Ontario General Sessions.-Anonymous.

though bound to provide for his wife's family, is not liable for necessaries applied to the support of the children of his wife by a for. mer husband, on the ground that the gen eral obligation of parents and children to support each other extends only to natur il relatives. It is indeed true that he is liable for necessaries furnished to them by his wife's order, while they reside with him in his family-not, however, on the ground of any natural obligation to do so-but for the reason where he takes such children into his family, by so doing he renders himself liable for the contract made by the wife for their education. 4 T. R. 118, 4 East R. 82, Clancy's Rights of Married Women, 47.

scribed by the court for the support of such poor person, the overseers may maintain in an action as for money had and received, and shall recover the sum prescribed by the court for every week the order shall have been disobeyed, up to the time of such recovery. In those counties where all the poor are charged upon the county, the Superintendents of the poor are vested with the same power, rights and authority, as is above given to the overseers of the poor of any town, and are entitled to the same remedies and actions, and are required to perform the like duties. The distinction between town and county poor has been abolished in the county of Yates. There is no child except the defendant, resident in Our statute is similar to that of 43 Eliz. this county, who is able to contribute any Ch. 2, § 7, and such has been the constructhing toward the support of this poor person, tion of that statute. In the case of Rex v. or any other relative residing here who is Munden, 1 Strange R. 190, an order had liable to contribute. There is a husband been made under the statute of Elizabeth, of one of her daughters residing in Yates which recited the fact that Munden, the soncounty, who is a man of wealth. The first in-law, had good fortune with his wife, and objection is based upon this fact: The her mother was poor, and directed him to fourth section of the statute makes provision provide for her; but the King's Bench that if it shall appear that any such relative quashed this order, on the sole ground that is unable wholly to maintain such poor per- the son-in-law was not bound, either within son, but is able to contribute towards such the intent or letter of the statute, to provide support, the court may in its discretion direct for her; that this statute extends only to two or more relatives of different degrees natural parents. The same doctrine was to maintain such poor person, and shall pre-also recognized in the subsequent case of scribe the proportion which each shall contribute. This section does not apply to a case like this, where the relative proceeded against the only one residing within the jurisdiction of the court. But if it did, we are satisfied we have no power to compel a son-in-law to contribute to the support of his wife's mother, even were he within our jurisdiction. For this statute extends only to natural relatives. The word children as therein used, extends only to natural children -it does not embrace the husband of a daughter. By the law of nature, a man is bound to take care of his father and mother, and parents their children; but as there was at common law no power to enforce obedience to this law of nature, it became necessary to provide for its enforcement by legislative enactment. As the object of such enactments is the enforcement of this natural law, the statute should not be construed as extending any farther than the law of nature went before; as that only reached natural relatives, the statute only extends to such relatives. It is upon this principle that it has been held that a husband, al

Tubbs v. Harrison, 4 T. R. 619. In the latter case, Lord Kenyon said that, although by the report of the case of Rex v Munden, it did not appear that the wife was still liv. ing; but that he had seen a copy of the order taken from the records of the court, from which it clearly appeared that the wife was alive when the order made. In our opinion this is a correct construction of the statute. Regarding this as a correct construction of our statute, it follows that the son-in-law is not bound, and cannot be compelled to contribute to the support of the respondent's mother.

We do not think that the superintendents should be turned over to the remedy of prosecuting the bond, which the respondent has taken for the support of his mother; such a decision would illy comport with the scope and design of this statute; the spirit of which is, to afford to the superintendent a summary remedy for the enforcement of the dictates of the law of nature, to the end that they may be relieved from the discharge of a duty which properly belongs to another, and to the prompt discharge of which, the

Ontario General Sessions.-Anonymous.

dictates of natural affection and filial grati- the manner in which it is to be paid, detude ought in all cases to be a sufficient in-signates the person by whom it shall be paid. ducive, without the intervention of this coer- An order must therefore be entered dicive power, provided for under the munici-recting the respondent to pay one dollar and pal constitutions of the State.

The only remaining question is, whether it is necessary that the superintendents should have made an order, or directed the manner in which the respondent should contribute to such support, before application to this

court.

tion.

term, present a bill of the same, and have them taxed by the court, giving the respondent two days notice of taxation, and whence taxed; the order for relief may also include directions that the respondent pay the same within thirty days after service of a copy of said order. As this application was made at the last term of this court, the order must be entered nunc pro tunc as of the first day of that term.

WAGER.

The following singlar case lately came

fifty cents per week to the superintendents of the poor of the county of Yates, which must be paid on the first day of every month until the further order of this court. He must also pay to the said superintendents the costs and expenses of this application. As those costs and expenses under the stat This petition states that the superintend-ute are to be ascertained by the court, the onts have made application to the respond- superintendents must, on some day in this ent to contribute to the support of his mother; and that he refused to pay any thing for that purpose, or to afford her any relief. This refusal is also substantiated by the proof. Under such circumstances, we should not require more than this, unless such order is absolutely necessary to give us jurisdicWe do not think that such is the import of the statute. It imposes the duty which the law of nature had before ordained, and that, too, without any application to the child to relieve and maintain a poor parent, in such manner as should be approved by the overseers of the poor. It evidently contemplates no action on the superintendent's before the Queen's Bench: part except that of approval. The act of The plaintiff declared in assumpsit, upon approval is one which would more properly a wager with defendant, to the effect that if be brought into exercise when some provi- defendant, who was about to submit to the sion had been made, or offered to be made, usual examination for admission as an aton the part of the respondent. But upon torney, did not pass such examination, the the failure of any such relative to relieve plaintiff should provide eight bottles of wine, and maintain such poor person--or in other to be consumed by the parties and their rewords, to yield obedience to the law of na-spective friends; whilst on the other hand, ture-it is made their duty to apply to the the defendant promised, that if he did pass court to compel such relief. The statute his examination he should provide eight does not seem to contemplate any previous bottles of wine, &c. The declaration went order or direction on the part of the super- on to aver, that the examination took place intendents, in relation to such order. The in Hil. Term, 1842, and that the defendant only jurisdictional facts which the statute had passed, but had neglected to provide contemplates are, the inability of the parent the eight bottles of wine, &c., which was to support herself; the ability of the child the breach complained of. To this declarato discharge this natural obligation satisfac- tion there was a demurrer, on the ground torily to the overseers, and the failures to that the contract as declared upon was illedo so. gal and contrary to publie policy; and it The proceedings are not in the nature of was contended in argument, that the wager appeal from any previous order or direction was analogous to those which relate to the of the superintendents; but it is an original event of proceedings in a court of law. The summary proceeding, to procure an original court, however, decided the point upon a order. that such relative maintain such poor totally different ground from that suggested person, in such manner as this court shall in argument; namely, that one of the pardirect; without any reference whatever to ties had the event in his own hands, which any previous order or direction by the super- rendered it impossible to maintain an action intendents. The order made by this court on the contract. On this short ground, is the one which fixes the amount, defines judgment was given for the defendant.

Rules of Practice U. S. Courts in Admiralty, &c.

RULES OF PRACTICE

OF THE COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES IN CAUSES OF ADMIRALTY AND MARITIME JURISDICTION ON THE INSTANCE SIDE OF THE COURT-IN PURSUANCE OF THE ACT OF 23rd August, 1842, CHAP. 188.

I.

No mesne process shall issue from the District Court in any civil cause of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, until the libel or libel of information shall be filed in the clerk's office, from which such process is to issue. All process shall be served by the marshall or by his deputy, or where he or they are interested, by some discreet and disinterested person appointed by the court.

II.

In suits in personam, the mesne process may be by a simple warrant of arrest of the person of the defendant in the nature of a capias, or by a warrant of arrest of the person of the defendant with a clause therein, that if he cannot be found, to attach his goods and chattels to the amount sued for, or if such property cannot be found to attach his credits and effects to the amount sued for in the hands of the garnishees named therein; or by a simple monition in the nature of a summons to appear and answer to the suit, as the libellant shall, in his libel or information, pray for, or elect.

III.

In all suits in personam, where simple warrant of arrest issues and is executed, the marshal may take bail with sufficient sureties from the party arrested by bond or stipu lation, upon condition that he will appear in the suit and abide by all orders of the court, interlocutory or final, in the cause, and pay the money awarded by the final decree rendered there in the court, to which the process is returnable or in any appellate court. And upon such bond or stipulation summary process of execution may and shall be issued against the principal and sureties by the court to which such process is returnable to enforce the final decree so rendered, or upon appeal, by the appellate court.

IV.

In all suits in personam where goods and chattels or credits and effects are attached under such warrant authorizing the same, the attachment may be dissolved by order of the court to which the same warrant is returnable, upon the defendant, whose property Is so attached, giving a bond or stipulation with sufficient sureties to abide by all orders, interlocutory or final, of the court, and pay the amount awarded by the final decree rendered in the court to which the process is returnable, or in any appellate court; and upon such bond or stipulation, summary process of execution shall and may be issued against the principal and sureties by the court to which such warrant is returnable to enforce the final decree so rendered, or upon appeal by the appellate court.

V.

Bonds or stipulations in admiralty suits may be given and taken in open court, or at chambers, or before any commissioner of the court who is authorized by the court to take affidavits of bail, and depositions in cases pending before the court.

Rules of Practice U. S. Courts in Admiralty, &c.

VI.

In all suits in personam, where bail is taken, the court may, upon motion for due cause shown, reduce the amount of the sum contained in the bond or stipulation therefor; and in all cases where a bond or stipulation is taken as bail, or upon dissolving an attachment of property as aforesaid, if either of the sureties shall become insolvent pending the suit, new sureties may be required by the order of the court to be given, upon motion and due proof thereof.

VII.

In suits in personam, no warrant of arrest, either of the person or property of the defendant shall issue for a sum exceeding five hundred dollars, unless by the special order of the court upon affidavit or other proper proof showing the propriety thereof.

VIII.

In all suits in rem against a ship, her tackle, sails, apparel, furniture, boats or other appurtenances, if such tackle, sails, apparel, furniture, boats or other appurtenances are in the possession or custody of any third person, the court may, after a due monition to such third person, and a hearing of the cause, if any, why the same should not be delivered over, award and decree that the same be delivered into the custody of the marshal or other proper officer, if upon the hearing the same is required by law and justice.

IX.

In all cases of seizure and in other suits and proceedings in rem, the process, unless otherwise provided for by statute, shall be by a warrant of arrest of the ship, goods or other thing to be arrested, and the marshal shall thereupon arrest and take the ship, goods or other thing into his possession for safe custody; and shall cause public notice thereof and of the time assigned for the return of such process and the hearing of the cause to be given in such newspaper within the district as the district court shall order, and if there is no newspaper published therein, then in such other public places in the district as the court shall direct.

X.

In all cases where any goods or other things are arrested, if the same are perishable, or are liable to deterioration, decay or injury by being detained in custody pending the suit, the court may, upon the application of either party, in its discretion order the same, or so much thereof to be sold, as shall be perishable or liable to depreciation, decay or injury, and the proceeds or so much thereof as shall be a full security to satisfy in decree to be brought into court, to abide the event of the suit; or the court may, upon the application of the claimant, order a delivery thereof to him upon a due appraisement to be had, under its direction, either upon the claimants depositing in court so much money as the court shall order, or upon his giving a stipulation with the sureties in such sum as the court shall direct to abide by and pay the money awarded by the final decree rendered by the court or the appellate court, if any appeal intervenes, as the one or the other course shall be ordered by the court.

XI.

In like manner where any ship shall be arrested, the same may, upon the application of the clain ant, be delivered to him upon a due appraisement to be had under the direction of the court, upon the claimant's depositing in court so much money as the court shall order, or upon his giving a stipulation with sureties as aforesaid; and if the claimant shall decline any such application, then the court may in its discretion, upon the application of either party, upon due cause shown, order a sale of such ship, and the proceeds thereof to be brought into court, or otherwise disposed of as it may deem most for the benefit of all concerned.

Rules of Practice U. S. Courts in Admiralty, &c.

XII.

In all suits by material men for supplies or repairs, or other necessaries for a foreign ship or for a ship in a foreign port, the libellant may proceed against the ship and freight in rem, or against the master or the owner alone in personam. And the like proceeding in rem, shall apply to cases of domestic ships, where by the local law a lien is given to material men for supplies, repairs or other necessarries.

XIII.

In all suits for mariners' wages, the libellant may proceed against the ship, freight and master, or against the ship and freight, or against the owner or master alone in personam.

XIV.

In all suits for pilotage, the libellant may proceed against the ship and master, or against the ship, or against the owner alone, or the master alone, in personam.

XV.

In all suits for damage by collision the libellant may proceed against the ship and master, or against the ship alone or against the master or owner alone, in personam.

XVI.

In all suits for an assault or beating on the high seas or elsewhere within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, the suit shall be in personam only.

XVII.

In all suits against the ship or freight founded upon a mere maritime hypothecation, either expressed or implied, of the master for moneys taken up in a foreign port for supplies or repairs, or other necessaries for the voyage, without any claim of marine interest, the libellant may proceed either in rem or against the master or the owner alone in personam.

XVIII.

In all suits in bottomry bonds, properly so called, the suit shall be in rem only against the property hypothecated, or the proceeds of the property in whomsoever hands the same may be found, unless the master had without authority given the bottomary bond, or by his fraud or misconduct had avoided the same, or has substracted the property, or unless the owner has by his own misconduct or wrong lost or substracted the property, in which latter cases the suit may be in personam against the wrong-doer.

XIX.

In all suits for salvage, the suit may be in rem against the property saved or the proceeds thereof, or in personam against the party at whose request and for whose benefit the salvage service has been performed.

XX.

In ali petitiory or possessory suits between part owners or adverse proprietors, or by the owners of a ship or the majority thereof against the master of a ship for the ascertainment of the title and delivery of the possession, or for the possession only, or by one or more part owners against the other to obtain security for the return of the ship from any voyage undertaken without their consent, or by one or more part owners against the others to obtain possession of the ship for any voyage upon giving security for the safe return thereof, the process shall be by an arrest of the ship and by a monition to the adverse party or parties to appear and make answer to the suit.