to own and con-
trol, by lease or purchase, railroads therein, and to subject itself to
such rules and regulations as may be prescribed by the second State;
and such legislation on the part of two or more States is not, in the
absence of inhibitory legislation by Congress, regarded as within the
constitutional prohibition of agreements or compacts between States.
8. Such corporations may be treated by each of the States whose legislative
grants they accept as domestic corporations. Ib.
9. The presumption that a corporation is composed of citizens of the
State which created it accompanies such corporation when it does
business in another State, and it may sue or be sued in the Federal
courts in such other State as a citizen of the State of its original cre-
ation. Ib.
10. That presumption of citizenship is one of law, not to be defeated by
allegation or evidence to the contrary. Ib.
11. The provision in the Arkansas statute of March 13, 1889, that a rail-
road corporation of another State which had leased or purchased a
railroad in Arkansas and filed with the Secretary of State of that
State, as provided by the act, a certified copy of its articles of incor-
poration, should become a corporation of Arkansas, does not avail to
create an Arkansas corporation out of a foreign corporation complying
with those provisions, in such a sense as to make it a citizen of Ar-
kansas within the meaning of the Federal Constitution, and subject
it to a suit in the Federal courts sitting in the State of Arkansas,
brought by a citizen of the State of its origin. lb.
12. The provision in the act of February 11, 1893, c. 83, 27 Stat. 443,
"that no person shall be excused from attending and testifying or
from producing books, papers, tariffs, contracts, agreements, and doc-
uments before the Interstate Commerce Commission, or in obedience
to the subpoena of the Commission, on the ground or for the reason
that the testimony or evidence, documentary or otherwise, required of
him may tend to criminate him or subject him to a penalty or for-
feiture; but no person shall be prosecuted or subjected to any penalty
or forfeiture for or on account of any transaction, matter or thing,
concerning which he may testify, or produce evidence, documentary
or otherwise, before said Commission or in obedience to its subpoena,
or the subpoena of either of them, or in any such case or proceeding,"
affords absolute immunity against future prosecutions, Federal or
state, for the offence to which the question relates, and deprives the
witness of his constitutional right to refuse to answer. Brown v.
Walker, 591.
See CORPORATION, 4, 5;
RAILROAD, 6, 14, 15.
1. A contract for the sale of goods "shipping or to be shipped during this
month from the Philippines to Philadelphia, per steamer Empress of
India," at a certain price "ex ship;" "sea-damages, if any, to be taken
at a fair allowance; no arrival, no sale;" and providing that if, by
any unforeseen accident, she is unable to load and no other steamer
can be procured within the month, the contract is to be void; does not
require the goods to be carried to their destination by the vessel named;
and is satisfied if the goods are put on board of her at the Philippines
at the time specified, and, upon her being so injured on the voyage by
perils of the sea as to be unable to carry them on, are forwarded by
her master by another steamer to Philadelphia. Harrison v. Fortlage,
2. After a critical examination of the record, the court, on the facts, finds
that the contract which forms the subject of controversy in this suit
is a valid contract, and directs judgment for the defendant in error for
the principal sum which it finds to be due him, but orders a correction
to be made in the calculation of interest by the court below. Spalding
v. Mason, 375.
3. Under a contract which, though its validity was disputed, is found to
have been valid, the defendant below had sundry transactions in
buying and selling grain with the plaintiffs below, between early in
August, 1888, and April 26, 1889, through which he had become
largely indebted to them. On or about the latter date the plaintiffs
asked of the defendant authority to transfer the May wheat to June
wheat, to which no answer was given. Nevertheless they sold the
May wheat at a loss and made purchases of June wheat on his account,
and informed him of both transactions. On June 8 all open contracts
were closed at a loss, and the defendant having refused payment, this
action was begun. There was no controversy as to the correctness of
any of the items except those relating to the June purchase. Held,
that the unauthorized voluntary act of the plaintiffs could not be said,
as matter of law, to have been ratified by defendant by his mere re-
tention, without complaint, of an account and statement rendered to
him "that said change had been made," or, in other words, that
plaintiffs had made a new purchase for his account. Hansen v. Boyd,
397.
1. The legal existence of a corporation is not cut short by its insolvency
and the consequent appointment of a receiver; and there is nothing
in the statutes relating to national banks which takes them out of the
operation of this general rule. Chemical National Bank v. Hartford
Deposit Co. 1.
2. A judicial sale and conveyance, made under order of court, of the
franchises of a corporation whose taxation is limited by the act of the
legislature of the State incorporating it to a rate therein named,
carries to the purchaser, (if anything,) only the franchise to be a
corporation; and a corporation organized to receive and receiving
conveyance of such franchises, is not the same corporation as the
original corporation, and is liable to taxation according to the con-
stitution and laws of the State in force at the time of the sale, or
which may be subsequently adopted or enacted, and is not entitled
to the limitation and exemption contained in the original act of
incorporation. Mercantile Bank v. Tennessee, 161.
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