spirits of their people for continuing the war, generally represent the state of their own affairs in a better light, and that of the enemy in a worse than is consistent with the truth; hence the populace on each side, expect better terms than really can be obtained, and are apt to ascribe their disappointment to treachery. Thus the peace of Utrecht, and that of Aix la Chapelle, were said in England to have been influenced by French gold, and in France by English guineas. Even the last peace, the most advantageous and glorious for England that ever she made, was, you may remember, violently decried, and the makers as violently abused. So that the blessings promised to peace-makers, I fancy, relates to the next world, for in this, they seem to have a greater chance of being cursed; and as another that in the multitude of counsellors there is safety, which, I think, may mean safety to the counsellors, as well as to the counselled; because if they commit a fault in counselling, the blame does not fall on one or a few, but is divided among many, and the share of each is so much the lighter, or perhaps because when a number of honest men are concerned, the suspicion of their being biassed is weaker, as being more inviolable; or because defendit numerus; for all these reasons, but especially for the support your established character of integrity would afford me, against the attacks of my enemies, if this treaty takes place, and I am to act in it, I wish for your presence, and for the presence of as many of the commissioners as possible; and I hope you will reconsider and change your resolution. In the mean time, as you have had opportunities of conversing with the new ministers, and other leading people in England, and of learning their sentiments relating to the terms of peace, &c. I request you would inform me by letters, of what you think important. Letters from you will come safer by the court courier than by the post; and I desire you would, if you should continue determined not to act, communicate to me your ideas of the terms to be insisted on, and the points to be attended to respecting commerce, fisheries, boundaries, and every other material circumstance,

to all or any of the United States. Lord Shelburne having written to me on the subject of the wished for peace, I acquainted him in my answer sent by our friend Mr. Oswald, that you were one of the commissioners appointed by congress to treat with Britain, and that I imagined his lordship would therefore think proper to discharge you entirely from the obligations you entered into, when you were admitted to bail, that you might be at liberty to act freely in the commission. He wrote to me in reply, that you were accordingly discharged immediately. His lordship mentioned nothing of any exchange being expected for you: nevertheless, I honor your sensibility on the point, and your concern for the credit of America, that she should not be outdone in generosity by Britain, and will cheerfully join with you in any act that you may think proper, to discharge in return the parole of lord Cornwallis, as far as in our power may lie; but as we have no express authority for that purpose, and the congress may possibly in the mean. time have made some other arrangement relative to his exchange, I conceive that our act should contain a clause, reserving to congress the final approbation or disallowance of the proceeding. And I have some doubts whether lord Cornwallis will think himself well freed from his engagement, and at liberty to exercise his military employments, by virtue of any concession in his favor, made by persons who are not vested with authority for that purpose. So that on the whole, perhaps the best and surest way will be our writing immediately to congress, and strongly recommending the measure. However, I will do what you shall think best.

I heartily wish you success in any endeavors you may use in Holland for raising a loan of money. We have pressed rather too hard on this court, and we shall want more than they can conveniently spare us; but I am sorry that too scrupulous a regard to our wants and difficulties should induce you, under the present infirmity of your lower limbs, to deny yourself the necessary comfort of an easy carriage, rather than make use of the public assis

tance, when the public must be much in your debt. I beg you would get over that difficulty, and take of me what you may have occasion for.

The letter forwarded to me, was from America's constant friend, the good bishop of St. Asaph. He speaks of you, in terms of the highest esteem and respect.

Mr. Oswald is gone back again to London, but intended to return immediately. Mr. Grenville remains here, and has received powers to treat; but no farther steps can be taken, till Spain and Holland have empowered ministers for the same purpose. I shall inform you and Mr. Adams (if he does not come) of the proceedings from time to time, and request your counsels in case of any difficulty. I hope you will not think of hazarding a return to America before a peace, if we find any hope of its being soon obtained, and that if you do not find you can be useful in the manner you wish in Holland, you will make me happy by your company and counsels here.

With great and sincere esteem, &c.

B. FRANKLIN."

May 26, I received the following letters, &c. from Mr. Hartley.

MY DEAR FRIEND,

London, May 1, 1782.

I HAVE received a packet from you, containing several letters of various dates. As I shall probably have a safe conveyance to you when Mr. Laurens leaves this country; I am now sitting down to write to you an omnium kind of a letter of various matters as they occur. The late ministry being defeated, I may now speak of things past more freely. I will take a sentence in onę of your letters as my text; vide yours of April 13th, 1782, in which you say, "you was of opinion, that the late ministry desired sincerely a reconciliation with America, and with that view a separate peace with us was proposed." I must qualify this sentence much before I can adopt it as my opinion. As to reconciliation, I never gave them much credit for that wish:

"It is a sweet expression, it certainly means more than peace." The utmost that I ever gave the late ministry credit for, was a wish for peace; and I still believe that the wisest amongst them, grew from day to day more disposed to peace, (or an abatement of the late war) in proportion, as they became more alarmed for their own situations and their responsibility. Had the war been more successful, I should not have expected much relating towards peace or reconciliation; that this has been always the measure of my opinion of them, I refer you to some words in a letter from me to you, dated January 5th, 1780, for proof: "But for the point of sincerity; why as to that, I have not much to say. I have at last expected some hold upon their prudence. My argument runs thus: It is a bargain for your ministers to be sincere now. Common pru

dence may hint to you to look to yourselves; it has amazed me beyond measure, that this principle of common, selfish prudence, has not had the effect which I expected." I have not been disposed to be deceived by any conciliatory professions, which I considered only as arising from prudence, and I hope that I have not led you into any deception, having so fully explained myself to you on that head. Had the American war been more propitious on the part of the late ministry, I do not believe the late resignation would have taken place; but it is evident from the proposition to the court of France, which you have communicated to me (and which I have communicated to the present ministry, with your letter) that even to the last hour, some of the late ministry were still set upon the American war to the last extremity, and probably another more prudent part of the ministry would proceed no farther; which if it be so, may reasonably be expected as the cause of the dissolution of the late ministry. These are the arguments which I have already driven and insisted upon with the greatest expectation of success, viz: prudential arguments, from the total unpracticability of the war, responsibility, &c. I have been astonished beyond measure, that the arguments have not had their effect sooner. If I could give you an

idea of many conferences which I have had upon the subject, I should tell you that many times Felix has trembled. When reduced to the terror of responsibility, either to renounce the American war or to relinquish their places: they have chosen the latter, which is a most wretched and contemptible retribution, either to their country or to mankind for the desolation in which they have involved every nation that they have ever been connected with. Peace they would not leave behind them, their legacy to their country and to mankind has been, "let darkness be the burier of the dead!"

As to the proposal of a separate peace arising from a desire of reconciliation, it certainly was so on the part of the people of England; but on the part of the late ministry, it probably arose from the hopes of suggesting to France ideas of some infidelity on the part of America towards them. If you should asked me why I have seemed to conspire with this, my answer is very plain. In the first place, if I could have prevailed with the late ministry to have actually made an irrevocable offer on their own part of a separate peace to America, that very offer would in the same instant have become on their part also, a consent to a general peace, because they never had any wish to a separate contest with France; and America being out of the question, they would have thought of nothing after that but a general peace. But I never could bring them even to this. They wished that America should make the offer of a separate treaty, (for obvious views) my proposal was, that they should offer irrevocable terms of a peace to America. If they had really meant what they pretended, and what the people of England did really desire, they would have adopted that proposition; then the question would have come forward upon the fair and honorable construction of a treaty between France and America: the essential and direct end of which was fully accomplished. When I speak of Great Britain offering irrevocable terms of peace to America, I mean such terms as would effectually have satisfied the provision of the treaty, viz. tacit independence. I send you a paper