be merely a love of happiness,) is criminal, I do not affirm On the contrary, I suppose it common to every intelligent and to every sensitive being in the universe. All, which! assert, is, that self love, acting in any way whatever, does not constitute virtue, or that moral state which is consequent to regeneration.

That virtue cannot be predicated of him, who acts merely with regard to his happiness or interest in the present life, will hardly be disputed. But if I am not truly virtuous, merely because I abstain from a course of behavior exter nally criminal, through fear of punishment tomorrow, next year, or twenty years hence; can I be virtuous because my anticipation embraces a larger space of time, and I abstain from such behavior through fear of punishment a hundred years hence, i. e. long after the soul shall be separated from the body?

Norwill the case be materially altered, if, instead of fear of punishment, I am actuated by hope of enjoyment. If a regard to one's own advantage in this life be not sufficient to constitute an action virtuous; neither would a similar regard to future advantage or happiness be sufficient for this purpose. If you are not ready to accede to this: but are of opinion, that the pursuit of our own advantage, to be enjoyed after death, is essentially different from the pur suit of present advantage, it will be important to consider, in what the difference consists. It must consist either in the greater forethought, implied in one case, than in the other; or else, in a superiority of taste.

As to the first; the moral quality of an action depends on the motive: but does not depend on the time, at which, that object, which constitutes the motive, is to be obtained. A man, let it be supposed, has two designs in his view; the success of one ensures advantage to himself at the close adof one year; the success of the other ensures greater vantage at the close of ten years. To concert and prose

cute the latter design may evince a different quality of in. tellect, from what is shown by concerting and prosecuting the former. It may discover more penetration and forethought. But as indications of moral qualities, they are precisely on a level. Though both are consistent with virtue, neither implies it. That forethought does not constitute an action virtuous, will be further evident from this consideration, that much of it is sometimes employed by the worst men in forming their worst designs. The purposes of ambitious men are never confined to the present year, they relate to the whole space of mortal life; and even to events beyond it. When Cæsar died, he had formed designs, which could scarcely be executed in the ordinary age of man. So had Charles XII. of Sweden. (Big. 3, v. 437.) The present emperor of France has been solicitous not for his own security and aggrandizement only, but for the splendor of his family after his decease.

But secondly, though it should be allowed, that the character of an action, the principal motive to which is one's own advantage, is not materially changed by the proximity or distance of that contemplated advantage, there may be supposed to exist an important difference between an action, to which we are influenced by the hope of temporal enjoyments, and by the hope of enjoyments beyond the grave, because these last are of a highly superior nature.

I acknowledge at once, that any person susceptible of happiness from those objects, which yield the bliss of heaven, possesses real virtue. That taste, which is implied in such susceptibility, is peculiar to the virtuous, or the renew ed. But wherever that taste exists, there is a love to virtue as such, and independently of its rewards. The strongest incentive to upright actions, in the case supposed, is not personal advantage, but inherent affection to moral rectitude. It does, by no means, follow however, that all persons, who are influenced by the hopes of future enjoyment,

that the difference between a renewed, and an unrenewed person, will generally, if not universally, be exceedingly small. There must be some where a dividing line. Ac cording to the supposition, we are investigating, there must be a certain number of degrees of good disposition, which the unrenewed person may possess, more than which he cannot possess, and yet retain his unrenewed character. The smallest increase of this number must change his standing, and place him among the regenerate. Designate if you please, the greatest quantum of good disposition, possible to a man remaining unregenerate, by the number of five hun dred. The moment, at which he comes into possession of one additional degree, he becomes of course a renewed man, entitled to all the privileges of such a character. Yet the change produced is extremely small. But the language, applied to regeneration by the sacred writers, is not suited to express a change, so inconsiderable. Were no greater alteration than this designed, would men be said to be born anew, to be born from above,-to pass from death unto life, to have old things done away, and all things become new,-to be raised from the dead,-from being the enemies of God, would they be said to become his friends; and would the power, by which such a change is effected, be compared to that which was wrought in Christ, when he was raised from the dead?

II. The scriptures seem very clearly to represent the difference between the saint and the sinner, as consisting in a new disposition, and not in higher degrees of disposition, previously existing. "Every one, that loveth is born of God." St. John does not say, that he, who loveth to such a degree, is born of God: nor is it easy to perceive the truth of his declaration, if many, who are not born of God, possess the quality here mentioned.

Our Lord said concerning the Jews, “I know you, that ye have not the love of God in you." It was the quality itself, you perceive, and not merely a high degree of it, of

which they were destitute. Had they possessed this love, however deficient in degree, I sce not how the declaration could be defended. At least, it will be allowed, that the language is precisely what it would be, were our doctrine true and such as it probably would not be, were the doctrine false. The same infallible teacher, on another occa sion, used an expression, still more forcible; "Ye have seen, and hated both me and my father." If Christ did not by these words deny, that those to whom they were spoken, possessed any degree of love for ther Creator and their Saviour, it is difficult to perceive how such a denial could be expressed.

But how, you may ask, can we argue from the character of the Jews to that of all unrenewed men? An assertion might be true in regard to the former; and yet not universally true, as it respects the latter. I answer, that there is no reason for supposing Jewish sinners to have been essentially different from others. But the matter appears to be placed above all doubt by other expressions of a more general import; and that which is here said of the Jews, is said to be common to mankind, "If the world hate you, ye know, that it hated me, before it hated you:-the world hath hated them because they are not of the world." It is not necessary to our present purpose, to understand by the term hatred, any thing more, than destitution of love; as our object is to prove merely, that unrenewed men are thus destitute.

III. If the difference between the righteous and the wicked consists only in the degrees of a quality, common to both, this difference is much less, than that which exists, between many, of the latter description. In their characters there is great variety. Some will be beaten with many stripes,our Lord has informed us, and some,with comparatively few. But their punishment will be exactly proportionate to their demerit. It must be true, therefore, that their char acters, or their demerits are various. This is undeniably

implied in the opinion, against which we contend. For if men, while unrenewed, have, strictly speaking, a holy or virtuous principle, which, if sufficiently increased, will con stitute them holy or virtuous, their characters vary, as this principle recedes, or advances. At one time, a sinner may have one degree of virtue; at another, five hundred: and different sinners may at the same time be thus different. But between the sinner and the saint, i. e. between the re newed and the unrenewed person, there may be according to this opinion, but the difference of a single degree. Now, the scriptures speak of a broad line of distinction between the righteous and the wicked; between those, who serve God, and those who serve him not. Happiness without end is prepared for the one; and punishment, equally dura ble is reserved for the other. Can it rationally be supposed, that of those, who are obnoxious to this punishment, certain individuals are five hundred degrees better than others, and but one degree worse, than some, who shall inherit eternal rewards?

Besides, if such price of language;—such bold figures have been employed to describe a change, so inconsiderable as regeneration must be according to this supposition, how has it happened, that so very little is said, and that, in a very depressed style, concerning the far greater change, produced in the sinners character previously to regenera. Lion?

IV. Whether it be common, or not, for believers to have assurance of their safety,such assurance is mentioned in scripture, as being attainable, and the want of it, as being a fault. "Give all diligence to the full assurance of hope to the end. Give all dilligence to make your calling and election sure. Know ye not your own selves? We know, that we have passed from death unto life, because we love the brethren." St. John often speaks of knowing ourselves to be in Christ. Now, such knowledge is perfectly unattainable unless there be some standard. by which our characters may be tried