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Madden v. The State.

error and that it would influence the jury to his injury, it was his duty to move to discharge the jury that he might have a jury free from such influence. His failure to do so was a waiver of the error if any there was. Coleman v. State, 111 Ind. 563; Henning v. State, 106 Ind. 386, and cases cited in each. See Townsend v. State, 147 Ind. 624.

The only other error complained of under the motion for a new trial is that the evidence is not sufficient. We have examined it and find the evidence as to appellant's guilt conflicting. But there was sufficient competent evidence adduced by the State from which the jury might reasonably and logically infer every essential fact necessary to constitute the appel lant's guilt of the crime of grand larceny, of which they found him guilty. It is true the evidence of his guilt was circumstantial, that is, it consisted in the fact that he was found in the exclusive possession of the recently stolen property, and he made no attempt to explain such possession. This was sufficient to warrant the inference of his guilt. Clackner v. State, 33 Ind. 412; Way v. State, 35 Ind. 409; Smathers v. State, 46 Ind. 447; Jones v. State, 49 Ind. 549; Bailey v. State, 52 Ind. 462, 21 Am. Rep. 182.

This court, on appeal, cannot correct any error of fact if any such has been committed by the jury in determining the weight of the evidence, nor can we reweigh it so as to settle conflicts therein. Deal v. State, 140 Ind. 354; Kleespies v. State, 106 Ind. 383; Hudson v. State, 107 Ind. 372; Skaggs v. State, 108 Ind. 53; State v. McKee, 109 Ind. 497.

The circuit court did not err in overruling the mo tion for a new trial.

Therefore, the judgment is affirmed.

HOWARD, J., took no part in the decision of this

cause.

Cincinnati, Indianapolis, St. Louis and Chicago R. W. Co. v. McLain.

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THE CINCINNATI, INDIANAPOLIS, ST. LOUIS AND CHICAGO
RAILWAY COMPANY v. MCLAIN.

[No. 17,191. Filed June 9, 1896. Rehearing denied June 9, 1897.]
PRACTICE. - Variance Between Allegations of Complaint and Proof.—
A plaintiff must recover according to the allegations of his com-
plaint, or not at all. He cannot recover on the evidence which
makes a case materially different from the case made by the plead-
ings. p. 193.
CARRIERS.-Injury to Passenger.-Contributory Negligence.—A pas-
senger on a railroad train, in the night time, desiring to get off at a
certain crossing where the train usually stopped, was informed by
the conductor that he could get off, and was directed by the con-
ductor to go upon the platform of the car when the train reached
a certain point, and be ready to get off when the train arrived at
the crossing. The passenger not only went upon the platform, but,
while the train was going twelve or fifteen miles an hour, and at a
point 1,600 feet from the crossing, went upon the lower step of the
car, and, by a sudden jerk of the train, was thrown from the car
and injured. Held, that the passenger was guilty of contributory
negligence which precluded recovery. pp. 193–195.

From the Marion Superior Court. Reversed.

B. K. Elliott, W. F. Elliott and J. T. Dye, for appellant.

Ayres & Jones and W. A. Ketcham, for appellee.

HOWARD, J.-This was an action for damages brought by the appellee for personal injuries, caused, as alleged, by the negligence of the appellant.

The accident occurred at a point on appellant's line of road a little east of where the same crosses the Indianapolis Belt Railroad, and while appellant's train was approaching the city from the east, between ten and eleven o'clock on the night of June 28, 1888.

Appellee was a passenger, and it appears that he

Cincinnati, Indianapolis, St. Louis and Chicago R. W. Co. v. McLain.

wished to leave the train at the crossing of the Belt road.

It is alleged in the complaint that as the train neared the city, the appellee "inquired of the conductor in charge of said train whether or not he could get off safely at the crossing of the Belt railroad near the city of Indianapolis, and whether the train upon which he was riding would stop at said crossing; that he was informed by said conductor that the train would stop and he could get off without any danger, if he so desired; that the conductor directed him as soon as they should come to freight cars standing on the side track, which he told the plaintiff would be the first freight cars that they would pass after the time the conductor and the plaintiff were talking, to go upon the platform and be ready to get off as soon as the train came to a stop; that when the train came to the freight cars, the plaintiff, pursuant to the direction of the conductor of said train, went out upon the platform, and, as the train slowed up, he walked down to the lower step to be ready to get off, as directed by the conductor, so soon as the train should stop; that the train came nearly to a stop, but without entirely stopping, it was negligently started up with a sudden and violent jerk to go forward again, and whereby the plaintiff was thrown under the cars and so that the car wheels passed over and cut off both of his legs, and so injured him that both of his legs had to be amputated above the said injury;" that by reason of said injury he has suffered and will always suffer, and has been incapacitated from work and labor, all to his damage in the sum of $10,000.00; "that the place where he was directed to get off of said cars by said conductor was not a safe and proper place for him to get off; that said injury occurred by reason of the negligence of the said railroad company, and without any

Cincinnati, Indianapolis, St. Louis and Chicago R.W. Co. v. McLain.

fault or negligence whatever on his part contributing thereto."

The cause was submitted to a jury who returned a verdict for appellee in the sum of $5,500.00, together with answers to interrogatories submitted by the appellant and by the appellee.

Numerous alleged errors are assigned and discussed by counsel; but the bill of exceptions does not appear to be in the record; and the only questions before us relate to the sufficiency of the complaint, and to the correctness of the court's action in overruling appellant's motion for judgment on answers to interrogatories, notwithstanding the verdict of the jury.

The answers to interrogatories show, that at the time of his injury, June 28, 1888, appellee was a passenger on appellant's train, from Valley Junction to Indianapolis; that shortly before the train reached the Belt road he informed the conductor that he desired to get off at the crossing, and asked if he could do so; that the conductor gave the required permission, and informed appellee that he could get off without danger; that shortly before arriving at the crossing the con ductor directed appellee that as soon as they reached certain freight cars standing beside the track he should get upon the platform and be ready to step off when the train should come to a stop; that the Belt road crossing was at the time a crossing of appellant's main line, the Belt road being a railroad over which passengers might be transported; that at and prior to the time of the accident the appellant was accustomed to stop its trains at the Belt and permit passengers to alight; that appellee knew that there was no passenger station or platform at or near the crossing, and knew that the Belt road was not advertised as a stopping place for the receiving or discharge of passengers, and that the stop there was a short one; that there was

Cincinnati, Indianapolis, St. Louis and Chicago R. W. Co. v. McLain.

then a signal keeper on duty at night, and it was the practice to slow up the train as it approached the crossing, and if a white signal was given by the keeper, showing a clear track, the train would pass on to the city without coming to a full stop; that the appellee was familiar with the movement of westbound trains at the Belt crossing, having gotten off there before; that his reason for desiring to get off at the crossing was that he wished to visit a relative living near there; that after the point was reached where the freight cars stood along the side track, the appellee got up and went out upon the platform and down to the lower step, prepared to alight when the train should come to a stop; that he stood upon the lower step, holding on to the railing and waiting for the train to stop so that he might alight; that as the train approached the Belt road it began to slow up, the steam being shut off and the air brakes applied, until it was going at a speed of about four miles an hour; that after the train had slowed up until it was running about twelve or fourteen miles an hour, and while appellee was standing on the lower step waiting to alight, the air brakes were suddenly loosed and the train started on without having come to a stop, whereby appellee was thrown from the steps and injured as alleged in the complaint; that the conductor did not notify the engineer to stop at the crossing, and the engineer did not know that the appellee was on the step or intending to get off; that the injury was not caused by the failure of the train to come to a stop at the crossing, having occurred further east than the point where the train usually stops; that the fact that the train did not come to a full stop at the usual stopping place, after slowing up, but started up again, had no effect as to the injuries of appellee; that the ap pellee, by direction of the conductor, went out volun

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